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Márton Sulyok:1
Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– Reflective Remarks on National Constitutional Courts 
Protecting Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights2
1 .  Nation, Community, Minority, Identity: Escaping Prisons of Circumstance 
Together? 
The authors of a closing paper of any research project usually have their work cut out 
for them. This task is all the more complicated with research projects that have taken 
more years to complete. While this is an introductory paper for the present volume, it 
also serves the purpose of an ‘epilogue’ for our two-year research, that was many times 
obstructed, diverted and prolonged by the COVID-19 pandemic. I now have undertaken 
the task of summarizing whether all the research that has been conducted by my distin-
guished Hungarian, Serbian and Serbian-Hungarian colleagues as part of our research 
team has reached its intended goals. 
The project originally rested on two interconnected approaches that could be best de-
scribed by the following headings: 
(i) Minority identity and rights – Protecting nationalities as constitutional values
(ii) National and constitutional identity – Protecting achievements of the legal order
In the following, I shall stand on these two legs when introducing the results of the second 
phase of our effort and summarize our overall results, with references to previous find-
ings. Last year, in the prologue for the previous book3 publishing the results of the first 
milestone of our research project I referred to an “age of constitutional identity” brining 
identitarian inquiries in the foreground of legal academic discourse and political activism. 
1  Márton Sulyok, dr. jur., PhD Senior Lecturer in Constitutional Law and Human Rights, Institute of Public 
Law, University of Szeged Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Head of Public Law Center at Mathias Cor-
vinus Collegium Foundation (Budapest).
2  Support for a research project by this name was awarded by the Ministry of Justice of Hungary for a period 
of two years, to realize the goals and objectives described herein. Members of the research group formed under 
a cooperation between the Faculty of Law and Business Lazar Vrkatic of the UNION University in Novi Sad 
and the Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of the University of Szeged are: Prof. Dr. László Trócsányi, Prof. 
Dr. Tamás Korhecz, Dr. Petar Teofilovic, Dr. Attila Varga, Dr. Anikó Szalai, Dr. Márton Sulyok, Dr. Katinka 
Beretka, Dr. Noémi Nagy, Dr. Zsuzsa Szakály and Dr. Norbert Tribl. The research has been carried out and 
financed as part of the programs of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level of legal education.
3  See: Márton Sulyok: Nation, Community, Minority, Identity – The Role of National Constitutional Courts 
in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights as Constitutional Values. In: Petar Teofilovic 
(ed.): Nation, Community, Minority, Identity: The Protective Role of Constitutional Courts. Innovariant, Sze-
ged, 2020, p. 6. Available online: https://www.researchgate.net/project/NATION-COMMUNITY-MINORI-
TY-IDENTITY-THE-PROTECTIVE-ROLE-OF-CONSTITUTIONAL-COURTS 
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Since then, a major win for minorities in European politics has been the recent (17 De-
cember 2020) adoption by the European Parliament of a resolution4 supporting the Euro-
pean Citizens Initiative famously called Minority SafePack with 524 votes cast in favor. 
The resolution marks an important milestone in the 7-years-long struggle for EU-level 
support to national and linguistic minorities. Normally, at this point it is on the European 
Commission to provide a proposal for EU legislation on the matters of establishing an 
agency dedicated to dealing with linguistic diversity, supporting media services behind 
linguistic minorities and cultural actors operating in regional or minority languages – 
among others. The answer came not long after the beginning of the new year, when in 
their response, the European Commission halted the initiative by stating that no legisla-
tive proposal will be put forward to the EU legislator because “[w]hile no further legal 
acts are proposed, the full implementation of legislation and policies already in place 
provides a powerful arsenal to support the Initiative’s goals.”5
Besides this “lopsided” win6 for those in favor of “access to identity”, the COVID-19 
pandemic has also shown us in many ways that an inward-looking, identity-focused dis-
course might just sometimes provide the necessary boost in many contexts to strengthen 
our stamina in facing the consequences of the “new normal”, of the way we are forced 
to live in the prison of our current circumstances. Just as the concept of “constitutional 
identity” is oftentimes found to be locked up in its own prison of circumstances due to an 
increasing reliance on the concept by national constitutional courts in the context of Eu-
ropean integration and its undeserved association with populist or Euro-pessimist over-
tones, the realization of many minority rights and identities also have their own prisons 
of circumstance on their respective national levels. 
In this book, building on the findings of the first phase of the research, Tamás Korhecz 
and Petar Teofilovic present a detailed review of Serbian, Croatian and Slovenian con-
stitutional case law. Korhecz examines whether Serbian court has thus far failed in es-
tablishing the fair balance between the competing (concurring?) constitutional values 
(principles) of a unitary nation state and constitutional minority rights. Teofilovic looks at 
whether the interpretation of affirmative action regulations by the Slovenian and Croatian 
constitutional court serves as one of the many possible proper means to introduce balance 
into the constitutional regulation of majority and minority rights. 
A well-rounded comparative approach – as originally intended – is prima facie apparent 
from these two papers, which resonate well with each other in terms of the absence or 
presence of positive legal or interpretive means to introduce a fair balance into the protec-
tion of minority rights. All this also corresponds to many of the questions initially raised 
as part the introduction of our research project, such as: 
4  See: European Parliament resolution of 17 December 2020 on the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘Minority 
SafePack – one million signatures for diversity in Europe.’ Available online: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/TA-9-2020-0370_EN.html 
5  See: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_21_81 
6  Cf. Balázs Tárnok: Widening the gap between the EU and its citizens – On the European Commission’s 
decision rejecting the Minority SafePack Initiative. Constitutional Discourse. 10 March 2021. https://www.
constitutionaldiscourse.com/post/balazs-tarnok-widening-the-gap-between-the-eu-and-its-citizens 
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 - What is the relative importance of minority rights in establishing the fair balance 
between these competing fundamental rights? 
 - Can constitutional courts be considered as activist in their approach of minority 
rights in any of the countries examined? 
 - If there is activism, is it affirmative in terms of minority rights or does it go 
against them? 
 - What does protecting constitutional values mean in upholding protections for 
fundamental minority rights?
 - What can the different systems learn from each other – is there any ‘cross-ferti-
lization’?7
Korhecz identifies a significant problem regarding the Serbian practice already in the title 
of his analysis wherein he refers to the fact that minority rights in Serbian constitution-
al case law seem to be reflected as ‘constitutional rights without protected substance’,8 
thereby referring to an apparent discrepancy between the letter of the law and the relevant 
practice and alluding to the necessity of the simultaneous inquiry into law in books as 
well as into law in action (famously attributed to Roscoe Pound9). 
Korhecz then looks at the protections offered to minority rights under the light of exam-
ining the Constitutional Court of Serbia (CCS) as a counter-majoritarian check protecting 
the rights of national minorities as a form of constitutional tolerance, or toleration, which 
he mentions in reference to Sadurski.10 Not to dwindle for too long on the disputed se-
mantic and semiotic distinction between the two terms but there seems to be a thin but 
noteworthy line separating the two in our context. This issue was already approached by 
Murphy in 1997, who stated that 
“[t]he tendency to use tolerance and toleration as roughly interchang-
able terms has encouraged misunderstanding of the liberal legacy and 
impeded efforts to improve upon it. We can improve our understanding 
by defining “toleration” as a set of social or political practices and 
“tolerance” as a set of attitudes”.11 
Some definitions – while failing to address its difference from ‘tolerance’ – approach 
‘toleration’ in a negative fashion, arguing that it equals 
“the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions 
or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such 
that they should not be prohibited or constrained.”12
7  Sulyok 2020, pp. 33-34. 
8  Tamás korhecz: Constitutional Rights without Protected Substance: Critical Analysis of the Jurisprudence 
of the Constitutional Courts of Serbia in Protecting Rights of National Minorities. In Present Volume, pp. 21-46.
9  Roscoe Pound: Law in Books and Law in Action. In: American Law Review, 1910/44, pp. 12-36. 
10  korhecz 2021, p. 25.
11  Andrew R. MurPhy: Tolerance, Toleration, and the Liberal Tradition. In: Polity. 1997/4, p. 593.
12  Cf. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/ 
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I would certainly argue that the protection of minority rights should not be considered 
“wrong but still tolerable” in a modern democracy, the emphasis should much rather 
be on their conditional acceptance as it is reflected in many statutory regulations in the 
examined countries, some of which are specifically mentioned in his examination of the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) legal systems contextualizing the Serbian case study 
he presents. 
As part of this, Korhecz structures the problems of the Serbian regime around overregu-
lation and inconsistency juxtaposed with the formally very extensive and generous provi-
sions on minority rights, with special focus on the constitution, wherein references to the 
spirit of (interethnic) tolerance, intercultural dialogue and affirmative action also appear. 
The criticism of the legal framework based on the constitution laid out by Korhecz is 
structured around its unambiguity due to well-intentioned ‘overregulation’, leading up to 
an important question regarding the extent to which the constitutional text can limit the 
legislator in defining the scope of minority rights.
The inquiry at this point turns toward the role of the CCS in providing guidance through 
interpretation, shaped by a culture of deference and restraint argued based on findings 
from Serbian authors. This restraint is illustrated by the number of cases dealing (even 
if tangentially) with minority rights issues during the 30 years of practice of the CCS 
(1990-2019) examined. This number is 45, which seems quite low in contrast to what is 
written regarding the complexity and importance of relevant constitutional and sectoral 
regulation and to the latest publicly available statistical numbers (from 2013), according 
to which the CCS has an annual 24.791 cases in front of it.13
Regarding the success of initiatives, Korhecz points to a form of bias towards subjects of 
minority rights deduced from – among others:
(i) the CCS’s attitudes toward the petitioning (minority vs. state) entities, and
(ii)  their preferred unwillingness to declare unconstitutionality of a challenged reg-
ulation for violations of minority rights (depending on the nature of the above 
entity)
Turning to actual jurisprudence, Korhecz picks up the examination with an eye on cases 
focusing on the constitutionality of Serbian laws regarding minority rights and on impor-
tant issues of methodology (stating the imbalance between the grammatical interpretation 
or legalism preferred over theoretical interpretation or doctrinarism or a larger reliance 
on ECtHR case law as a form of comparative reasoning in individual complaints then in 
petitions for constitutional review.) From a methodical and methodological approach to 
13  Cf. 2016 Serbian Report on the Current State of the Judiciary, by the Anti-Corruption Council of the Ser-
bian Government, p. 18. Available online: http://www.antikorupcija-savet.gov.rs/Storage/Global/Documents/iz-
vestaji/REPORT%20ON%20THE%20CURRENT%20STATE%20IN%20THE%20JUDICIARY.pdf. Minority 
rights issues, possibly due to their delicate nature, seem to share this fate (of low occurrence) in other countries’ 
constitutional court practices as well. Noémi Nagy has already made this argument in her paper on Hungary 
regarding the findings of the first phase of this project, and she also relies on this in her contribution to this book. 
Cf. Noémi nagy: Pacing around hot porridge: Judicial restraint by the Constitutional Court of Hungary in the 
protection of national minorities. In Present Volume, p. 51.
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cases lying before the CCS follows a verdict on the consistency of such practice, which 
will turn out less flattering in light of the empirical research carried out. 
The eventual presentation of what he calls “cornerstone cases”, Korhecz sheds light 
on the CCS’s attitudes capriciously shifting between restraint and activism when faced 
with important issues on minority rights. He arrives at the conclusion that the consensus 
reached by authors on the Serbian ‘law in books’ coincides with an empirical analysis of 
Serbian law in action and this points to the existence of a ‘dysfunctional marriage’ be-
tween the positive and the negative legislator, i.e. they coexist without proper communi-
cation on the issues of importance examined and despite many considerable efforts taken 
by the CCS in its “cornerstone decisions”, a ‘culture of prevention’ dominates the CCS’s 
relationship with the National Assembly to the detriment of lasting outcomes in favor of 
the constitutional values represented by minority rights. 
In his paper,14 still in this context, Petar Teofilovic also focuses on issues of constitutional 
interpretation undertaken by constitutional courts in the domain of ‘positive discrimina-
tion’, otherwise more widely known as “affirmative (or positive15) action”16 in Slovenia 
and Croatia (between 1990 and 2020, effectively until 2016, based on available data). 
The preferential treatment of minority groups, e.g. through the introduction of quota sys-
tems is a widely applied tool to foster equal opportunities, but are not necessarily subject 
to non-derogation in a goal-oriented approach, as argued by Teofilovic. Constitutional 
courts’ responsibility in these terms lies, according to him, in their argumentation regard-
ing any challenged affirmative action. 
After a broad-ranging enumeration of the different minority rights provided for by Slo-
venia and Croatia17 and their individual and collective nature, Teofilovic carries out the 
comparison of the two countries’ constitutional jurisprudence in illustrative detail, focus-
ing on three main areas: 
(i) representation and holding public office, 
(ii) use of minority language, 
(iii)  education (also extending to minority language) and other “special” rights (re-
garding constitutional remedies for minorities). 
14  Cf. Petar Teofilović: The Interpretation of Positive Discrimination in The Practice of Constitutional 
Courts of Slovenia and Croatia. In Present Volume, pp. 114-135.
15  See e.g. Section 11 of Act CXXV of 2003 on equal treatment (Hungary). It is available in English at the 
website of Hungarian Equal Treatment Authority: https://www.egyenlobanasmod.hu/sites/default/files/content/
torveny/J2003T0125P_20190415_FIN%20%281%29.pdf 
16  First introduced in the United States, the expression stood for a remedy introduced by the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act against those violating the Act, i.e. for actions affirming that no discrimination takes place. (See: 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, e.g. Section 706 (g) (1). Available: https://www.eeoc.gov/statutes/title-
vii-civil-rights-act-1964 Since then, it is more widely used for any preferential action or positive steps taken to 
provide certain minorities with advantages.
17  This chapter also provides the necessary background information of the national legal frameworks exam-
ined by Anikó Szalai from the point of view of the CoE mechanisms in this domain. Anikó Szalai: Mapping 
the implementation of minority protection in Central European countries by the Council of Europe. In Present 
Volume, pp. 70-90.
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Teofilovic connects the categories of special rights and positive measures in his compar-
ison of the two countries’ relevant practices focusing on the methodological segment of 
the courts’ understanding of affirmative action. 
Ad (i) most importantly, the „model of reserved seats” is mentioned and the ensuing 
controversies decided by the two constitutional courts are analyzed – among others – in 
light of equal suffrage. To resolve the disputes, as it will be presented, the Croatian Con-
stitutional Court (CCC) looked to the fundamental values of the constitution to declare 
the unconstitutionality of the challenged electoral measures with the exception of positive 
measures taken to ensure the effective participation of smaller minorities against larger 
ones. While this decision took place in 2011, the Slovenian court examined the same issue 
already in 1998 (however, with regard to the members of autochthonous communities 
enjoying a special status in the country: the Italians and the Hungarians). 
Ad (ii) the collision of territorial and constitutional norms is brought to the foreground 
in the context of official documents and direct democracy and their afterlife, with due 
regard to the absence or respect of the duty of balancing undertaken by the respective 
courts. In other instances, consumer protection and fair trial arose in a linguistic context 
where constitutional review was directed at examining pressing social needs, necessity in 
a democratic society and the possible arbitrariness of any challenged affirmative action.
Ad (iii) “access to identity” issues are discussed in relation to education and fair trial (in 
terms of access to constitutional remedies enforcing minority rights) that are – as expect-
ed – heavily influenced with local specificities such as the special status of autochthonous 
communities in Slovenia or the unique interpretation of the concept of “those entitled” 
to file constitutional complaints in Croatia, excluding organizations unaffected by the 
alleged violation but acting to remedy them on behalf of victims (as a possible form of 
affirmative action in the earlier discussed original (American) sense of the word as a 
remedy against discrimination). 
A comparative summation of these different paths leads Teofilovic to distinguish between 
the two models of affirmative action: one (that I now call the active priority model applied 
by Slovenia), consciously and actively prioritizing affirmative action to support the spe-
cial status groups of the two autochthonous communities, and a second (that I now call 
restrictive conditionality applied by Croatia) viewing minority rights in concurrence with 
the needs to the majority, imposing conditions for their applicability, and also applying a 
restrictive approach in any interpretive task aimed at their active development. 
Katinka Beretka joins this line of research with her detailed analysis18 of linguistic rights 
of what she calls “new minority groups”, through the presentation of the linguistic rights 
of the Serbian minority group in Croatia. Linguistic rights are traditionally attached to the 
use of one’s native (in this case minority) language when participating in public affairs. 
In those countries where this might exacerbate the peaceful coexistence of majority and 
minority populations due to its role in people’s “access to identity”, courts will step in to 
18  Katinka BereTka: Practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia in Field of National 
Minority Rights, with Special Regard to the Linguistic Rights of the Serbian Community in Croatia. In Present 
Volume, pp. 91-112.
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decide the resulting legal disputes. The prison of circumstance in which Beretka analyzes 
these issues is constituted by the break-up of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugosla-
via and the ensuing changes in the “ethnic-linguistic-religious structure of the respective 
[successor states’] population.”19 
Since this is a given, a categorization is introduced by distinguishing old and new minor-
ities also in terms of the success of their efforts to secure their rights in correlation with 
the duration of their political and legal struggle to reinforce the enjoyment of their rights. 
Soon after, Beretka moves on to a line of argument looking at the features and the content 
of constitutional and sectorial regulation of minority rights in Croatia, analyzing issues 
regarding the hierarchy of legal norms, based on some core determinations made by the 
CCC. 
In the case law examined by Beretka issues of cultural autonomy, language use, propor-
tional representation in general, minority representation in local and regional bodies are 
most often touched upon. Regardless of the motivation behind the petitions bringing these 
issues in front of the CCC (also dissected as part of the research), the role of the court is 
assessed in a functional approach (focusing on an analysis of its powers and competenc-
es, with a special focus on constitutional complaints) and the consistency of the relevant 
practice is evaluated through ten key cases (decided between 2005 and 2019) regarding 
e.g. proportional representation, cultural autonomy, language rights in general, including 
the bilingual use of identity documents. 
Continuing along the lines of mapping out constitutional courts’ relevant practices, the 
research carried out by Noémi Nagy20 analyzes the causes and the effects of judicial 
self-restraint in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) regarding these 
rights. The first “prison of circumstance” she identifies is the factual minority of relevant 
cases in the overall caseload of the HCC (1%)21, however, this also facilitates a clearer 
delineation of the topical focus of jurisprudence around questions regarding the concept 
of “constituent part of the state”22 (and who qualifies for such a classification). 
Based on this, another issue Nagy examines is “access to identity”, i.e. legal channels for 
minority self-identification, leading directly to the question of the scope and extent of mi-
nority rights, elaborated in this book. Starting out from various legal aspects of the major-
ity-minority counterbalance dilemma, the parliamentary representation of nationalities23 
(minorities) is addressed (specifically provided for by the Fundamental Law), the extent 
19  BereTka 2021, p. 94. 
20  nagy 2021, pp. 48-67.
21  For comparison, in this aspect, Beretka comes to the conclusion that from almost 100.000 cases decided by 
the CCC over the course of 30 years about 10 dealt with violations of minority rights and most of these were not 
constitutional complaints but requests for review of constitutionality (norm control). Cf. BereTka 2021, p. 102.
22  Alluding to nationalities, the renewed Hungarian terminology for minorities after the Fundamental Law.
23  For a brief review of different models of kin-state policies of Hungary’s neighboring countries and the 
relevant theories regarding the loyalty of nationalities and their parliamentary representation in Hungary, see: 
Ágnes M. BalázS: Kötődés és identitás. – A nemzetiségek országgyűlési képviselete, az identitás fogalma az 
anyaországhoz való viszony tükrében. [Belonging and identity – The parliamentary representation of minorities 
and the notion of identity in light of their relationship to the kin-state.]. In: Kisebbségkutatás, Minority Stud-
ies, 2018/1, pp. 7-27. Available online: http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00462/00078/pdf/EPA00462_kisebbsegkuta-
tas_2018_01.pdf 
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of which varies from symbolic recognition (like the long-lasting debate24 regarding Aus-
tralia’s indigenous minorities) to providing actual veto rights in legislative matters direct-
ly concerning national minorities (e.g. under Article 64 of the Slovenian constitution25). 
Nagy remains pessimistic regarding any early release from this prison of circumstance 
as she moves on to address the right to self-governance (with all its corollaries) and its 
pitfalls identified in HCC case law. A main take-away from her relevant analysis in this 
regard is that HCC case law seems to have failed to stick to a conceptual framework 
when it analyzed petitions regarding the issue of “consent” of minority self-governments 
and flailed between approaches of participation, empowerment, consent and consultation 
when trying to grasp the essence of self-governance rights in this context. 
Moving on to another “prison of circumstance”, language rights are addressed, with the 
many aspects that – according to Nagy – have gotten lost in translation (regarding name 
usage for localities and individuals, procedural language rights), based on review of the 
constitutional case law. She finishes her paper by introducing HCC Decision 3192/2016 
(X. 4) AB, where the HCC – while rejecting the petition – interpreted the right of minor-
ities to use their native language as a human right, with Justice Czine concurring, calling 
attention to the relevance of the issue in minority protection arguing that a substantive 
examination of the claims for violation of language use rights should have been carried 
out, but it was not warranted by the claims introduced by petitioners with regard to their 
rights. 
The last chance for the HCC to address the issue of language rights in administrative and 
civil proceedings presented itself via the 2020 HCC Decision No. 2/2021 (I.7.), based on 
(prima facie) judicial initiatives petitioning the ex post constitutional review of legislation 
relevant to language use in the Civil Procedure Code and in the General Administra-
tive Procedure Code. (In reality, as the HCC argued the judge initiating the proceedings 
“missed the mark”, because in reality the initiative petitioned for a declaration of leg-
islative omission, which was not possible under the circumstances, so the petition was 
denied.) 
Since this decision was adopted and published after closing the manuscript for this book, 
Nagy could not include it in her analysis, but if I were to apply her approach to charac-
terize it, it could easily be considered another missed opportunity, with Justice Czine this 
time in dissent. However, we should not forget that this time a constitutional requirement 
was also specified by the HCC, with the intent to orient future judicial practice on the 
issue of language rights. Reading point 1. of the operative part of the decision specifying 
this requirement (as follows), one might think that Justice Czine’s previous concurring 
opinion was heard loud and clear by the majority: 
“The Constitutional Court – acting ex officio – determines that in the 
course of applying para. (3) of Article 113 of the Act CXXX of 2016 
24  Summarized by: Murray gleeSon: Representation in keeping with the Constitution. A worthwhile project. 
Uphold & Recognise, 2019. (online) https://static1.squarespace.com/static/57e8c98bbebafba4113308f7/t/5d-
30695b337e720001822490/1563453788941/Recognition_folio+A5_Jul18.pdf 
25  Cf. https://www.us-rs.si/media/constitution.pdf 
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on Civil Procedure, it shall be considered a constitutional requirement 
arising from the fundamental right to use one’s native language under 
para (1), Article XXIX of the Fundamental Law that all parties required 
to be present in front of the court, and who are residents of Hungary 
and members of the nationalities recognized under the Nationalities Act, 
shall be entitled to the oral use of their nationality language under the 
same conditions.”26
We should bear in mind that the possibility to provide for constitutional requirements is 
a tactical weapon in the hands of the HCC (courtesy of the new Act on the Constitutional 
Court27), but applying it does not absolve the HCC from under the constitutional respon-
sibility to reinforce the protection of minorities in their jurisprudence. This decision can 
certainly be considered as a step toward more effective protections for minorities in ju-
dicial proceedings, but I am sure that future case-law along this path will provide fertile 
ground for continued research in this field as well. What we learn from Noémi Nagy’s 
elaborate analysis of the HCC’s minority rights jurisprudence is that there is always room 
to improve. Her detailed historical review of constitutional case-law from the 1990 transi-
tion sheds light on many omissions, myths, ideas, misnomers and misconceptions regard-
ing the missed opportunities in law-making and constitutional interpretation. 
Justice Czine’s dissent in the above-mentioned language-use case also makes reference 
to the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages and missed opportunities 
in this regard, which takes us directly to the next paper compiled and published as part 
of this second book on our research findings. In it, Anikó Szalai focuses on the Council 
of Europe (CoE) as the regional, external framework of protecting minority rights and 
directs her inquiry to Central and Eastern European countries. This system of protections 
is built on a dual foundation (two prisons of circumstance) comprising the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM, 1995) and the European 
Charter (ECRML, 1992). 
Szalai’s research outlines a contemporary map of implementation measures introduced in 
Serbia (2002-2019), Croatia (1998-2019), Slovenia (2000-2017), Romania (1999-2018), 
Slovakia (1998-2019) and Hungary (1999-2020) as evaluated in reports by the respective 
states and by the Advisory Committee (AC). During these approximately 20 years, all 
countries have relied on a “similar legal heritage” after Trianon, nonetheless with sig-
nificant differences in terms of minority protection, but within very common problems 
regarding the integration of the Roma community – argues Szalai.28 Two well-constructed 
geographic clusters are created for the assessment based on geopolitical considerations 
and proximity. 
In the first cluster (Serbia-Croatia-Slovenia), the following issues are apparent impedi-
ments for significant change: 
in Serbia, the AC points to lacking inter-ethnic tolerance in general (realized and fos-
tered through education) and citizenship status discrimination regarding the Roma that 
26  and without additional costs (as per point [135] of the justification of the HCC Decision quoted)
27  Cf. Article 46, para. (3), Act CLI of 2011. Available in English: https://hunconcourt.hu/act-on-the-cc
28  Szalai 2021, p. 70.
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remained unresolved during the 16 years that have passed between the first and the last 
AC opinion. 
in Croatia29, the AC’s most recent opinion (2015) points to lacking inter-ethnic tolerance 
and dialogue in general. It needs to be added that – among other international monitoring 
mechanisms – the 2020 cycle of UPR on Croatia refers to a National Roma Inclusion 
Strategy in education (2013-2020)30 intended to bridge these gaps, but no results are yet at 
our disposal to evaluate its success. Efforts towards the reduction of discrimination of the 
Roma have also been made, but problems of ethnic profiling and segregation in education 
still persist after four cycles of AC assessment. 
in Slovenia, the emphasis is on the differences between the realization of minority rights 
for the Italian and Hungarian communities versus the Roma communities. Despite all 
this, based on the AC assessments’ conclusions, Slovenia seems to be the outlier of the 
group, where inter-ethnic tolerance has been successfully reinforced through education 
and media. 
In the second cluster (Romania-Slovakia-Hungary) the obstacles that remain seem to be 
the following: 
(i)  in Romania, the existence of an actual and effective legislative framework is 
brought into question;31
(ii)  in Slovakia, effective access to education (combined with language use), health 
care, employment and investigation of alleged violations thereof in terms of the 
Roma minority (and their children) is identified (noting that access to education 
in one’s native language in constitutionally bound to national citizenship, which 
generally and persistently limits all minorities’ relevant rights.)
(iii)  in Hungary, an issue that will possibly have effects on the next monitoring cy-
cle regarding the thus far positively assessed rights protection is the impending 
merger of the Equal Treatment Authority with the Office of the Commissioner 
for Fundamental Rights (effective as of 1 January 2021) that was unknown to 
the AC at the time of the adoption of the latest report (26 May 2020). Besides 
this, discrimination against the Roma minority in terms of access to education 
(segregation), employment and health care is mentioned as a persisting obstacle.
29  Some aspects of Croatia’s accession to the EU are also mentioned by Beretka regarding the status and 




31  Cf. the website of the lower house of the Romanian parliament lists the debate of the latest 2005 draft on 
the status of national minorities as being in progress, with the last development listed to have happened in 2012. 
(http://www.cdep.ro/pls/proiecte/upl_pck.proiect?idp=6778) Some sources mistakenly identify this as a law in 
effect, but more evidence is found, also by international monitoring bodies that the law has not yet been adopted. 
Regardless, the most recent Romanian national report contains an admission in this respect, stating that in their 
view „there is no obligation under the Framework Convention to adopt such general legislation on the protec-
tion of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. The Consultative Committee did not evaluate in 
its previous reports on Romania that the lack of a general law on the status of national minorities hampers the 
promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities in Romania (especially those 
considered as numerous in the total population). The Government of Romania is also unaware of the existence 
of a general policy of the Advisory Committee to recommend to all States Parties the adoption of a general law 
in the field as a condition for the fulfillment of the obligations under the Framework Convention.” (Cf. Fifth Re-
port submitted by Romania pursuant to Article 25, paragraph 2f the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, ACFC/SR/V(2019)013, p. 11. Available: https://rm.coe.int/5th-sr-romania-en/16809943af)
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Now, rounding up the protection of minority communities and their rights at the national 
level as reflected in constitutional jurisprudence and in the assessment of the CoE, we 
shall again change course for a bit. As the geographic focus of the studies presented 
so far shifted from Hungary toward the neighboring countries, another shift in focus is 
necessary to include the entirety of the Western Balkans into our inquiry as per our orig-
inally defined research objectives. Some on the brink of establishing formal ties with the 
European Union, some being tangled in complicated relations with their neighbors, the 
countries of the Western Balkans also exist within their own prison of circumstance. 
As Tim Marshall, author of the New York Times bestselling geopolitics book “Prisoners 
of Geography”32 puts it, we are as nations and communities all prisoners of our geogra-
phy and the circumstances they brought about. Therefore, all decisions and policies flow 
from such a pre-determined environment and this has been the case, historically too, not 
just for the superpowers but for all the countries subject to our research as well. Marshall 
also uses Churchill’s infamous quote, which goes like this: “It is a riddle wrapped in a 
mystery inside an enigma; but perhaps there is a key.”33 Churchill made this comment in 
trying to explain to his fellows the actions of Russia, and the key he alluded to was focus 
on national interest. 
The key to successfully reconciling the notions of nation, community, minority and iden-
tity (as part of their respective constitutional arrangements and national interests) in all of 
the countries subject to our research remain “mystery-wrapped riddles inside an enigma” 
due to the very complicated historical and geopolitical entanglements they are bound 
together by. However, scientific inquiry can hopefully help untangle some of the ingredi-
ents of success and provide a key. 
The same goes for the Western Balkans, and in this book Zsuzsa Szakály examines the 
connected application of the notions of nation and identity in the constitutions of the 
countries of the Western Balkans (as understood geographically, not for the purposes of 
European Union enlargement and neighborhood policy). Szakály examines the constitu-
tions of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedo-
nia, Serbia and Slovenia (all former Member States of Yugoslavia) and their terminology 
describing their minority communities and their nation-concepts, as well as references to 
the sources of sovereignty and identity. 
Besides the different national interests that guided these nations in adopting their national 
constitutions on common historical roots, Szakály reflects on the “international factors”34 
that have influenced these processes, e.g. in terms of EU enlargement negotiations and 
the like. We shall first and foremost bear in mind that the reconstruction period after 
the South-Slavic Wars (Yugoslav Wars) saw the adoption of constitutions for the new-
ly emerging state entities causing large minority populations being amassed in each of 
the countries. What is this, if not a prison of circumstance? Remedying the effects of 
32  Cf. Tim MarShall: Prisoners of Geography – Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need To Know 
About World Politics. Elliott and Thompson, 2016. 
33  Cf. http://www.churchill-society-london.org.uk/RusnEnig.html 
34  Zsuzsa Szakály: Intertwined – The Notion of Nation and Identity in the Constitutions of the West Balkan. 
In Present Volume, p. 137.
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the long-lasting conflict, all constitution-makers in the region adopted a kin-state model 
and created constitutional frameworks which tried to protect minority rights and this is 
reflected, as Szakály argues, in the “caring attitude”35 of these constitutions towards mi-
nority communities. 
The adoption, imposition of a constitution to restore order in a community is undoubtedly 
a sovereign act of subjection of the united community to constitutional rule. The source 
of this sovereignty is usually traced back to the nation – as it can be familiar from many 
preambular constitutional texts – and this is why the concurrent presence of the notions of 
nation (either cultural or political), minority and identity need to be examined as Szakály 
comes to the conclusion between the lines. 
Szakály’s textual inquiry identifies many “nationalist” constitutions that provide refer-
ences to the nation, and many outliers who “avoid the question”, and along with it an 
actual choice between the political or cultural approach to “nationhood”. The same line 
of inquiry is then continued for minorities, describing the different terminological choic-
es and their backgrounds, taking us through short case studies of Serbian and Bosnian 
cases in front of the ECtHR, adjudicating on the experiences of the nationalities of these 
countries. 
Thus far, the notions of nation, community and minority have been linked with one an-
other and with the constitution. Adding identity to this mix, Szakály rightly cites Jacob-
sohn’s seminal work on constitutional identity, which argues that the identity to which 
constitutions point is gained through experience. In the countries of the region examined 
by Szakály, the experiences of the past by the different nations, minorities and commu-
nities make it very hard to single out one majority identity to protect, and minority com-
munities’ identities (and their protection) are always included in the constitutional text 
alongside national identity. 
If there is an “age of identities”,36 to which János Martonyi alludes in his latest book, then 
the Western Balkans is a region of identities. The same can be said nowadays about the 
European Union as well, which is – legally and politically speaking – way more than a 
region, but geographically (and in the language of European human rights protection), we 
are still regarding it as such. 
It is time to shift our focus accordingly, and address the most recent infatuation with the 
“identity debate” in Europe, which focuses on a very special approach to the notion of 
identity, “inherent in [Member States’] fundamental structures, political and constitu-
tional”37, also known by European constitutional scholarship (and previously referred to) 
as constitutional identity. The spread of this line of argumentation – considered by many 
as a veritable prison of circumstance obstructing the development of a viable future of 
35  Szakály 2021, p. 138.
36  See: János MarTonyi: Nyitás és identitás. [Opening and identity.]. Pólay Elemér Alapítvány, Szeged, 2018, 
pp. 22-23. 
37  Article 4(2), Treaty on the European Union. Available online: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12012M004  
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Europe – is mainly attributed to populist political pressures and trends, but the legal and 
constitutional dimension of this “specter” should not be neglected either. 
In the second phase of our research, this aspectwas further examined by Norbert Tribl 
based on his initial findings38 about the HCC’s identity decision, linking autonomies and 
national minorities to the concept of constitutional identity as part of a broader survey 
sent to European constitutional courts in 2018-2019. 
In our “age of identities” previously recalled, new political and legal impetus has been 
given to the “identity debate” by the May 5 2020 decision39 of the German Federal Con-
stitutional Court (GFCC) dubbed PSPP (after the public sector purchase program it con-
cerned). Albeit this decision squarely falls outside of the predetermined geographical 
focus of our research, it cannot be circumvented in this field for two reasons: 
(i)  Although it did not spend much time with fine-tuning the German-type ‘iden-
tity review’ of the challenged ultra vires EU legal act in the case at hand, it 
was heavily criticized40 for its identitarian tone ‘against’ the idea of integration, 
which it chose in light of its self-proclaimed constitutional responsibility for the 
European integration, the so-called ‘Integrationsverantwortung’.41 In this light, 
we can agree that responsible thinking about the future of EU integration in 
constitutional terms requires a careful consideration of all aspects of constitu-
tional identity on both the EU and the national levels and this also extends to the 
examination of scientific approaches and trends to this concept in countries that 
expect to soon join the integration. 
(ii)  As part of such approaches, the paper of Norbert Tribl focuses on the similari-
ties and the differences between the PSPP decision and the 2016 “identity-deci-
sion” of the Hungarian Constitutional Court, defining some of the elements of 
38  Published in our first book on this research, see: Norbert TriBl: Alkotmányból tükröződő önmeghatározás? 
Szemelvények a nemzeti alkotmánybíróságok formálódó joggyakorlatából. [Self-determination reflected in the 
Constitution? Excerpts from the evolving case law of national constitutional courts]. In: Petar Teofilovic (ed.): 
Nation, Community, Minority, Identity: The Protective Role of Constitutional Courts. Innovariant, Szeged, 
2020, pp. 83-112.
39  The decision merged several proceedings in front of the GFCC – 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 
2006/15, 2 BvR 1651/15.
40  On this decision being the prelude to a possible “Dexit”, cf.: Daniel groS: Voice or Exit? What other 
choice for Germany’s Constitutional Court. (2020) Available online: www.ceps.eu/voice-or-exit/. For a joint 
open letter of many European constitutionalists arguing that such a decision by a Member State constitutional 
court risks destabilizing the whole of the integration process. R. Daniel keleMen et alii: National Courts Cannot 
Override CJEU Judgments. (2020) Available online: https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-over-
ride-cjeu-judgments/ (and on a critical account of the previous reaction: Maciej krogel: Is the Theory Culpa-
ble? A Response to a Statement against Constitutional Pluralism. (2020) Available online: https://blogs.eui.eu/
constitutionalism-politics-working-group/theory-culpable-response-statement-constitutional-pluralism/. For a 
French commentary arguing that the decision shall have catastrophic ripple-effects for the Eurozone and the fu-
ture of Europe, while also satisfying Europeistes”, cf. François aSSelineau: La décision historique du Tribunal 
constitutionnel allemand du 5 mai 2020. [The historic 5 May 2020 decision of the German Constitutional Court] 
www.upr.fr/actualite/la-decision-historique-du-tribunal-constitutionnel-allemand-du-5-mai-2020/ 
41  It is a lesser-known fact in Europe that the German legislator has already codified this constitutional 
responsibility into law in 2009, at the time the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, relying on the protection of sub-
sidiarity and on the necessity of a two-thirds majority decision of German legislators for any modifications of 
the Treaty-basis of the EU under Article 23 GG. To find the law mentioned: Gesetz über die Wahrnehmung der 
Integrationsverantwortung des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union 
(Integrationsverantwortungsgesetz – IntVG). Available online: www.gesetze-im-internet.de 
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Hungarian constitutional identity in relation to the achievements of the histor-
ical constitution and the effects of these decisions on the development of iden-
tity-theories, working toward a hypothesis that national constitutional courts 
might indeed have respective “constitutional responsibilities” to protect (nation-
al) constitutional identity as part of the process of European integration.
In his research,42 Norbert Tribl focuses the inquiry into the PSPP decision to its similari-
ties with the “identity practice” developed in recent years by the Hungarian Constitution-
al Court (HCC). The judicial arena cannot be circumvented when it comes to defining the 
relationship of EU law and national constitutional law (more exactly the national consti-
tution). This is the price we pay, as Tribl rightly argues, for the lack of political consensus 
on the European level, and as a corollary the traditional functions of centralized, Kelse-
nian constitutional courts are complemented by an “integrational function” guided by a 
sense of responsibility for the integration, very similar to that elaborated by the GFCC in 
the above-mentioned PSPP decision. 
When tracing this change in function, Tribl goes back to 2010, starting with the intro-
duction of the first Hungarian “Lisbon judgment” by the HCC, wherein the notion of 
constitutional identity first appeared. Six years later some difficult dilemmas were to be 
dealt with in HCC Decision 22/2016 (XII.5), the so-called “identity decision”,43 which 
undertook the interpretation of the “integration clause” of the Fundamental Law of Hun-
gary inspired by previous German constitutional case law. Reliance by the HCC on Ger-
man constitutional jurisprudence has always been a given, many pattern- and pacesetting 
decisions on the GFCC have been taken into consideration regarding the development 
by the HCC of personal data protection or privacy jurisprudence, personality rights and 
self-determination, and this time, constitutional identity as well.44 
The next HCC decision Tribl examines is 2/2019 (III.5) and the choice was motivated 
for its different approach. It also focuses on the integration clause, but the focal point of 
the decision is not constitutional identity. It concentrates on the theoretical monopoly of 
the constitutional court to interpret the national constitution with an authoritative, erga 
omnes effect. The analysis also presents parallels with the German PSPP decision and the 
constitutional responsibility for the integration mentioned therein. 
42  TriBl 2021, pp. 158-174.
43  For this research project, the “identity decision” was already important for another reason as well, because 
at the outset, we could already rely on one of its most relevant conclusions, i.e. that the elements of constitutional 
identity are “identical with the constitutional values generally accepted today”, and among these the respect 
of autonomies under public law, equality of rights, and the protection of the nationalities living with us (i.e. 
minorities) have been mentioned. This actual link between minorities and constitutional identity reinforced 
our selection of the four interconnected keywords (nation, community, minority and identity) underlying our 
research project. Cf. Sulyok 2020, pp 5-36.
44  On the use of foreign law by the HCC, cf. Csaba erdős – fanni TanáCs-Mandák: Use of Foreign Law 
in the Practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court – With Special Regard to the Period between 2012 and 
2016. In: Giuseppe Franco ferrari (ed.): Judicial Cosmopolitanism. Brill. Nijhoff, 2019. p. 618., Zoltán szenTe: 
A nemzetközi és külföldi bíróságok ítéleteinek felhasználása a magyar Alkotmánybíróság gyakorlatában 1999-
2008 között. [Using international and foreign court judgments in the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court between 1999-2008]. In: Jog – Állam – Politika, Budapest, 2010/2.
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2 .  Escaping the ‘Prison of Circumstance’ Together? Impossible or Improbable – 
On Lessons Learned 
Having reviewed how our different authors have approached the keywords defining our 
specific research fields, the most difficult task still lays ahead: an assessment of our suc-
cess. 
Our original research objective was to conduct an in-depth analysis of Serbian, Croatian, 
Slovenian, Slovakian, Romanian and Hungarian constitutional frameworks (regulation 
and jurisprudence) regarding national and constitutional identity, extending to the pro-
tection and promotion of minority rights from 1990 to this date under the keywords of 
nation, community, minority and identity. 
All of the originally selected countries are former Socialist countries in Europe with var-
ying traditions and roots based in rule of law, that have developed with regional specifici-
ties even after the regime change. On top of regional specificities, many different national 
characteristics have influenced the development of constitutional frameworks and prac-
tices over time, testing the limits of their European “prison of circumstance”. Regarding 
further criteria for the selection of the countries subject to our research please refer to the 
introduction of the first book on our research findings.45 
Within this framework, over two years, our researchers spent time analyzing the different 
perceptions of these four key words within their respective fields and areas (internation-
al public law, constitutional law), and on their possible contexts appearing in national 
constitutional courts’ jurisprudence on minority rights and, where available, national and 
constitutional identity, with any possible links between the two spheres. 
Our researchers have, over the course of two years, examined frames of reference (and 
their consistency) regarding the keywords developed in national constitutional court case 
laws and identified shortcomings as well as signs and directions for possible future de-
velopment. Due attention was given to the fact that historical and regional prisons of 
circumstance might have bearing on the content and context of national, constitutional 
identity and its appearance in constitutional jurisprudence. Due to a comparative point of 
view, similarities and differences were identified on several accounts regarding certain 
principles and constitutional values. 
In many chapters of this book and the previous one we can find numerous examples of 
minority rights’ conflicting with other constitutional rights and the relative importance of 
minority rights as part of a balancing exercise was always assessed by our authors, if not 
by the respective constitutional courts themselves. Law in books was indeed compared to 
law in action. Judicial restraint, deference, activism, neglect are all attitudes that appear 
in the different case studies for the countries subject to our research. 
The mindset of constitutional convergence and learning theories mentioned already in 
the introduction of this research project in the first volume of our findings has already 
45  Cf. Sulyok 2020, pp. 29-31.
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imposed a limit on our inquiry. This limitation is our prison of circumstance. We are 
also prisoners not just of circumstance but also of geography. Prisons we cannot always 
escape – not even together.
Whether we are in the EU or under the auspices of the CoE, or specifically in the Western 
Balkans, the inherent diversity of the national contexts examined, the different social 
conditions and overall popular goals46 mixed with the sometimes very much connected 
national past and present puts us in a situation where – even after carefully studying the 
protective roles and approaches of the different national constitutions and constitutional 
courts – we still have more questions than answers regarding the peaceful cohabitation of 
nations, communities, minorities and identities.
46  Cf. Sulyok 2020, pp. 5-13. For the reference on learning theories and convergence, see: Rosalind dixon – 
Eric PoSner: The Limits of Constitutional Convergence. In: Chicago Journal of International Law. 2011/11, pp. 
399-423, at 413-414. 
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Tamás Korhecz:1
Constitutional Rights without Protected Substance: 
Critical Analysis of the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional 
Courts of Serbia in Protecting Rights of National 
Minorities2
The constitution is either a superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on 
a level with ordinary legislative acts, alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it. It is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. This is the 
very essence of judicial duty.” 
/John Marshall/
“Courts are supposed to be places of reason. But this, of course, is a fantasy. I mean, there is 
reason being used as a technique. But courts, in fact, are baths of emotions.” 
/Helen Garner/
1 . Introduction
The Republic of Serbia is a nation state with an ethnically rather mixed population3 and 
with a comparatively developed legal and institutional system for the protection of na-
tional minorities, including the protection of national minorities and their specific rights 
in many provisions of the Constitution itself. However, the worth of its constitutional 
provisions – including human and minority rights – can only be truly equivalent to the 
degree to which they are implemented and protected in practice; by the legislator, the ad-
ministration and, in final instances, by the courts. The Constitutional Court of the Repub-
lic of Serbia (hereinafter CCS) has, as other similar constitutional courts, the extensive 
and supreme power to interpret and protect constitutional provisions, including human 
and minority rights, primarily through their traditional competence: the judicial review 
of laws, government decrees, etc. This article critically analyses the almost three decade 
1  SJD Central European University, Judge of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, Professor of Constitutional 
and Administrative Law at the Faculty of Legal and Business Studies “Dr Lazar Vrkatić” in Novi Sad, Univer-
sity UNION.
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights 
as Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level 
of legal education. The earlier version of this paper was submitted and accepted for publication in the Review 
of Central and East European Law.
3  More than 15 per cent of the total population of Serbia (without Kosovo) belongs to various national mi-
norities. The most numerous national minorities are the Hungarian (253,000 persons or 3.53 per cent of the total 
population), the Romas (147,000 persons or 2.05 per cent) and the Bosniaks (145,000 persons or 2.02 per cent). 
Other numerous national minorities are the Croats (57,000 persons), Slovaks (52,000 persons), the Albanians 
(61,000 persons) the Montenegrins (38,000 persons), the Vlachs (35,000 persons), the Romanians (29,000 per-
sons), the Macedonians (22,000 persons), the Bulgarians (18,000 persons), the Bunjevcis (16,000 persons), and 
the Ruthenians (14,000 persons). The minority population is largely concentrated in the Autonomous Province 
of Vojvodina, in the Raška/Sandžak region and in municipalities bordering Kosovo; Population, Ethnicity, Data 
by Municipalities and Cities – 2011 Census of Population, Households and Dwellings in the Republic of Serbia, 
Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade, 2012, pp. 14-15.
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long history of case law of the Serbian Constitutional Court related to the constitutional 
rights and protection of national minorities beginning in 1990 – namely, from the time 
when basic elements of liberal democracy, including political pluralism and market econ-
omy were constitutionally guaranteed in the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter Serbia). 
The strong judicial review of legislative acts is a disputed instrument among scholars; 
some influential scholars like R. Dworkin and J. Waldron have in their papers often in 
examined the pros and cons of judicial activism and the legitimacy of the judicial branch 
to annul the acts of the democratic legislator.4 Judicial review and activism was seriously 
questioned by Griffin, who claimed that in US constitutional history Congress has en-
acted legislation enforcing civil rights, often as a reaction to the various right-restricting 
abridging court decisions.5 On the other hand, one of the most frequently invoked theo-
retical arguments in favour of such judicial review is the protection of various minorities 
and their rights against the violations and abuses by the democratic political majority.6 In 
this article, we examine whether the CCS has served as an anti-majoritarian institution 
protecting the constitutional rights of minorities (in this case national minorities) against 
potential limitations set by the political-ethnic majority governing the legislation and the 
executive branch, or, as Sadurski concluded, as measured against all East and Central Eu-
ropean Constitutional Courts, which have been neither intellectually equipped nor mor-
ally and politically prepared to interpret minority rights in an expansive, generous man-
ner – and thus these courts have not played a significant role in shaping the “toleration 
regimes.”7 To answer this basic question one must extensively analyse the case law – the 
jurisprudence of the CCS. We shall analyse the case law of the CCS in order to determine 
its pro minority function (or the lack of such function) through the following methods: by 
defining the subject matter and final outcome of cases before the CCS, by identifying the 
interpretational technics and methods applied by the CCS in interpreting constitutionally 
protected minority rights, namely, if and how the CCS has been or has not been creating 
a balance between constitutional minority rights and other constitutional rights and prin-
ciples, including an examination of the consistency or inconsistency of the interpretation 
and argumentation of the CCS regarding minority rights. We also wish to identify the 
background and the powers influencing the outcomes of constitutional disputes that have 
come before the CCS.
This article is divided into six sections. After the Introductory section, the second sec-
tion contains a short overview of the legal protection of ethnic-linguistic diversity in 
East-Central European (henceforth ‘ECE’) states with particular emphasis on Serbia. The 
third section describes the legal regulation and position of the CCS, with a brief review 
of its history and its social-political reputation. The fourth section contains an analysis 
of the CCS case law based upon certain formal criteria. In the fifth section, an in-depth 
4  See more: Jeremy Waldron: Moral Truth and Judicial Review. In: Am Journal Juris 1998/43, pp. 75-98, 
Jeremy Waldron: The Core of the Case against Judicial Review. In: Yale Law Review, 2006/6, pp. 1346-1407, 
Ronald dWorkin: Laws Empire. Fontana Press, London 1986, Ronald dWorkin: Taking Rights Seriously. Har-
vard University Press, Harvard, 1977.
5  Stephen M. griffin: American Constitutionalism. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1996, p. 116.
6  John Hart ely: Democracy and Distrust: The Theory of Judicial Review. Harvard University Press, Har-
vard, 1980.
7  Wojciech SadurSki: Rights before courts — a study of constitutional courts in post-communist states of 
Central and Eastern Europe, 2nd edn. Springer, Heidelberg, 2014, p. 289, 324.
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analysis of the case law shall follow with the purpose of identifying driving forces behind 
the jurisdiction of the CCS including the methodologies and techniques employed in 
interpreting minority rights, and the constitutional values determining court decisions. In 
the sixth chapter, concluding remarks are offered.
2 .  The Protection of National Minorities in East- and Central Europe8 and the 
Legal Framework on the Legal Framework of Minority Protection in Serbia
Since the early 19th century, the idea of liberal democracy and the nation state (hand in 
hand) have begun to prevail as a state organization principle. The main problem with the 
liberal nation state model was then, and still is, that the borders of the nation (nation in the 
cultural sense) and the nation state have not usually been compatible.9 Usually the pop-
ulation of nation states in East Central Europe (ECE) has been composed of one titular 
national group having ascendency in the nation state, holding a privileged position in the 
nation state, and a number of numerically smaller ethnic groups, usually labelled national 
minorities.10 In such a situation, the titular nation is pursuing a nation-building policy of a 
real or imaginary nation state where language, culture, territory and polity are congruent. 
A specificity of the ECE context is that newly formed or reborn ECE states have needed 
the nationalist component in order to strengthen their political identity, with national mi-
norities regarded as a threat, one that could destabilize their new and week statehoods.11 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, ECE states began to establish legal and institutional 
frameworks for the protection of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, mainly re-
lated to their projected integration into the European Union. In this process the centrality 
of the idea of the homogenous nation state and nation-building in ECE was complement-
ed, and in a way confronted with the emerging European regime of guaranteed minority 
rights – the systematic protection of national minorities and their separate identity.  
2.1. Protection of National Minorities in ECE States
After the collapse of communism ethno-national state building, on the one hand, was 
accompanied by the constitutional recognition of minority rights and, on the other hand, 
the emergence of a European regime of minority protection.12. The auspices of this Eu-
ropean legal framework were created in many documents enacted within the Council 
of Europe, the Conference (later Organization) for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
8  Under the notion of the “East-, Central Europe states” we consider former socialist countries (ruled by the 
communist parties) within geographic Europe including those established after the fall of a part of the Soviet 
Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. 
9  Will kyMlicka – Christine STraehle: Cosmopolitism, Nation-States, and Minority Nationalism: Critical 
Review of Recent Literature. In: European Journal of Philosophy 1999/1, pp. 65-88, at 73.
10  Timofey agarin – Karl cordell: Minority Rights and Minority Protection in Europe, Rowman & Little-
field, London, 2016, p. 175.
11  Jeryy kranz: Introduction. In: Jerzy kranz – Herbert küPPer (eds.): Law and Practice of Central Eu-
ropean Countries in the Field of National Minority Protection After 1989. Center for International Relations, 
Warszawa, 1998, i. 
12  agarin – cordell 2016, p. 39, 41-42.
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and the European Economic Community (later the European Union).13 The acceptance 
of these standards by ECE states gradually became one of the political conditions (Co-
penhagen criteria) for their membership in the EU and became a relatively prestigious 
implementation mechanism for these relatively vague standards of minority protection.14 
The system created under the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Mi-
norities deserves special attention. The complexity and general wording of its provisions, 
the acceptance of the Convention by almost all ECE states and the specific system of 
monitoring, which proved to be much more effective in practice than initially expected,15 
all contributed to the situation that the fulfilment of (minimal) state obligations towards 
minority protection standards are now usually measured in the process of EU integra-
tion by the congruency of domestic standards with the Framework Convention standards. 
Although the integration of ECE states to the EU, contrary to expectations, has resulted 
in the reincarnation of the politicization of ethnicity,16 it has also contributed to the in-
corporation of European minority right standards into the domestic constitutional and 
legislative framework, and ensured peace and stability within nation states and between 
nation states.17 The constitutional identity of ECE states includes principles guaranteeing, 
on the one hand, the unitary state, the indivisibility of state territory, national unity, the 
protection of the titular nation and its language on one hand, while, on other hand, the 
protection of the separate identity of the members of national minorities, including the 
protection of their language, education, and sometimes rights for specific political rep-
resentation.18 A common denominator of ECE domestic standards of minority rights is 
that they, contrary to many Western European states, unanimously refuse to accept rights 
of ethnic territorial autonomy, and treat minority rights as primarily a security issue.19 
All these states except Bulgaria have decided to protect national minorities via group 
specific rights, often creating positive duties for state authorities rather than embracing 
the so called individualistic or liberal-neutralist approach of allotting universal individual 
rights to all persons including persons belonging to minorities.20 In this way ECE states 
have continuously faced the challenge of how to accommodate constitutionally protected 
minority rights with the constitutionally protected ideal of an ethnic-based nation state, 
in which the titular nation is a bearer and owner of the state and in which the territory of 
the state and the titular nation tends to be congruent as much as possible. The protection 
and implementation of minority rights should ensure formal and also effective equality of 
persons belonging to minorities and those belonging to the titular nation, and beyond this 
13  Will kyMlicka: The internationalization of minority rights. In: International Journal of Constitutional 
Law 2008/1, pp. 1-32 at 22-23, Balázs vizi: European integration and minority rights conditionality policy. 
In: Balázs vízi – Norbert TóTh – Edgár doBoS (eds.): Beyond International Conditionality: Local Variations of 
Minority Representation in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Nomos, Baden-Baden, 2017, pp. 57-58.
14  vizi 2017, p. 59.
15  Asbjorn eide: The Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. In: 
Kristin henrard – Robert dunBar (eds.): Synergies in Minority Protection – European and International Law 
Perspectives. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, pp. 145-151.
16  agarin – cordell 2016, p. 45.
17  Ibid. p. 43, 181. 
18  Iván haláSz: A Közép-európai alkotmányok születése és identitása (1989-2012) [Birth and Identity of 
Central European Constitutions (1989-2012)]. NKE, Budapest, 2014, pp. 118-121.
19  Will kyMlicka: Justice and security in the accommodation of minority nationalism. In: Stephen May 
– Tariq Modood – Judith SquireS (eds.): Ethnicity, Nationalism and Minority Rights. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2001, p. 156.
20  SadurSki 2014, pp. 310-311.
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the preservation of those specific, different ethnic identities of persons belonging to na-
tional minorities (language, traditions, culture, religion etc.), e.g. to sustain and preserve 
ethnic diversity in the nation state. The ultimate goals of nation-building and minority 
rights seems hardly adjustable; they resemble a “zero sum game” in which successful 
nation-building excludes the successful protection and implementation of minority rights 
and sustainable ethnic diversity. The alternative might be to perceive the ethnic diversity 
management (minority rights) and nation building policies (protection of the titular nation 
and nation state) as competing constitutional values, abridging each other, looking for 
accommodation and balancing within the constitutional framework. Constitutional courts 
and the judiciary may seem, then, to be tasked with the pivotal role of balancing them 
and adjusting and accommodating these competing constitutional principles reflecting 
contradicting policy alternatives.
2.2. Constitutional and Legislative Framework of Minority Protection in Serbia
Minority rights in Serbia are guaranteed extensively and generously by a large number of 
constitutional provisions, as well as through numerous ratified international and bilateral 
agreements and various domestic legislative acts.21 The spectrum of minority rights in-
cludes both individual and collective rights, the right to minority self-governance, special 
representation in elected assemblies, affirmative action and many rights requiring posi-
tive state action, including additional budgetary funding. The formally high standards of 
minority rights originate mainly from two resources. First, they originate from the feder-
alist legal tradition of the socialist federal Yugoslav state, which not only tried to create 
equality and balance between Yugoslav titular nations, but also guaranteed high standards 
of protection to so-called nationalities, primarily living in the multinational autonomous 
provinces of Kosovo and Metohia and Vojvodina.22 Despite the rigid one-party communist 
environment, which lacked democracy, the policy towards minorities, primarily language 
rights, was not merely a well-decorated display and mimicry – it indeed, at least partially, 
demonstrated genuine political desire and living practice. 23 Secondly, present day high 
minority right standards are result of the fact that after the fall of Milosević, Serbia tried 
to demonstrate its separation from the bloody ethnic conflicts in the nineties of the 20th 
century by accepting high standards of minority rights, showing considerable readiness 
towards the international community to accept some political demands of minorities.24   
Notwithstanding the formal high standards of minority protection in Serbia, critics have 
continued to point out the problems of overregulation and inconsistency of the normative 
21  Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Third Opin-
ion on Serbia adopted on 28 November 2013, No. ACFC/OP/III(2013)006, p. 6. 
22  Tamás korhecz: National Minority Councils in Serbia. In: Tove H. Malloy – Aelxander oSiPov – Balázs 
vizi (eds.): Managing Diversity through Non-Territorial Autonomy: Assessing Advantages, Deficiencies and 
Risks. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, p. 73.
23  Tamás korhecz: Official Language and Rule of Law: Official Language Legislation and Policy in Vo-
jvodina Province, Serbia. In: International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 2008/4, pp. 457-488, at 481, 
Tibor várady: Minorities, Majorities, Law, and Ethnicity: Reflections of the Yugoslav Case. In: Human Rights 
Quarterly, 1997/1, pp. 9-54, at 18.
24  Tamás korhecz: Evolving legal framework and history of national minority councils in Serbia. In: Inter-
national Journal of Public Law and Policy, 2019/2, pp. 116-137, at 119.
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framework, such as problems with the implementation and effective protection of minor-
ity rights, and other human rights requiring positive state action.25 
All the constitutions of Serbia from 1947 and onwards have contained some positive mi-
nority rights, including even the 1990 Constitution, which was criticized for its restriction 
of minority rights.26 This continuity and consistency might serve as legitimate grounds 
for the bold claim that the recognition and guarantees for minority rights has become a 
part of the constitutional identity of Serbia.27 The rights of national minorities and persons 
belonging to national minorities in Serbia were extensively incorporated into the 2006 
Constitution of Serbia, welcomed by international bodies.28 This constitution of the newly 
independent Serbia incorporated almost entirely the provisions on minority rights from 
the Charter of Human and Minority Rights of Serbia and Montenegro (2003), but also 
added some further provisions, in doing so adding many new, constitutionally protected 
minority rights compared to 1990 Serbian constitution.29
Provisions explicitly mentioning minority rights, protecting ethnicity, persons belonging 
to national minorities and guaranteeing special minority rights are present in the Pre-
amble of the Constitution, and in not less than 37 articles of the total 206 articles of the 
Constitution30 Even the Preamble of the Constitution makes a reference to minorities, 
stipulating: “Considering the state tradition of the Serbian people and equality of all 
citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia… the citizens of Serbia adopt…”
In the normative part of the Constitution, protection of national minorities is guaranteed 
first in Section One, titled Constitutional Principles, in Article 14, titled Protection of 
national minorities, which stipulates that “The Republic of Serbia shall protect the rights 
of national minorities” and that it guarantees special protection “for the purpose of exer-
cising full equality and preserving their identity.”31
25  Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Third Opin-
ion on Serbia adopted on 28 November 2013, No. ACFC/OP/III (2013)006, p. 6, 54 and 55. European Commis-
sion for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) Opinion on the Constitution of Serbia, no. 405/2006 
adopted on the 70th. Plenary Session of the Commission, Venice, 17-18 March 2007, p. 5, 10. [Hereinafter: 
Venice Commission Opinion]
26  várady 1997, pp. 21-26. Aelksandar fira: Ustavno pravo Republike Srbije i Republike Crne Gore. [Con-
stitutional Law of the Republic of Serbia and Republic of Montenegro]. Agencija MIR, Novi Sad, 1995, pp. 
184-185.
27  Tamas korhecz: Ustavna revizija i manjinska prava – u kojoj meri je reviziona vlast slobodna da menja 
posebna prava manjina u Ustavu Republike Srbije? [Constitutional Amendments and Minority Rights – to 
Which Extent is the Amendment Power Free to Change Certain Minority Rights in the Constituion of the Re-
public of Serbia?]. In: Edin Šarčević – Darko siMović (eds.): Reviziona vlast u Srbiji – Proceduralni aspekti 
ustavnih promena. [Amendment Power in Serbia – Procedural Aspects of the Constitional Amendments]. Fon-
dacija Centar za javno pravo, Sarajevo, 2017, p. 141.
28  Venice Commission Opinion, p. 10.
29  Ibid. p. 7. 
30  Constitution of the Republic of Serbia Preamble and Articles 1, 3, 5, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 
50, 55, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 100, 105, 108, 114, 166, 170, 180, 183, 190, 192, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203.
31  This constitutional provision greatly resembles the objects of minority protection defined by the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice in its famous advisory opinion: “The first is to ensure that nationals belonging 
to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every respect on the footing of perfect equality 
with the other nationals of the State. The second is to ensure for the minority elements suitable means for the 
preservation of their racial peculiarities, their traditions and their national characteristics.” Minority Schools in 
Albania, Advisory Opinion, Series A. IB, Fascicule No.64. p. 17.  
29
Section Two of the Constitution, titled Human and Minority Rights and Freedoms, in 
its second chapter, titled Human Rights and Freedoms, contains two articles specially 
linked to minority rights. Article 47 guarantees freedom of national affiliation, including 
the freedom that “No person shall be obliged to declare his national affiliation,” while 
Article 48 stipulates that “the state shall promote understanding, recognition and respect 
of diversity arising from specific ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity of its citi-
zens through measures applied in education, culture and public information.”
The main and most specific provisions guaranteeing minority rights are concentrated in 
Section Two of the Constitution in the separate Chapter 3, titled Rights of Persons Be-
longing to National Minorities, in Articles 75-81. Article 75, titled Basic Provision, guar-
antees in its first paragraph “special individual or collective rights in addition to the rights 
guaranteed to all citizens by the Constitution.” Paragraph two guarantees that as a collec-
tive right “Persons belonging to national minorities shall take part in decision-making 
or decide independently on certain issues related to their culture, education, information 
and official use of languages and script,” while paragraph three concretizes this right and 
stipulates that these persons “may elect their national councils in order to exercise the 
right to self-governance in the field of culture, education, information and official use of 
their language and script in accordance with the law.”
Article 76 prohibits the discrimination of persons belonging to national minorities and 
guarantees equality before the law, with the possibility of specific provisional measures 
in various areas “aimed at eliminating extremely unfavourable living conditions which 
particularly affect them.” Article 77 stipulates “the right to participate in administering 
public affairs and assume public positions, under the same conditions as other citizens,” 
adding also a positive affirmative obligation for various public authorities and public ser-
vices that in the course of employment “the ethnic structure of population and appropri-
ate representation of members of national minorities shall be taken into consideration.” 
Article 78 strictly “prohibits the forced assimilation of members of national minorities” 
and also “undertaking measures, which would cause artificial changes in the ethnic struc-
ture of population in areas where members of national minorities live traditionally and 
in large numbers”.
Article 79 deserves special attention because it contains a catalogue of individual rights 
related to the preservation of the specific identity of the members of national minorities.32 
This article stipulates in paragraph 1 “that members of national minorities shall have a 
right to: expression preservation, fostering, developing and public expression of national, 
ethnic, cultural, religious specificity; use of their symbols in public places; use of their 
language and script; have proceedings also conducted in their languages before” various 
public authorities “in areas where they make a significant majority of population; educa-
tion in their languages in public institutions, founding private educational institutions; 
use of their name and family name in their language; traditional local names, names 
of streets, settlements and topographic names also written in their languages, in areas 
32  These rights are usually called individual minority special rights, they are a step above a non-discrimina-
tion guarantee and they usually require positive state action. See: Georg Brunner – Herbert küPPer: European 
Options of Autonomy: A Typology of Autonomy Models of Minority Self-Governance. In: Kinga gál (ed.): 
Minority Governance in Europe. Open Society Institute, Budapest, 2002, pp. 17-18.
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where they make a significant majority of population;” complete, timely and objective 
information in their language, “including the right to expression, receiving, sending and 
exchange of information and ideas; establishing their own mass media, in accordance 
with the Law.” The second paragraph stipulates that if empowered by Law “in accord-
ance with the Constitution, additional rights of members of national minorities may be 
determined by provincial regulations.”
Article 80 stipulates the rights to “found educational and cultural associations”, to which 
the state shall “acknowledge a specific role” in their exercise of rights, and also “the right 
to undisturbed relations and cooperation with their compatriots outside the territory of 
the Republic of Serbia.”
Article 81 reformulates the obligation of the state already stipulated in Article 48: “In 
the field of education, culture and information, Serbia shall give impetus to the spirit of 
tolerance and intercultural dialogue to achieve mutual respect, understanding and coop-
eration among all people living on its territory.”
The Constitution contains several provisions guaranteeing special representation of na-
tional minorities in elected parliamentary bodies in all levels of governance, though these 
provisions are formulated as state obligations and guarantees, not as specific rights.33 Ar-
ticle 100, paragraph 2, stipulates that “in the National Assembly, equality and representa-
tion of different genders and members of national minorities shall be provided, in ac-
cordance with the Law.” A similar guarantee is provided in Article 180, paragraph 4, for 
the provincial and local assemblies: “In those autonomous provinces and local self-gov-
ernment units with the population of mixed nationalities, a proportional representation 
of national minorities in assemblies shall be provided for, in accordance with the Law.”
Beyond the above described provisions on minority rights in the referenced 12 Articles, 
the Constitution provides other kinds of recognition and protection of national minorities 
in 25 additional articles.34 
2.3. Evaluation of the Serbian Legal Framework of Minority Rights
There is a wide range of consensus among scholars that the wording of the 2006 Serbian 
Constitution lacks necessary clarity and precision, making the interpretation of its pro-
visions complex and demanding.35 The Venice Commission expressed its opinion in the 
33  These minority rights are defined in The Lund Recommendations on the Effective Participation of Nation-
al Minorities in Public Life (1999) of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities as participation in 
decision making, pp. 8- 9.
34  Minorities, their protection and their right are mentioned in several articles, together with human rights in 
(Article 1, Article 3, Articles 18-20 and 22), as a protected value (Articles 5, 43, 44, 49, 50, 55,), as a competenc-
es of various local and central authorities (Articles 105, 108 and 114, 166, 170, 183, 190, 192) or in conjunction 
with state of emergency or war (Articles 200-203). 
35  Profesor Ratko Marković labelled the 2006 Constitution the “most illiterate of all constrictions of Serbia.” 
See Ratko Marković: Ustav Republike Srbije iz 2006.godine – kritički osvrt. [The Constituion of the Republic 
of Serbia from Year 2006 – Critical View.]. In: Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of 
Law in Belgrade], 2006/2, pp. 5-46, at 5.
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following words: “the hasty drafting is evident in provisions that are unclear or contra-
dictory… the new Constitution has all the hallmarks of an over-hasty draft…”36
Such criticism is well-founded in regard to provisions protecting minorities as well. In 
observing the large number of provisions, one cannot avoid the impression that the drafter 
tried to incorporate as many as possible provisions related to the protection of nation-
al minorities. This tendency is present also in the case of human rights, particularly in 
the case of the provincial autonomy.37 At the same time, this overregulation resulted in 
the repetition of similar provisions, with sometimes not-welcomed alternations creating 
confusion in interpretation. Clear examples of such negligence in drafting are evidenced 
in the regulation of the exceptions allowing affirmative action (in Article 21 and Article 
76)38 or in state measures promoting interethnic tolerance (Article 48 and Article 81). 
Overregulation and unclear wording is present in provisions regulating the conditions for 
the restriction of (human and) minority rights (Articles 18 and 20).39 
It is also important to note that in the case of most important minority rights, such as 
the collective right for self-governance (Article 75), all rights protecting special identity 
(Article 79) and representation in Serbian, provincial and municipal assemblies (Articles 
100 and 180) shall be exercised in accordance with the Law. These provisions empow-
ering the legislator to regulate the exercise, enjoyment and scope of these constitutional 
minority rights opens the question to which extent the constitutional provisions limit 
the discretion of the legislator to determine the scope of these rights? This is especially 
evident in provisions found in Article 18, paragraph 2 (protection of the substance of the 
guaranteed minority right) and Article 20, paragraph 2 (protection of the attained level of 
minority rights). The responsibility to determine constitutional tests for such limitations 
lays exclusively on the CCS, but, as the Venice Commission noted, the problems inherent 
in the drafting of the constitutional provisions have led “to many issues of interpretation 
and the Constitutional Court of Serbia will have to ensure a coherent interpretation”40.
The overloaded constitutional framework of minority protection is complemented with 
a comparatively large number of international and bilateral conventions, laws and other 
legislative acts regulating the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed minority rights.41 
36  Venice Commission Opinion, p. 3.
37  Tamas korhecz – Katinka BereTka: Ustavnosudsko uobličavanje normativne nadležnosti Autonomne 
pokrajine Vojvodine – deset godina primene Ustava Republike Srbije. [Constitutional Shaping of the Regulatory 
Powers of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina –Ten Years of Application of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Serbia.]. In: Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu [Annals of the Faculty of Law in Belgrade], 2018/1, pp. 
90-116, at 93.
38  In Article 21 special measures for achieving full equality of individuals or groups in a substantially une-
qual position shall not be deemed discrimination, while in Article 76 only special measures aimed at eliminating 
extremely unfavorable living conditions which particularly affect national minorities shall not be considered 
discrimination.  
39  Venice Commission Opinion, p. 8.
40  Venice Commission Opinion, p. 8.
41 Katinka BereTka – Tamás korheCz: The Agreement between Serbia and Hungary on the Protection of 
National Minority Rights – Revision Welcomed. In: Hungarian Journal of Legal Studies, 2019/3, pp. 300-310.
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3 . The History, Legal Framework, Position and Reputation of the CCS
The constitutional adjudication, the judicial review of legislative acts, has a long tradition 
in Serbia (as in other successor states of the socialist Yugoslavia), at least compared to 
other ECE states.42 Judicial review in Serbia has been exercised in continuity by a special 
Kelsenian-type constitutional court, outside the judicial branch, in the so-called concen-
trated system.43 Despite important novelties introduced by the Serbian constitutions in 
1974, 1990 and 2006, the constitutional review of statutes remained within the concen-
trated system by the constitutional court outside the judicial branch. Stipulations in the 
2006 constitution intended to make the CCS more independent and powerful. 
3.1. Status and Position of the CCS and its Judges
The constitutional provisions on the CCS are concentrated in Section Six of the Con-
stitution (Articles 166-175). The CCS is defined as “autonomous and independent state 
body which shall protect constitutionality and legality, as well as human and minority 
rights and freedoms”. The CCS has 15 judges with nine year mandates, each judge hav-
ing the possibility of one re-election. 44 Judges must fulfil the following requirements 
beyond those applicable for all public servants: be a minimum age of 40 years old and 
be a prominent lawyer with at least 15 years of practice in law. 45 In the appointment of 
judges, all branches of state power participate, ensuring a kind of balance between them; 
the National Assembly elects five judges from the list of 10 candidates proposed by the 
President of the Republic, the President of the Republic appoints five judges from the list 
of 10 candidates proposed by the National Assembly and the Supreme Court appoints five 
judges from the list of 10 candidates proposed jointly by the High Judicial Council and 
the State Council of Prosecutors.46 The president of the CCS and its deputy are elected 
among the judges by themselves.47 The CCS judges enjoy full immunity against any 
prosecution, as do the members of the National Assembly, and only the CCS itself can 
decide on the lifting of this immunity.48 Judges cannot hold any other public function and 
cannot participate in any other professional activity except for teaching in law schools in 
Serbia.49 A judge of the CCS may be dismissed only if he or she violates the incompatibil-
ity rules, loses his or her working capacity or is sentenced for a crime, making him or her 
“dishonoured” for the office.50 Even in these cases the CCS itself decides on the extent to 
42  The Constitutional courts and constitutional review were established in socialist Yugoslavia and in its 
Republics, including Serbia with the 1963 constitutions. See more in Olivera vučić – Vladan PeTrov – Darko 
siMović: Ustavni Sudovi Bivših Jugoslovenskih Republika. [Constitutional Courts of Former Yugoslav Repub-
lics]. Dosije studio, Beograd, 2010, pp. 69-93. 
43  Alan brewer-Carrias: Introduction/Hans Kelsen, Judical Review, and the Negative Legislator. In: Alan 
brewer-Carias (ed.): Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2011, pp. 6-8.
44  Ustav Republike Srbije [Constitution of the Republic of Serbia], Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije [Offi-
cial Gazette of the Republic of Serbia], number 98/2006, Art 172. par. 1. and 6.
45  Ibid. Art. 172. par. 5. 
46  Ibid. Art. 172. par. 3. 
47  Ibid. 
48  Ibid. Art. 173. par. 2.
49  Ibid. Art. 173. par. 1. 
50  Ibid. Art. 174. par. 2.
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which the conditions for dismissal are met, before the National Assembly can decide on 
the dismissal.51 
3.2. Competences
On account of, and through its broad competences, the CCS falls within the group of most 
powerful constitutional courts, allowing the CCS to be significant actor in constitution-
al and political matters.52 The competences of the CCS are exclusively regulated by the 
constitution and they cannot be enlarged by the legislation, yet the constitutional text in 
this respect is not precise enough.53 Most of the CCS competences are stipulated in Article 
166 of the Constitution, but they are stipulated as well in several other provisions. The 
competences of the CCS are the following:
 - it controls the constitutionality of ratified international treaties, laws and other 
legislative acts,
 - it controls the compatibility of the laws with any ratified international treaties 
and with the general principles of international law,
 - it controls the legality of bylaws, 
 - it controls the constitutionality and legality of the regulations of autonomous 
provinces and local self-governments, 
 - it controls the constitutionality and legality of collective agreements, acts of pub-
lic institutions, political parties, syndicates, and civic associations.54
Any law ruled by the CCS as unconstitutional, such as other general legal acts ruled un-
constitutional or unlawful, ceases to exist on the day the decision of the CCS is published 
in the official gazette.55 It is notable that the CCS controls the constitutionality and legality 
of various bylaws and regulations, not only laws enacted in the National Assembly. 
Anyone can initiate normative control by the CCS (actio popularis) and in these cases the 
CCS formally accepts or rejects the initiative with an order.56 If 25 members of the Nation-
al Assembly, the Government, courts or other empowered state or local authority initiate 
the control procedure, the procedure begins without the order of the CCS.57 
There is also an ex ante control of the laws enacted by the National Assembly but not 
promulgated yet by the President of the Republic, which can be initiated by one third of 
51  Ibid. Art. 172. par. 3.
52  Violeta beŠirević: Governing without Judges – The politics of the Constitutional Court in Serbia. In: 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2014/4, pp. 954-979, at p. 964., Boško Tripković: A Constitutional 
Court in Transition: Making Sense of Constitutional Adjudication in Post-authoritarian Serbia. In: brewer-
cariaS 2011, pp. 741- 742., Tatjana papić – Vladimir djerić: On the Margins of Consolidation: The 
Constitutional Court of Serbia. In: Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2018/1, pp. 59-82, at p. 66. 
53  Marijana pajvančić: Odnos između sudske vlasti i Ustavnog suda– uporedna studija. [The Relationship 
between the Judiciary and the Constitutional Court – Coparative Analyses]. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Buku-
rešt-Novi Sad, 2018, p. 31.
54  Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 166. par. 1. 
55  Ibid. Art. 168. par. 3. 
56  Ibid. Art. 168. par. 2.
57  Ibid. Art. 168. par. 1.
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the members of the National Assembly.58 In such cases, the CCS shall decide within seven 
days. If the initiative is rejected, the ex post control is not allowed.59  
Besides the abovementioned classical constitutional court competences, the CCS can 
suspend regulations of an autonomous province before they come to force if the Govern-
ment initiates the control of such regulation before its promulgation.60 The CCS decides 
on the constitutionality of individual court and administrative decisions based upon the 
constitutional complaints of all persons claiming that these final decisions or acts violated 
their constitutional rights, 61 resolves conflicts of competences between courts and admin-
istrative bodies, such as between central, provincial or local administrational bodies62, 
decides on electoral disputes not within the competence of regular courts,63 decides on the 
banning of political parties, trade unions, civic associations and religious organizations,64 
decides on appeals of dismissed judges65 and public prosecutors,66 decides on the viola-
tion of the constitution by the President of the Republic within the procedure for dismiss-
al67  and decides on the complaints stemming from the abridgment of the competences of 
autonomous provinces or local self-governments.68
The CCS decides in sessions with a majority vote of all the judges.69 Everyone is obliged 
to obey and implement the decisions of the CCS.70 If necessary, the CCS decides about 
the manner by which a decision should be executed.71 The internal organization, the pro-
cedure before the CCS and the legal effects of its decisions are regulated by the Law on 
the Constitutional Court.72
3.3. General Evaluation of the Performance of the CCS
Despite the relatively long history of the CCS, its case law has mainly remained outside 
the interest of legal scholars (even) in Serbia. Those scholars that have published arti-
cles on the CCS in international journals in recent years have emphasized that the CCS, 
despite its formal strong competences, has demonstrated no will or capacity to become 
an active actor in the process of democratic consolidation, in actively shaping the institu-
tional and legal framework, in maintaining relationships and a balance between branches 
of power, or in protecting human rights.73 On the one hand, the CCS has demonstrated 
restraint and deference towards the actual ruling majority in political branches of power 
58  Ibid. Art. 169. par. 1.
59  Ibid. Art. 169. par. 4. 
60  Ibid. Art. 186.
61  Ibid. Art. 170.
62  Ibid. Art. 167. par. 2. points 1-4.
63  Ibid. Art. 167. par. 2.  point, 5.
64  Ibid. Art. 167. par. 3. and Art. 44. par. 3.
65  Ibid. Art. 148. par. 2. and Art. 155.
66  Ibid. Art. 161. par. 4. 
67  Ibid. Art. 118. par. 3.
68  Ibid. Art. 193. par. 1. and 2.
69  Ibid. Art. 175. par. 1. 
70  Ibid. Art. 171. par. 1.
71  Ibid. Art. 171. par. 2. 
72  Ibid. Art. 175. par. 3. 
73  beŠirević 2014, p. 966.
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in the exercising of its judicial review powers, while, on the other hand, it has shown 
more determination in striking down rulings of courts in individual constitutional com-
plaint proceedings.74 Regarding its deference in the judicial review of legislative acts and 
executive regulations of the government, authors have highlighted two groups of reasons, 
both interacting with one another. The first group stems from a culture of restraint or 
the lack of tradition of judicial independence and judicial power. Generally, justices in 
Serbia, particularly constitutional court justices, have not been ready or willing to con-
front those in political power or to involve themselves at all in political disputes.75 This 
behaviour requires, and perpetuates, keeping as much as possible to the status quo. The 
normative pillar of such deference is based on the ideology of legalism, focusing more 
on the legislative procedure and less on the content of the provision, and also on applying 
dictionary style, textual interpretation technics, thereby avoiding going beyond the gram-
matical meaning of phrases interpreting principles and applying constitutional theory.76 In 
order to position itself in the favour of the political majority, the CCS has been applying 
most frequently the so-called “delaying strategy” waiting for a change in, or of, the ruling 
political majority for the adopting of a law or waiting for the political majority to repeal or 
amend a law.77 However, it is worthy of mentioning that not all periods of the CCS should 
be characterized by equal levels of deference; there are certain cases in which the CCS 
has invalidated an act of legislation reflecting the will of the political majority, and in do-
ing so gone beyond the ideology of restraint, legalism and grammatical interpretation.78 In 
a recent systematic study analysing the web page and media presence of the CCS, it was 
criticized for its pure invisibility and lack of transparency.79
4 .  Formal Analysis of the CCS Case Law Regarding the Protection of the Rights of 
National Minorities 
In order to determine the real practical weight and importance of these constitutional 
rights and the actual protection afforded to them by the CCS, prior to in-depth analysis, 
we will first engage in a general formal analysis of these cases, mainly based on their 
formal features, such as the overall number of cases, their structure, the subject matter 
and outcome of the constitutional disputes, the initiators, the direction of initiatives, the 
length of the procedure before reaching a decision etc.
To identify all the cases of normative control regarding minority rights, research was 
conducted by reading all the CCS decisions published in bulletins of the CCS from 1990 
74  papić – djerić 2018, p. 59.
75  beŠirević 2014, pp. 972 – 973. 
76  Tripković 2011, pp. 744 – 745.
77  papić – djerić 2018, p. 69.
78  papić – djerić 2018, pp. 72 -73, Tripković 2011, pp. 749, 751.
79  Dubravka valić-nedeljković: Monitoring izveštavanja o delatnosti Ustavnog suda Srbije – Monitoring 
portala Ustavnog suda i izveštavanja vodećih medija o Ustavnom sudu od januara 2018. do juna 2019. Godine. 
[Monitoring of Reporting on the Activities of the Serbian Constitutional Court – Monitoring of the Internet-site 
of the Constitutional Court and Reporting of Leading Media on the Constitutional Court from January 2018 
till June 2019]. In: Slobodan BeljanSki – Marijana pajvančić – Tanasije Marinković – Dubravka valić-ned-
eljković (eds.): Odnos Ustavnog suda i sudske vlasti – Stanje i perspective. [Relationship of the Constitutional 
Court and Judicial Power – Situation and Perspectives]. CEPRIS, Beograd, 2019, pp. 84-85.
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to 2019, as well as by reading and analysing all available court files of identified cases, 
primarily accessible in various archives. 
The conducted research identified a total of 45 rules related to the constitutional rights of 
national minorities. This number includes both decisions (in which the CCS decided on 
the cases’ merits through complete procedure) and orders (mainly procedural decisions 
on ill-founded initiatives) in which the court interpreted and applied constitutional pro-
visions guaranteeing minority rights. In 23 cases the CCS ruled on the constitutionality 
of provisions in the legislative acts of the National Assembly80, while in 22 other cases 
the court decided on the constitutionality and legality of provisions in the regulations and 
bylaws of local and provincial assemblies (in 16)81, state administration (in five)82 and in 
one on state owned company act83.  
Regarding the length of the procedures, there is an indication for the potential presence 
of the so called delaying strategy of the CCS identified by scholars. In 15 cases the CCS 
reached the decision after more than two years, among which were included relatively 
simple cases or cases where the procedure was eventually completed with an order reject-
ing the initiative without merits. 
The procedures of the CCS were initiated by groups of deputy members of the National or 
Provincial Assemblies, political parties, state and local authorities, NGOs and individuals 
etc. In 15 cases, minority self-governments, minority ethnic political parties, their presi-
dents or NGOs protecting minority rights initiated procedures before the CCS, claiming 
that the contested provision(s) of a legislative act or a ministerial regulation violated their 
constitutional rights. In six other cases, Serbian central authorities initiated procedures, 
in all such cases claiming that local self-government regulations of municipalities pop-
ulated dominantly by persons belonging to national minorities violated the law and the 
Constitution. In six further cases, the initiatives were launched by Serbian (mainly na-
tionalist) political parties or NGOs claiming that the contested law or regulation violated 
the constitution or law in favour of national minorities. In an additional three cases, local 
80  Decision IU-330/92 from 14 October 1993, Decision IU-328/92 from 14 October, Decision IU-7/98 from 
1 June 2000, Decision IU-178/2000 from 23 November 2000, Order IU-110/2004 from 15 July 2004, Order 
IU-97/2008 from 18 December 2008, Order IU-78/2008 from 25 December 2008, Order IU-133/2008 from 
22 December  2009, Decision IUz-52/2008 from 21 April 2010, Decision IUp-42/2008 from 14 April 2011, 
Order IUz-883/2010 from 8 December 2011, Order IUz-611/2011 from 22 March 2012, Order IUz-25/2011 18 
April  2012, Decision IUz-353/2009 from 10 July 2012, Order IUz-882/2010 from 17 January 2013, Decision 
IUz-27/2011 from 3 October 2013, Order IUz-116/2009 from 31 October 2013, Decision IUz-882/2014 from 
16 January  2014, Decision IUz-479/2014 from 9 April 2015, Decision IUz-166/2014 12 May 2016, Order IUz 
248/2017 from 16 April 2019, Order IUz 50/2019 from 18 June 2019, Order IUz-202/2018 from 16 October 
2019.
81  Decision IU-409/91 from 24 June 1993, Decision IU-27/99 from 11 January 2001,  Decision  IU-111/93 
from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-350/93 from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-64/94 from 25 January 2001, 
Decision IU-138/95 from 1 February 2001, Decision IU-171/2002 from 5 June 2003, Order IU 334/2004 from 
2 December 2004, Decision IU 294/2002 from 24 February 2005, Order IU-390/2003 from 26 June 2008, De-
cision IU-446/2004 from 18 February 2010, Decision IU-394/2005 from 22 June 2010, Decision IUo-360/2009 
from 5 December 2013, Order IUo-399/2011 from 10 June 2014, Order IUo-199 from 19 February 2015,  Order 
IUo-56/2016 from 28 February 2017. 
82  Decision IU-297/96 from 8 February 2001, Order IUp-42/2008 from 8 April 2008, Order IUo-33/2011 
from 13 June 2012, Order IUo-1259/2010 from 5 February 2013, Order IUo-272/2015 from 19 July 2017.
83  Decision IU-505/91 from 22 April 1993
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authorities initiated a procedure. Finally, in all other cases, various NGOs and individuals 
without any clear political background initiated the procedures. 
The outcome of the constitutional disputes reveals the following: in 27 out of 45 cases, 
the CCS rejected completely the initiatives and upheld the constitutionality and legality 
of the disputed provisions, while in 18 cases the court declared unconstitutional, null 
and void some of the contested provision. In 23 constitutional disputes involving the 
provisions of the legislative acts of the National Assembly, the CCS declared some pro-
visions unconstitutional only in four cases. In the case of contested provisions in various 
provincial and municipal regulations, altogether 16 procedures were initiated; in 10 the 
contested provisions were completely or at least partially declared unconstitutional or un-
lawful, while in only six cases were the local regulations completely upheld by the CCS. 
Regarding the provisions of bylaws enacted by central administrative authorities, the in-
itiatives were successful in one case, while in the other four cases the bylaw remained in 
force after the constitutional scrutiny.  
It is interesting to link successful and unsuccessful initiatives with various groups of ini-
tiators, as well as with the direction of the claims in initiatives. In doing so, the following 
relationships become visible:
 - In all cases where minority self-governments, minority political parties or NGOs 
initiated the procedure before the CCS, initiatives were completely rejected by 
the CCS and the constitutionality of the contested provisions was upheld by the 
court,84
 - The CCS has never declared a provision of the law unconstitutional by claiming 
that such a provision violated a minority right, and only once did in relation to 
a provision in a local assembly regulation because it violated some minority 
right.85
 - The CCS often declared unconstitutional or unlawful provisions granting some 
rights and privileges to persons belonging to national minorities.86
84  Decision IU-328/92 from 14 October 1993, Decision IU-330/92 from 14 October 1993,  Decision IU 
297/96 from 8 February 2001, Decision IU-7/98 from 1 June  2000, Decision IUp-42/2008 from 21 April  2011, 
Decision IUz-52/2008 from 21 April 2011, Order IUz-611/2011 from 22 March 2012, Order IUo-33/2011 from 
13 June 2012, Order  IUo-1259/2010 from 5 February 2013, Decision IUz-479/2014 from 9 April 2015, Order 
IUo-56/2016 from 28 February 2017, Order IUo-272/2015 19 from July 2017, Order IUz 248/2017 from 16 
April 2019, Order IUz 50/2019 from 18 June 2019, Order IUz-202/2018 from 16 October 2019.   
85  In Decision 446/2004 from 18 February 2010, the CCS declared unlawful a provision in the regulation of 
the municipality of Bačka Topola because it restricted the official use of the Slovak and Ruthenian language. B. 
Topola is a municipality in Vojvodina, dominantly inhabited by ethnic Hungarians. 
86  Cases where provisions guaranteeing minority rights were declared unconstitutional or unlawful are the 
following: Decision IU-505/1991 from 22 April 1993, Decision IU-491/1992 from 24 June 1993, Decision 
IU-111/93 from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-350/1993 from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-64/94 from  25 
January 2001, Decision IU-27/99 from 11 January 2001, Decision IU-294/02 24 February 2005, Decision  IUp-
42/08 from 8 April 2008, Decision  IUo-360/2009 from 5 December 2013, Decision IUz-882/2010 from  16 
January  2014, Decision IUz-166/2014 from 12 May 2016.
38
 - All initiatives of central authorities contesting the constitutionality and legality 
of local self-government regulations were successful and the CCS declared these 
regulations null and void.87 
 - Out of 23 cases, only in four cases did the CCS declare some provisions of the 
legislative acts of the National Assembly unconstitutional; in all four cases the 
CCS did so after the ruling political party which supported the enactment of 
those laws in the National Assembly lost its power and position in elections.88 
 - Successful initiatives challenging legislative acts were launched once by oppo-
sition members of the National Assembly (at the time of the initiative), in two 
cases by various NGOs, and in one case by an administrative authority.
5 . In Depth Analysis of the CCS Jurisprudence
In this section we will try to identify the technics and methodologies of constitutional 
interpretation used by the CCS in interpreting constitutional minority rights in instances 
when the court determined in concrete constitutional disputes the basic content, scope 
and specific weight of these rights in the constitutional order of Serbia. We also seek to 
establish the existence of consistency or inconsistency in the CCSs applying of some 
constitutional tests for these minority rights. Finally, we will explore whether there is a 
connection between the state policy towards national minorities and CCS jurisprudence. 
With few exceptions, analysis will be limited to cases in which the CCS decided on the 
constitutionality of the provisions of laws enacted by the National Assembly. Within this 
group of cases we will focus on those cases in which the CCS interpreted the content, 
scope, and specific weight of a constitutionally guaranteed minority right, as well as its 
relationship with other rights and constitutional principles. With good reason, particular 
attention will be paid to a cornerstone case of the CCS in the area of minority rights from 
201489 in which the CCS elaborated its general standing regarding constitutionally pro-
tected minority rights and its practical accountability therein.90
5.1. Methodology of the Constitutional Interpretation applied by the CCS 
In assessing which methodologies of constitutional interpretation the CCS has applied in 
its case law related to minority rights, one might begin with Goldsworthy’s division. He 
groups all methodologies applied by constitutional courts into two groups; in the first, 
an approach called positivism, are those conceiving the constitution as a set of written 
87  Decision IU-505/91 from 22 April 1993, Decision IU-491/92 from 24 June 1993, Decision IU-27/99 from 
11 January 2001, Decision IU-111/93 from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-350/93 from 25 January 2001, Deci-
sion IU-64/1994 from 25 January 2001.
88  Decision IUz-353/2009 from 10 July 2012, Decision IUz-27/2011 from 3 October 2013, Decision IUz-
882/2010 from 16 January 2014, Decision IUz-166/2014 from 12 May 2016. All these legislative acts were en-
acted during the rule of the Democratic Party in Serbia (2001-2012) and decisions of the CCS were enacted after 
this party lost its position after the 6 May 2012 parliamentary and the 6 and 20 May 2012 presidential elections. 
89  Decision IUz-882/2010 from 16 January 2014.
90  For a complete analysis of this case, see: Tamás korhecz: Neteritorijalna samouprava nacionalnih man-
jina u Srbiji – Pravni okvir i njene nedorečenosti u svetlu odluke odluke Ustavnog suda Srbije. [Non-territorial 
Self-governance of National Minorities in Serbia – Legal Framework and its Shortcomings on the Light of the 
Decision of the Constitutional Court]. In: Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, 2015/1, pp. 75-96. 
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provisions with objective determined meaning, while in the second, termed normativism, 
are those conceiving the constitution and its provisions as based on deeper principles 
(principles of political morality, or natural law).91 
The CCS has usually applied the so-called grammatical interpretation of constitutional 
principles and provisions (literalism), focusing on the literal, formal meaning of phrases 
in the constitutional text – narrowly conceived positive jurisprudence.92 Some authors 
have called this practice of extreme positivism literalism and others legalism.93 In inter-
preting the constitution, the CCS has only rarely based its interpretation on legal theory 
(doctrinarism) or on the original intention of the drafter (historic interpretation or orig-
inalism), or sought to establish the purpose of the contested provision (teleological) in 
its interpretation. Even if the CCS has, in its reasoning, gone beyond the grammatical 
meaning of the provision, applying a teleological interpretation (based on purpose), it has 
done so indirectly, without explicitly defining the governing purpose, without adequate 
reasoning 94. In interpreting constitutionally guaranteed human rights and freedoms, the 
CCS has often based its interpretation on the reasoning and interpretation elaborated in 
cases of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) related to those human rights. 
However, it more frequently references ECtHR case law in deciding on individual con-
stitutional appeals than in adjudicating constitutional disputes related to the constitution-
ality of the laws enacted by the National Assembly.95 It is notable that the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR helps to little or no degree in interpreting minority rights in the Serbian 
constitution; hence, these group specific rights (or additional rights as the CCS refer to 
them) are not guaranteed by the European Convention. The principal issue that must be 
addressed in decisions of the CCS is whether, and how, constitutionally guaranteed mi-
nority rights limit legislative action.
5.2.  Scope of legislative liberty/Discretion to Regulate Constitutional Minority 
Rights
In describing and elaborating upon provisions on minority rights in the Constitution, it 
was pointed out that these rights usually require positive state action, budgetary funding 
etc., and that the Constitution stipulates that these rights shall be exercised in accordance 
with the Law. These provisions empowering the legislator to regulate the exercise, enjoy-
ment and scope of these constitutional minority rights elicits a question: to what extent do 
the constitutional provisions limit the discretion of the legislators to determine the scope 
of these rights?
91  Jefrey goldSWorThy: Constitutional Interpretation. In: Michel roSenfeld – András Sajó (eds.): The Ox-
ford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012, pp. 690-692.
92  Violeta beŠirević: If Schmitt Were Alive...Adjusting Constitutional Review to Populist Rule in Serbia. In: 
Violeta beŠirević (ed.): New Politics of Decisionism. Eleven International Publishing, Hague, 2019, p.198.
93  Tripković 2011, pp. 745-747.
94  Tamás korhecz: Ustavno-sudsko tumačenje i rasuđivanje – sa osvrtom na praksu Ustavnog suda Republike 
Srbije. [Constitutional Interpretation with regard on the Practice of the Constitutional Court of Serbia]. In: Pravni 
život 2018/12, pp. 555-573, at p. 572. 
95  Tanasije Marinković: Analiza uticaja odluka Evropskog suda za ljudska prava na rad Ustavnog suda 
Srbije. [The Analysis of the Influence of the Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on the Work 
of the Constitutional Court of Serbia]. In: Slobodan BeljanSki – Marijana pajvančić – Tanasije Marinković – 
Dubravka valić-nedeljković (eds.): Odnos Ustavnog suda i sudske vlasti – Stanje i perspective. [Relationship 
of the Constitutional Court and Judicial Power – Situation and Perspectives]. CEPRIS, Beograd, 2019, p. 59.
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In those constitutional disputes in which the initiators contested the constitutionality of 
the provisions of laws regulating the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed minority 
rights (limiting it by prescribing some preconditions for enjoyment of those minority 
rights), the CCS repeated in several decisions that the National Assembly is constitution-
ally empowered to determine the conditions for exercising these rights and, furthermore, 
that it has wide freedom in determining these ways and conditions, that such regulation 
falls within the legislative policy of the National Assembly and that the CCS has no 
power to control such a legislative policy choice. This kind of reasoning was repeated in 
several procedures controlling the constitutionality of provisions in laws enacted by the 
National Assembly regulating the constitutional rights of persons belonging to national 
minorities for mother-tongue education in 1990 Constitution.96 Similar arguments were 
repeated later applying to the guarantees in the 2006 Constitution in relation to minority 
rights (or state obligations) for preferential representation in the National Assembly97 or 
in local assemblies.98 In these cases the CCS made no reference to Article 18, which pro-
hibits the limitation of the basic content of a minority right by law, nor did it apply any 
proportionality test. 
Contrary to the above mentioned cases, the CCS has generally demonstrated no respect 
toward the discretion of the National Assembly and the scope of legislative policy in 
those cases where it declared provisions of laws stipulating the exercise of constitution-
ally guaranteed minority rights unconstitutional99 on the grounds that such rights are be-
yond the scope of minority rights.100 
Regarding the power of the legislature to regulate the exercise of these minority rights, 
there is also an important interpretation of the CCS related to the guarantee in Article 
20, paragraph 2 of the Constitution. This provision guarantees that the attained level of 
human and minority rights shall not be diminished. Until 2015, the CCS had avoided 
interpreting this guarantee. Then, however, in its decision it finally declared that this 
constitutional principle shall not be applied to cases where the legislature, using its em-
powerment to regulate the exercise of constitutional rights, diminishes the level of such 
a right.101 According to this interpretation of the CCS, in which they went beyond the 
grammatical meaning, the guarantee of the attained level of human and minority rights 
only limits the constitution making power in a way that it is obliged to incorporate the 
existing human and minority rights from the present constitution into an amended new 
one.102 This principle, then, would not obligate the legislature to sustain the level of these 
rights guaranteed by a previous legislatives act.103
96  Decision IU-328/1992 from 14. October 1993, Decision IU-7/1998 from 1. June 2000. 
97  Decision IUp-42/2008 from 14.. April 2011.
98  Decision IUz-52/2008 from 21. April 2010.
99  Decision IUz-27/11 from 3. October 2013, Decision IUz-882/2010 from 16. January 2014, Decision 
IUz-166/2014 from 12 May 2016.
100  By stipulating such a competence “the Legislator went outside actions for the implementation of addi-
tional rights of persons belonging to national minorities.” Decision IUz-882/2010 from 16. January 2014, Part 
VI., 44 and Decision IUz-166/2014 from 12. May 2016, Part V, 5. 
101  Decision IUz-479/2014 8. April 2015, Part IV, 14.
102  Ibid.
103  This principle was applied and emphasised not only in the case of minority rights but also in the case of 
some social rights (pensions) requiring legislative regulation. See: Decision IUz-531/2014 from 23 September 
2015 and Order Iuz-351/2015, from 25 April 2019.
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5.3. Consistency and Inconsistency in the Jurisprudence of the CCS
The authority of constitutional courts depends a great deal on the consistency of their 
interpretations and their reasoning in resolving similar constitutional disputes. In this re-
spect, in the area of minority rights, the jurisprudence of the CCS is far from convincing. 
Changing attitudes of the CCS in relation to some minority rights have often occurred 
in short periods of time, without valid arguments provided for the changing of its under-
standing and interpretation of some constitutional provisions. In the area of the official 
use of minority languages, the CCS modified its position in a short period of time related 
to the constitutionality of the empowerment of the multi-ethnic Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina to regulate in detail the official use of minority languages based on the consti-
tutional provision in Article 79, paragraph 2, which states that the “additional rights of 
members of national minorities may be determined by provincial regulations”. Yet in its 
decision on the legality and constitutionality of the regulation of the Vojvodina Assem-
bly on the official use of national minority languages, the court offered no objection at 
all on the entitlement of the Vojvodina Assembly to regulate the official use of minority 
languages,104 while through its decisions in 2012105 and 2013,106 the court interpreted the Con-
stitution in such a way that the Constitution provides no possibility for the regulation 
this issue. Furthermore, even the National Assembly Law on these competences cannot 
delegate such power to the multi-ethnic province of Serbia. 
Another example of double standards and inconsistency can be seen in two decisions of 
the constitutional court enacted in an even closer time range to one another. In these cases 
the CCS decided on the constitutionality of Article 18 of the Law on Local Elections and 
on Article 43, paragraph 1 of the Law on the Election of the Members of the National 
Assembly. The contested provisions stipulate equal conditions for the candidacy for both 
those lists proposed by ordinary political parties (nation level more or less nationalistic 
Serbian political parties) and those proposed by political parties of national minorities, 
while the latter possessed priority in acquiring mandates in local and national assemblies.107 
The constitutional dispute centred on whether the rules on candidacy excluding any pref-
erential treatment for national minority political parties unconstitutionally restricted the 
rights of national minorities for representation stipulated in Article 100, paragraph 2 and 
Article 180, paragraph 4 of the Constitution. In both decisions the CCS rejected initiatives 
arguing that the National Assembly has discretion to choose between various methods of 
ensuring the representation of national minorities in respective assemblies, and it fulfilled 
its constitutional obligation by deciding to erase the 5% threshold for national minority 
political parties. However, concerning the non-existence of beneficiary conditions for the 
potential candidacy of candidate lists, the CCS argued contrastingly in its decisions. In 
104  Decision IU 395/2005 from 22 June 2010 on the constitutionality and legality of the Vojvodina Assembly 
Decree on the Further Regulation of Some Issues of the Official Language Use of National Minorities on the 
Territory of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
105  Decision IUz-353/2009 from 10 July 2012 on the constitutionality of some provisions of the Law on the 
Competences of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.
106  Decision IUo-360/2009 from 5 December 2013 on the constitutionality and legality of some provisions 
in the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. 
107  According to these laws, the listed candidates nominated by a national minority political party can take 
a seat in the assembly if they collect enough votes for only one seat (natural threshold), while other parties are 
qualified to participate in the distribution of the seats in the assembly if they collect at least 5% of casted votes. 
42
the first case108, related to the rules of candidacy in the Law on Local Elections (stipulat-
ing 30 verified signatures of voters for each candidate on the list), the CCS analysed the 
possible effects of this rule on the representation of national minorities in local assem-
blies and considered whether they could prevent national minorities from having rep-
resentation in local assemblies. After its analysis, the CCS concluded that this rule was 
not expected to have the effect of preventing the representation of national minorities 
in local assemblies, in accordance with Article 180, paragraph 4. Yet only a year later, 
when the CCS examined the constitutionality of a rule which prescribed that all political 
parties are required to have 10,000 verified signatures for candidacy, the court failed to 
consider the potential effects of a 10,000 signature rule for the representation of national 
minorities in the National Assembly. Without any analysis on this front, the CCS simply 
concluded that the provided threshold was enough to fulfil the obligation stated in Article 
100, paragraph 4, and that there was no need to prescribe any preferential treatment in the 
process of candidacy for national minorities.109 The empirical electoral data reveal that the 
10,000 verified signature rule makes it extremely difficult for minority political parties to 
produce a candidate for listing in national elections, even for those minorities and parties 
having realistic expectations for achieving enough votes to qualify a candidate for a seat 
in the national parliament. 
5.4. The Cornerstone Case of the CCS on Minority Rights
The above-mentioned decision (IUz-880/2010 from January 16, 2014) deserves particu-
lar attention in the analysis of the case law for several reasons. In late 2009 the Demo-
cratic Party led Serbian National Assembly enacted the Law on the National Councils of 
National Minorities. It was considered as long-awaited and the most important piece of 
legislation in Serbia ever enacted in the area of minority rights. This complex law regu-
lated in detail the status, registration, competencies and budgetary financing of national 
councils, and as such it opened the door for direct democratic elections of the members of 
national councils upon separate voting registers of persons belonging to each national mi-
nority.110 This law made possible the exercise of the collective right of national minorities 
to self-governance in areas of culture, education, information and official language use. 
The law was enacted with consensual support of national minority organizations, but it 
was mainly opposed by Serb nationalist organizations, opposition political parties which 
claimed that the law empowered national minorities and their elected councils with too 
much power.111 Consequently, in 2010 and 2011, eight initiatives were brought before the 
CCS contesting primarily the competences of these minority councils in various areas, 
but also challenging the possibility of direct elections of these bodies. The initiators con-
tested various provisions in contained in 37 out of the 139 articles of the law. The large 
number of initiatives and contested provisions, the innovative character of the law and the 
poor jurisprudence of the CCS related to minority rights, particularly regarding minority 
self-government, all spurred the CCS to strive to produce a well elaborated decision with 
solid doctrinaire foundations. Furthermore, the fall of the Boris Tadić led Democrats in 
108  Decision IUz-52/2008 from 21. April 2010.
109  Decision IUp-42/2008 from 14. April 2011
110  korhecz 2019, p.120.
111 Katinka BereTka: Fluid Borders of National-Cultural Autonomy: The Legal Status of National Minority 
Councils in Serbia. In: Nationalities Papers 2019/2, pp. 273-288, at p. 276.
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May 2012 liberated the CCS from its traditionally present deference, culture of restraint 
towards the ruling political majority. In other words, the new political majority after 2012 
had no sympathy towards this legislative act, making it possible for the CCS to decide 
freely upon its own considerations, and demonstrate strong judicial activism. With a high 
degree of certainty one can claim that this decision primarily reflected the opinion of 
judges voting for the decision.
In January 2013 with its decisive order, the CCS rejected as ill-founded initiatives related 
to the majority of contested provisions addressing separate voting registers, the electoral 
process, competences in areas of culture and the official use of languages. However, it did 
decide that the challenged provisions in 14 Articles merited further adjudication.112 Final-
ly, a year later, in its decision the CCS declared unconstitutional two articles of the law in 
their totality and several provisions in another eight articles. In the case of four articles, 
the CCS confirmed the constitutionality of the contested provisions.
Almost all of the invalidated provisions were related to the competences of national mi-
nority councils in the area of education and information (media) and their competences 
and relations towards state and local bodies in protecting minority rights.113   
The specificity of this decision, which further contributes to the magnitude of its signifi-
cance, is that its reasoning contains many important general statements of the CCS on the 
protection of national minorities and minority rights. On the one hand, the CCS stressed 
the necessity of guaranteeing group specific (additional) rights to national minorities 
based on the grounds that without them full and effective equality between members of 
the ethnic majority and national minorities is not possible, equal rights and non-discrim-
ination are not enough for effective equality.114 On the other hand, the at times general 
nature of their response was not without serious shortcomings. It omitted several impor-
tant sources and offered no clear answers to some basic questions regarding the definition 
and legal nature of national councils,115 such as what is the purpose of guaranteeing the 
collective rights for self-governance? 
The initiators contested ardently those provisions of the law which empowered respec-
tive national minority councils to take part in the decision making processes and in the 
management of public educational institutions with instruction in minority languages 
and, furthermore, to become co-founders or founders of these public educational insti-
tutions, primarily on the grounds that such powers are in violation of the equality of all 
citizens,116 as well as the provision in Article 79 of the constitution stipulating that the 
right to mother tongue education would be implemented in public educational facilities. 
The CCS confirmed the constitutionality of these provisions of the law in general on the 
grounds that the powers of national councils regarding public educational institutions, 
including the right to become a founder of such institutions, are based on the collective 
112  Order IUz-882/2010 from 17. January 2013. 
113  korhecz 2015, pp. 81-82. 
114  Decision IUz-882/2010, from 16 January 2014, Part V, 31. 
115  BereTka 2019, p. 277. 
116  According to the initiatives, persons not belonging to national minorities have no opportunity to influence 
the decision-making procedure in these public educational institutions; only representatives in national councils.
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right to self-governance in Article 75 paragraph 2 on constitutional empowerment and in 
Article 21 paragraph 4 on the affirmative measures necessary to achieve full equality of 
persons in substantially unequal positions and on the assumption that the right to mother 
tongue education cannot be implemented with the exclusion of the representatives of 
the respective national minority; rather, they declared that their inclusion is essential in 
decision-making.117 It is interesting that the CCS supported its own arguments regarding 
the founding rights of public educational institutions of national minority councils by 
invoking the practice in Hungary concerning the position of Serb minority educational 
institutions. 
Despite the fact that the CCS upheld the constitutionality of the general concept of the 
law, it found many of its contested provisions unconstitutional on various grounds. 
In the case of numerous contested provisions, the CCS invalidated provisions not because 
they were directly violating some provisions of the Constitution, but because these provi-
sions were not in harmony with so-called sectorial laws regulating the area of electronic 
media, administrative procedure, public broadcasting, the educational system etc. Such 
inconsistencies may violate the constitutional principle of unity of the legal order, Article 
4, paragraph 1 of the Constitution. In many of its decisions on individual provisions, the 
CCS emphasized that the provision of a law regulating a different subject matter cannot 
change a rule from a law regulating another area of public life without this explicit pos-
sibility provided within the law. The essential problem with the application of this rule 
regarding the concrete competences of national councils is twofold. Firstly, one can argue 
that national councils and their competences are in a systematic way regulated by the Law 
on the National Councils of National Minorities and, therefore, have the standing of a 
subject matter that cannot be regulated systematically by another law. Secondly, by letting 
a sectoral law provision prevail, the CCS could exclude or drastically limit the exercise of 
collective rights guaranteed by Article 75 of the Constitution.118 
In several other cases, the unconstitutionality of provisions was not based on any concrete 
provision of the Constitution, but rather on the restrictive interpretation of the CCS of the 
scope of minority rights119, or, as the CCS articulated it simply; the “Legislator went out-
side actions for the implementation of additional rights of persons belonging to national 
minorities”.120 The problem with this kind of court activism is that the CCS provided 
very weak, or even a complete lack of, argumentation about the constitutional limits of 
these minority rights, violated by the National Assembly. One could infer, however, that 
behind these arguments the constitutional guarantees of the ethnically-based nation state 
and the interest of the dominant ethnic group were present without it being explicitly 
mentioned.121 A suitable example of such a restrictive interpretation is the annulment of 
the provision in Article 12, par. 1, point 5, which stipulated that national minority councils 
are to participate in the appointment of some school directors via preliminary consent 
117  Decision IUz-882/2010 from 16 January 2014, Part VI, 39, 45.
118  Dissenting Opinion Judge Odri Kartag Agnes, Bilten Ustavnog suda 2012-2016 Knjiga 1 [Bulletin of the 
Constitutional Court 2012-2016, Book 1]. Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2018, p. 522. 
119  BereTka 2019, p. 281.
120  Decision IUz-882/2010, from 16. January 2014, Part VI, 35,.43-45, 57, 68, 70.
121  korhecz 2018, p. 572.
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(veto) power. The CCS tried to defend its argument that participation in decision-making 
cannot amount to veto power by referring to Article 15 of the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities and the Explanatory Report attached to this conven-
tion.122 In its argumentation the CCS completely neglected to analyse the standings of the 
Advisory Committee for monitoring the Framework Convention, which could suggest a 
completely different conclusion.123 According to various scholars, domestic, constitution-
al, and legal provisions provide even less of a basis for such a restrictive constitutional 
interpretation of minority rights. Várady and Beretka argue that constitutional provisions 
(Article 75, par. 2) stipulate both autonomous decision making and participation in deci-
sion making; therefore, preliminary consent cannot violate the constitution – on the con-
trary, consultation is the lowest level of participation in decision making, if it is a form of 
participation at all.124 Odri Kartag refers to the Law on Administrative Procedure, which 
explicitly stipulates preliminary consent as a means of participation in administrative 
decision-making.125 
A third group of provisions was invalidated because the CCS made some rather technical 
omissions in the interpretation of some provisions of various laws.126
The unusual activism of the CCS in this cornerstone case can also be seen in the light of 
the court acting as a positive legislator. In the case of several provisions, the CCS, inter-
preted phrases in provisions differently from their literal meaning, and in doing so spared 
the unconstitutional provision, but under the strict condition that they are interpreted ex-
clusively in the manner stated by the CCS.127 
Although the reasoning lacks any reference to constitutionally protected values, juxta-
posed with the constitutionally protected minority rights, one could see in it the tacit de-
termination of the CCS to protect the centralized ethnic based nation state from collective 
minority rights aimed to protect ethnic diversity. In this respect one can find a slightly 
more direct reference to the protection of the position of the titular nation and nation 
state in another cornerstone case of the constitutional court, in which the CCS declared 
122  Decision IUz-882/2010, from 16. January 2014, Part VI, 43-44
123  Norbert TóTh: A tool for an effective participation in the decision-making process? The case of the na-
tional councils of national minorities. In: Balázs vízi – Norbert TóTh – Edgár doBoS (eds.): Beyond Internation-
al Conditionality: Local Variations of Minority Representation in Central and South-Eastern Europe. Nomos, 
Baden-Baden, 2017, pp. 235-236. korhecz 2015, pp. 91-92.
124  Tibor varadi: Mišljenje o ustavnopravnim pitanjima koja je postavljaju povodom osporenih odredaba 
Zakon o nacionalnim savetima – Izneto na javnoj raspravi pred Ustavnim sudom 2. jula 2013.godine. [Opinion 
on Constitutional Law Question Related to Disputed Provision of the Law on National Councils – Elaborated 
on Public Hearing Before the Constitutional Court on 2 July 2013.]. In: Pravni zapisi, 2013/2, pp. 419-435, at 
pp. 427-428, BereTka 2019, p. 281.
125  karTag 2018, p. 520.
126  korhecz 2015, pp. 93-94.
127  Milan sTanić: Doprinos unapređenju pravne države kroz mehanizam ustavnosudske kontrole opštih 
akata u svetlu interpretativnih odluka Ustavnog suda Srbije. [Contribution of the Constitutional Court to the 
Development of the Rule of Law Principle through the Judicial Review of Legislative Acts in the Light of In-
terpretation Decisions of the Constitutional Court]. Bilten Ustavnog suda. Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2018, pp. 
929-934, Decision IUz-882/2010, from 16. January 2014, Part VI, 37, 59.
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unconstitutional the majority of the provisions of the Statute of the multi-ethnic Autono-
mous Province of Vojvodina.128
5.5. Relationship Between Interpretation Methodology, Judicial Activism and 
Constituency in Jurisprudence and State Policy Towards National Minorities
In the period of our analysis, from 1990 to 2019, the Serbian government has embraced 
different policies regarding the rights of national minorities. Even without precise, de-
tailed analysis, clear ups and downs and shifts over short time periods are apparent in 
its policies towards national minorities. This policy is best measured by the content and 
direction of various legislative acts regulating the rights of national minorities, by the 
involvement of minority political parties in governments, by the foundation of various 
institutions for the implementation of minority rights, by the level protection provided 
to various national identities and by the level of budgetary finances allotted for the im-
plementation of minority rights. Measured by these parameters, the golden age of state 
policy towards national minorities in Serbia was somewhere between 2001 and 2011129, 
while since the political turnover of 2012 some decline in state policy towards national 
minorities is evident.130 Over the last three decades, the policy towards national minor-
ities was most restrictive during the Milosević rule in the nineties of the last century.131 
If we juxtapose the periods of ups and downs in the state policy with the decisions on 
minority rights enacted by the court in those periods we get astonishing concordance. In 
the period between 2001 and 2011, the CCS declared constitutional and confirmed all 
contested provisions in the laws enacted by the national assembly which in one way or 
another broadened the scope of minority rights. One specific decision deserves special 
attention in this respect. In 2004 the CCS upheld the constitutionality of a provision in 
Article 13 of the Law on the Election of Members of the National Assembly guaranteeing 
preferential position of electoral lists proposed by national minority political parties (and 
not applying the 5% threshold requirement) despite the fact that the 1990 Constitution 
had no provision guaranteeing special representation or affirmative action of national 
minorities in the National Assembly. The CCS in its reasoning stated that the preferential 
treatment of minority political parties is not discriminatory towards other citizens, but 
rather that it guarantees access for minorities to the National Assembly, that it is necessary 
128  The CCS declared unconstitutional Article 6 of the Statute guaranteeing equality of all national-ethnic 
communities including the Serb majority partially on the grounds that according to Article 1 of the Constitution 
Serbia is the unitary state of the Serb nation; therefore, it is unconstitutional to declare Serbs as a majority 
national-ethnic community equal with other national-ethnic communities, which are actually defined in the 
Constitution as national minorities. In this way the CCS clearly protected the specific dominant constitutional 
position of Serbs in the Serbian nation state, in juxtaposition to national minorities and their position. Decision 
Iuo-360/2009 from 5 December 2013, 79-80 
129  In this period the most important legislative acts on minority rights were enacted (Law on the Protection 
of Rights and Freedoms of National Minorities (2002), Law on the National Councils of National Minorities 
(2009), Bilateral Agreements on the Reciprocal Protection of National Minorities with Hungary, Croatia, Ro-
mania and FYR of Macedonia (from 2002-2004, etc.) and several public institutions protecting the national 
identity of national minorities were established; a new university faculty, schools, cultural institutes and centers, 
theatres (2003-2011) etc.
130  Petar Teofilović: Trendovi u oblasti prava nacionalnih manjina u Srbiji. [Some Tendencies in the Area 
of Minority Rights in Serbia]. In: Tibor varady (ed.): Prava nacionalnih manjina u ustavnopravnom sistemu 
Republike Srbije. [Rights of National Minorities Under the Constitutional System of the Republic of Serbia]. 
Srpska akademija nauka i umetnosti, Beograd, 2019, p. 71, 80.
131  várady 1997, pp. 21-26.
47
to protect minorities and that such protection cannot be restricted merely to areas of cul-
tural identity.132 This case is a clear example of the CCS going beyond the grammatical 
meaning of constitutional provisions and supporting a pro minority solution with a basis 
in certain principles and through teleological interpretation. Moreover, in this period, 
CCS principally confirmed the legality and constitutionality of contested provisions in 
the regulations of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and some municipalities inhab-
ited mainly by national minorities. The CCS upheld the constitutionality of the contested 
provisions in the provincial regulation on the election of deputies in the Assembly of the 
Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.133 The CCS repeated its argumentation related to 
the preferential treatment of national minority political parties in state level elections, but 
added that Vojvodina is a specific multi-ethnic region, where such measures are needed. 
The CCS was similarly positive in confirming some provisions in local regulations. In 
such a way, the CCS upheld the Statute of Stara Pazova and Bačka Topola. In the first 
decision, the CCS upheld the provision of the local statute stipulating that local author-
ities and institutions founded by the municipality are obliged to take into account the 
knowledge of the national minority language and the national-ethnic proportions of the 
population in employing new employees. The provisions on the preferential employment 
of national minorities and the minority language knowledge requirement, and the power 
of local municipalities to regulate such issues, was upheld on the broad interpretation 
of the provision in the federal law on the protection of national minorities.134 In another 
affirmative decision, the CCS upheld the provision of the Statute of Bačka Topola munic-
ipality determining the traditional names of settlements in Hungarian language. Despite 
its previous interpretation of the respective provisions of the Law on Official Language 
and Script and the annulment of similar provisions in other Hungarian populated munic-
ipalities in 2001,135 the CCS upheld the provision. The CCS based its reasoning on the 
provisions of the Framework Convention, on the Bilateral Agreement with Hungary and 
on the Law on the Protection of National Minorities, all of which make lawful the use of 
traditional names of settlement in national minority languages, contrary to the Law on the 
Official Use of Languages and Script.136
On the other hand, in other periods, there are decisions in which the CCS interpreted con-
stitutional and legal provisions on minority rights restrictively, allowing various authori-
ties to implement them with wide discretion or not to implement them at all. In previous 
sections we elaborated many examples in which the CCS respected the wide discretion 
to the legislature to limit these constitutionally protected rights, however such interpre-
tation of the CCS is present even towards the provisions in the acts of administration 
or local self-governments. In three cases the CCS failed to declare unconstitutional and 
unlawful the provisions of the ministerial decree and local self-government regulations 
132  Decision IU-110/2004 from 15 July 2004. 
133  Decision IU-334/2004 from 2 December 2004.
134  Decision IU-171/2002 from 5 June 2003.
135  Decision IU-111/93 from 25 January 2001, Decision IU-350/93 from 25 January 2001, and Decision 
IU-64/94 from 25 January 2001.
136  Decision IU-446/2004 from 18 February 2010.
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despite their clear, even literal collision with the Laws regulating official language use of 
minority languages137 and the Law regulating the financing of minority self-governments138.
6 . Concluding Remarks
The general and dominant characteristics, as well as the chief criticisms, of the CCS 
identified by scholars are confirmed in the case law analysed in this paper as well. The 
Court’s tendencies to consistently escape conflicts with the actual ruling political majority 
and to show deference to the legislative and executive power is evident in these cases as 
well; moreover, the jurisprudence of the CCS typically followed the concurrent track of 
the actual state policy towards national minorities and their rights.
In the almost 30 years covering the period from 1990 to 2019, the CCS invalidated no 
provision of law adopted by the national assembly adjudging that it restricted a minority 
right. Neither did the court ever uphold an initiative launched by members of national mi-
norities or their organizations seeking the protection of a minority right against a violation 
by a law or regulation. Generally, such initiatives were rejected and the necessity of a law 
to conform to the constitution was declared on the grounds that the legislature is empow-
ered to stipulate the execution of minority rights, and it has wide discretion in doing so. 
Contrastingly, the CCS declared in certain cases provisions of the law unconstitutional 
because they provided too great a degree of minority rights or on the grounds that they 
were not harmonized with the provisions of some sectorial laws stipulating differently on 
the same subject matter. In doing so the CCS interpreted minority rights restrictively, not 
affirmatively to protect them against potential violations,139 while at the same time giving 
preference to certain constitutional provisions over minority rights. Contrary to its dom-
inant interpretation methodology (positivism or even literalism), in cases where the CCS 
invalidated some minority rights guaranteed in legislative acts it tacitly applied normativ-
ism as constitutional interpretation methodology. Namely, in these cases the CCS often 
went beyond the text of the constitutional provision and based its decisions on inherent 
constitutional values – the protection of the ethnically based nation state, and the position 
of the titular nation. Unfortunately, the CCS did so indirectly, without openly identifying 
137  In Decision IU 297/96 from 8 February 2001 the CCS rejected the initiative against a ministerial decree 
rendering the exclusive use of only Serb language forms by Birth Registrars in general, despite of the provi-
sion of the Law on the Official Use of Language and Script obliging authorities to issue bilingual forms from 
all public registers in areas in which the language of the national minority is in official use as well. The CCS 
rejected the initiative on the ground that the Decree is formally not regulating the use of minority languages 
but only forms, so if some question is not regulated by the legal norm it can not violate higher norm as well. In 
Order 399/2014 from 10 June 2014 the CCS rejected the initiative against the Statute of the Irig municipality 
rendering the exclusive official use of the Serb language not regulating the official use of the national minority 
language contrary to the provision of the laws and provincial regulations obliging all municipalities to guarantee 
the official status of minority language in settlements where the minority population exceed a percentage of the 
total population. The court argued that the CCS has no competence to decide in cases in which something was 
not regulated by the Statute, even if such obligation to regulate might exist.  
138  In Order IUo-56/2016 from 28 February 2017 the CCS rejected the initiativinst the Act on Budget of Mu-
nicipality Novi Pazar for the Year 2016, planning no financial support to the Bosniak National Council contrary 
to the provision of the Law on the National Councils of National Minorities (Art. 115). The CCS argued that the 
CCS has no competence to create provisions which were not enacted by the Local Assembly.
139  karTag 2018, p. 518.
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the protected inherent constitutional value or principle, nor did the CCS identify guiding 
principles for balancing minority rights and constitutional principles guaranteeing the 
position of the titular nation and nation state.
Despite the above mentioned conclusions, it should be noted that the CCS has made 
some considerable efforts to interpret the character, position and goals of minority rights 
in the Constitution using and applying international standards and legal and political the-
ory, primarily in its cornerstone decision from 2014. The constitutionality of many legal 
provisions guaranteeing special rights was upheld by the CCS on the basis that persons 
belonging to national minorities cannot be fully equal with other citizens (the majority) 
without special minority rights, in this way asserting a clear difference between formal 
equality before the law and effective equality, for which special minority rights are in-
evitable. These principles, however, were not consequently applied in resolving concrete 
constitutional disputes. With a great deal of certainty, one may conclude that the CCS has 
not operated an anti-majoritarian institution protecting the constitutional rights of minor-
ities against potential limitations of the political-ethnic majority governing the legislative 
and the executive branches. Furthermore, the CCS has not contributed substantially to 
understanding the basic content of minority rights or their relationship to the constitution-
al principles protecting the unity of the nation state of Serbia, with Serbs as the dominant 
ethnicity. On account of this approach, the long catalogue of specific minority rights 
in the Constitution has been practically degraded to the level of second-ranked consti-
tutional rights, to the status of political proclamations without judicial protection. The 
best illustration might be the jurisprudence of the CCS concerning the minority right for 
special representation in assemblies. First, in 2004, the CCS upheld the constitutionality 
of legal provisions guaranteeing privileged representation of national minorities in the 
National Assembly and in the Provincial Assembly without invoking any basis in the pro-
vision of the 1990 constitution, but basing their decision on general principles,140 while in 
2011, the same court rejected initiatives launched against the lack of affirmative action in 
the nomination procedures for national minority lists despite the special provision in the 
Constitution guaranteeing equal representation of national minorities in the National As-
sembly.141 This illustrates that if the National Assembly wishes it can provide privileges 
without a specific constitutional guarantee. On the other hand, a constitutional guarantee 
does not press the National Assembly to provide suitable tools for effective participation 
in the national assembly.
This situation gives rise to a question: what can motivate the constituent power to guar-
antee all these minority rights if there is no judicial intention to effectively protect and 
implement them? These rights are mainly decorative windows, reflecting the heritage of 
the Federal Yugoslavia based on ethnic balancing, while posing as a tool for European 
integration.
140  Order IU-110/2004 from 15 July 2004 and Order IU-334/2004 from 2 December 2004.
141  Decision IUp-42/2008 from 14 April 2011.
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Noémi Nagy:1
Pacing around hot porridge: Judicial restraint by the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary in the protection of 
national minorities2
1 . Introduction
This paper presents the final results of a two-year research evaluating the role of the 
Constitutional Court of Hungary in the protection of national minorities. Since in most 
democratic states the ultimate guardian of minority rights (and human rights in general) 
is a constitutional court, it is essential to be aware of its jurisprudence to have a thorough 
understanding of the situation of national minorities. 
In Hungary the relevant case law is relatively minor: during the three decades of its op-
eration, the Constitutional Court of Hungary adjudicated approximately 10 000 cases 
in sum, whereas only about 30, that is less than 1% of these3  are related to the rights of 
national minorities (or as they are referred to since 2011: nationalities4). The issues dealt 
with in these cases may be categorized along three main questions: 1. What is a minority? 
More specifically, what does the constitutional term “constituent part of the state” mean, 
and which groups seeking recognition can be considered minorities? 2. Who belongs to a 
minority? That is, who is to be recognized as a subject of minority rights, and what are the 
rules for minority self-identification? 3. What are minority rights? The first two issues I 
have discussed elsewhere,5 therefore this paper will focus on the third one only. Namely, I 
will explore the exact content of specific rights for persons belonging to minorities set out 
in the Constitution/Fundamental Law, the Minorities/Nationalities Act6 and other sectoral 
laws, in the light of the interpretation of the Constitutional Court. For a general overview 
of Hungary’s legal framework on minority rights readers are referred to my previous 
article,7 however, when analyzing the individual cases, the necessary explanation of the 
relevant legal provisions will be given. 
1  Senior Lecturer, University of Public Service (Budapest), Faculty of Public Governance and International 
Studies, Department of International Law.
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights as 
Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level of 
legal education. The manuscript was submitted on 31 October 2020.
3  The full texts of the decisions and orders discussed in this paper are available (in Hungarian) at the official 
website of the Constitutional Court of Hungary: https://www.alkotmanybirosag.hu/ugykereso/ . Translations of 
excerpts have been prepared by the author.
4  The terms “nationalities” and “(national) minorities” will be used interchangeably throughout this paper, 
similarly to how they are used in the constitutional case-law.
5  Noémi nagy: Identifying minority communities and persons belonging to national minorities in light of 
the case-law of the Constitutional Court of Hungary. In: Petar Teofilović (ed.): Nation, Community, Minority, 
Identity – the Protective Role of Constitutional Courts. Szeged – Novi Sad, Szegedi Tudományegyetem Állam- 
és Jogtudományi Kar – Pravne i poslovne akademske studije dr Lazar Vrkatic, 2020, pp. 36–82.
6  Act no. LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities; replaced as of 1 January 2012 
by Act no. CLXXIX of 2011 on the Rights of Nationalities.
7  nagy 2020, pp. 38–47.
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In the following section I will provide a theoretical background to how Hungarian legis-
lation conceive the very notion of minority rights, then I will analyze those decisions of 
the Constitutional Court which are relevant for the rights of national minorities. Issues 
that have been raised include the right to representation of minorities (parliamentary and 
municipal), the legal status of minority self-governments, and certain language rights. Fi-
nally, I will discuss how effectively or ineffectively the Constitutional Court of Hungary 
have protected minority rights. The conclusions will be provided on the basis of all the 
relevant cases, analyzed in both my previous paper and this one.
2 . What are minority rights?
According to Article XV (2) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary (entered into force on 
1 January 2012),8 the State shall guarantee the fundamental rights to everyone without 
any discrimination, in particular without discrimination on the grounds of language and 
national origin. This was also provided by the former Constitution.9 At the same time, one 
of the underlying ideas of Hungary’s legislation on minorities is that it is not enough to 
guarantee universal human rights without discrimination to persons belonging to minor-
ities, because in their case equal treatment with other citizens would only lead to formal 
equality.10 As Justice Bragyova put it in one of his concurring opinions: “The rights of 
national and ethnic minorities are, in fact, constitutional rights equal to the »majority« 
rights; their uniqueness stems only from the fact that they serve to compensate for the 
disadvantages – in any case, differences – arising from the different situation of national 
and ethnic minorities in the exercise of certain constitutional rights. The constitutional 
role of minority rights is to ensure the equality of national and ethnic minorities in the 
exercise of fundamental rights.”11 For Bragyova, minority rights have a dual basis: one 
of them is the constitutional provision which guarantees the fundamental rights of the 
members of national and ethnic minorities without discrimination. The other basis is “the 
provision for special conditions for the exercise of fundamental rights […], especially the 
provision for rights that can only be exercised in community (jointly) with the members 
of the minority which, due to the peculiarities of national and ethnic minorities, cannot be 
created by the mere absence of discrimination.”12
Five years later, Decision no. 1162/D/2010 of the Constitutional Court expressed a sim-
ilar view: “national and ethnic minorities as constituent parts of the State should be as-
sisted in the exercise of certain constitutional rights, in order to eliminate disadvantages 
and inequalities arising from [their] different situation”.13 That is why it can be said that 
8  The English translation is available at: https://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2021/01/thefundamental-
lawofhungary_20201223_fin.pdf  
9  Act no. XX of 1949, thoroughly modified after the transition to democracy, in 1989/90.
10  Bernadette SoMody: A nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek jogai. [The rights of national and ethnic minorities.]. 
In: István kukorelli (ed.): Alkotmánytan I. Budapest, Osiris Kiadó, 2007, p. 155.
11  Decision 45/2005. (XII. 14.) AB, Justice Bragyova’s concurring opinion, [1], par. 2.
12  Ibid. [1], par. 3.
13  Decision 1162/D/2010 AB, III. [3], par. 1.
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Hungary’s regulation is based on the provision of special or additional minority rights.14 
However, whether minority rights shall be considered as additional or special rights at 
all, is a subject of serious academic debate. Legal philosopher Andrássy, for example, 
strongly opposes this notion, and claims in relation to minority language rights that it is 
precisely the recognition of these rights that can counterbalance, to a modest extent, the 
additional rights and privileges enjoyed by persons belonging to the majority.15 Interna-
tional lawyer Kardos’s opinion might offer a middle ground here: “minority rights are not 
additional rights because they give an additional right in a material sense, because they do 
not, they only guarantee the implicit rights of the majority, but because their implementa-
tion requires additional effort – […] infrastructure – on the part of the State”.16 
Another important starting point for the protection of minorities in Hungary is that minor-
ity rights cannot be properly implemented if they are regulated only as individual human 
rights; it is also necessary to formulate them as collective rights.17 In this spirit, the Fun-
damental Law provides for the following – partly individual and partly collective – rights 
of minorities: to freely express and preserve their identity, to use their mother tongue, to 
use names in their own languages, to nurture their own cultures, to receive education in 
their mother tongues, and to establish their self-government at both local and national 
level (Article XXIX). In addition to these, the previous Constitution specifically ensured 
the right to collective participation and representation in public life, whereas the current 
Fundamental Law (Article 2 (2)) mentions the participation of nationalities in the work of 
the National Assembly (but does not guarantee it as a subjective right). In the following, 
I will discuss the constitutional case law relevant to these rights.
3 . The right of minorities to representation
Ensuring the representation of minorities living in Hungary has been subject to heated 
public debate since the democratic transition in 1989/90, thus it is no surprise that the 
issue was brought to the Constitutional Court several times. However, the Court did not 
actively promote the case, instead it usually rejected to address the subject on the merits 
on the grounds that, although ensuring participation in the decision-making of public 
authorities is a constitutional obligation, the legislator has a wide discretion in choosing 
how to fulfill this obligation.18
14  Interestingly, while the need to reduce „the disadvantages which result from being a minority” was in-
cluded in the preamble of the (previous) Minorities Act of 1993, in the new Nationalities Act of 2011 this per-
ception – i.e. acknowledging that belonging to a nationality can be a disadvantage – is omitted. Péter kállai: 
Az alkotmányos patriotizmustól a nemzeti és etnikai kisebbségek parlamenti képviseletéig. [From constitutional 
patriotism to parliamentary representation of national and ethnic minorities.]. In: Fundamentum, 2012/4, p. 46.
15  György andráSSy: A nyelvszabadságról és a nyelvszabadság jelentőségéről. [On the freedom of language 
and the importance of freedom of language]. In: Létünk, 2013/special edition, p. 17.
16  Gábor kardoS: Nyelvi jogok, európai megoldások? [Language rights, European solutions?]. In: Magyar 
Kisebbség – Nemzetpolitikai Szemle, 2016/2, p. 8.
17  Ernő kállai– Gabriella varjú: A kisebbségi törvény. [The Minorities Act.]. In: Tamás gyulavári– Ernő 
kállai (eds.): A jövevényektől az államalkotó tényezőkig. A nemzetiségi közösségek múltja és jelene Magyar-
országon. [From newcomers to state-forming factors. The past and present of ethnic communities in Hungary.]. 
Budapest, Országgyűlési Biztos Hivatala, 2010, p. 188.
18  Cf. e.g. Decision 34/2005. (IX. 29.) AB, III. [2]
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One form of representation is the establishment of minority self-governments, which will 
be discussed in detail in the next section of this paper. Other forms of representation 
include the participation of political parties representing minorities in the elections, the 
establishment of a second parliamentary chamber on a corporate basis, and the deviation 
from the general rules for the allocation of mandates in favor of minorities in the elec-
tions.19
The latter mode of representation, namely the possibility of obtaining a preferential seat 
in the local government, was provided by the regulation in force until 2005, but the simi-
lar new provisions (modifying the former Minorities Act) did not pass the Constitutional 
Court’s ex ante review, initiated by the President of the Republic.20 The provision in ques-
tion would have made it possible for an elected member of the local minority self-gov-
ernment to become a member of the board of representatives of the local government 
(municipality) by making a declaration, if he or she obtained a certain amount of votes. 
According to the Constitutional Court, this solution violates the principles of democratic 
legitimacy and equal suffrage, as it would give persons belonging to minorities the right 
to vote twice (that is, to vote in the elections of both the local governments and the mi-
nority self-governments). The Court found that a departure from the principle of equal 
suffrage constitutes a restriction on fundamental rights, which cannot be justified even 
with the protection of fundamental rights of minorities.21
As far as parliamentary representation is concerned, the relevant constitutional rules al-
low for various interpretations. The previous Constitution in 1990 clearly stated that “the 
representation of national and linguistic minorities living in the Republic of Hungary 
must be ensured in the National Assembly and the Councils”.22 However, the provision 
was amended in the same year by Act no. XL of 1990: “The laws of the Republic of 
Hungary ensure the representation of national and ethnic minorities living in the territory 
of the country”. Clearly, the latter provision no longer refers explicitly to representation 
in the Parliament23. However, the issue remained on the political agenda, and despite 
the relevant – albeit contradictory – decisions of the Constitutional Court (see below), 
the legislator seemed to embrace the idea of an outstanding constitutional omission to 
represent minorities.24
A constitutional amendment in 2010 eventually limited the number of the members of 
Parliament at two hundred, and allowed for the election of maximum thirteen addition-
al members to represent national and ethnic minorities. However, this provision never 
19  Gábor kurunczi: Az általános és egyenlő választójog elvével összefüggő kihívások alkotmányjogi ele-
mzése a magyar szabályozás tükrében. [Constitutional analysis of the challenges related to the principle of 
universal and equal suffrage in the light of Hungarian regulations.]. PhD dissertation. Budapest, Pázmány Péter 
Katolikus Egyetem, Jog- és Államtudományi Doktori Iskola, 2019, p. 97. Available online: http://real-phd.mtak.
hu/874/2/Kurunczi_G%C3%A1bor_dolgozatv.pdf 
20  Decision 34/2005. (IX. 29.) AB
21  Ibid. III. [5]–[6]. This decision may be one of the reasons why the current regulation on the representation 
of minorities in the Parliament prescribes that persons belonging to minorities shall vote for either a party-list 
or a nationality-list but not both. See more on this below.
22  Article 68 (3), incorporated by Act no. XVI of 1990.
23  The terms „Parliament” and „National Assembly” are used interchangeably in this paper.
24  kállai 2012, p. 49.
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entered into effect, and the Fundamental Law, in force since 2012, does not deal with 
the right of nationalities to representation. Although Article 2 (2) stipulates that “[t]he 
participation of nationalities living in Hungary in the work of the National Assembly 
shall be regulated by a cardinal Act”, as Kállai appropriately points out, the concept of 
participation is not the same as representation.25 The cardinal law in question26 finally 
came into force on 1 January 2012, but the regulation on the parliamentary representation 
of nationalities and its practical benefits continue to be disputed.27 Based on the over-
view of legislative changes, Hargitai’s statement made two decades ago seems valid even 
today: “the Hungarian political elite […] never had a definite idea of the parliamentary 
representation of minorities”.28
The issue was first brought before the Constitutional Court in 1991. Although the pe-
titioner alleged the unconstitutionality of a legislative omission expressly with regard 
to paragraph 3 of Article 68 of the Constitution, which regulates the representation of 
minorities, the Constitutional Court examined the entire article ex officio. After finding 
that „the general representation of minorities has not been statutorily ensured to the ex-
tent and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution” (emphasis added),29 it called on 
the Parliament to pass a law on the rights of national and ethnic minorities. Importantly, 
the decision did not specify that there would be any constitutional requirement to en-
sure the parliamentary representation of minorities. The Parliament finally enacted the 
Minorities Act in 1993, in which it settled the issues of minority self-governance (as a 
form of representation), but delegated the regulation of parliamentary representation to a 
separate law.30 That law, in turn, was never drafted, and it is also clear that the right to rep-
resentation referred to by the Minorities Act was not a constitutional requirement, simply 
because it was not included in the Constitution but in a parliamentary act.31
In light of the above, one may have a hard time understanding Order no. 24/1994 of the 
Constitutional Court. Here, a petitioner alleged a legislative omission violating the Con-
stitution, because the electoral law in force at the time did not provide for the election 
of minority members of the Parliament. The Constitutional Court noted with satisfaction 
25  Ibid.
26  Act no. CCIII of 2011 on the Election of Members of the National Assembly, and Act no. XXXVI of 
2013 on the Electoral Procedure. The latter gives nationalities the possibility to obtain preferential seats: the 
5% threshold for candidates of nationalities is abolished, and it is sufficient for them to reach a quarter of the 
votes required to obtain a mandate from the party-list (cf. Articles 14 and 16). Following this regulation, in 2014 
no nationality group was able to send a representative to the Parliament, and in 2018 only the Germans did. 
The other nationalities elected so called advocates to the Parliament. However, the legal status of nationality 
advocates is fundamentally different from that of the Members of Parliament, as an advocate does not have the 
right to vote at parliamentary meetings, and he can only speak if the agenda item affects the interests or rights 
of nationalities (cf. Act no. XXXVI of 2012 on the National Assembly, Article 29). For more information, see 
Péter kállai: Képviselő-e a szószóló? Nemzetiségi képviselet az Országgyűlésben. [Is the advocate a Member 
of Parliament? Representation of nationalities in the National Assembly.]. MTA Law Working Papers, 2017/12. 
Available online: https://jog.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/2017_12_Kallai.pdf
27  See András László PaP: Sarkalatos átalakulások – a nemzetiségekre vonatkozó szabályozás. [Cardinal 
transformations – regulation on nationalities.]. MTA Law Working Papers, 2014/52. pp. 11–12. Available on-
line: http://jog.tk.mta.hu/mtalwp; kurunczi 2019, pp. 104–118.
28  János hargiTai: A kisebbségek jogai. [The rights of minorities.]. In: Fundamentum, 2001/3, p. 61.
29  Decision 35/1992. (VI. 10.) AB, III. par. 3.
30  Act no. LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities, Article 20 (1).
31  kállai 2012, p. 48.; cf. hargiTai 2001, p. 62.
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that the representation of minorities in form of local self-governments had already been 
settled by law.32 As regards parliamentary representation, the Court quoted at length from 
its previous decision (no. 35/1992), and concluded that it had „already established a viola-
tion of the Constitution with regard to the representation of national and ethnic minorities 
in the Parliament”, which therefore qualifies as res judicata and entails the rejection of the 
submission without substantive examination.33 András Sereg, then press chief of the Con-
stitutional Court, thought that the 1994 order subsequently “projected” the constitution-
al requirement of compulsory parliamentary representation into the previous decision, 
where it had not been explicitly included – thus providing adequate basis for creating the 
“myth of omission”.34
Since the Parliament remained reluctant to remedy its legislative omission (even after the 
Constitutional Court had “already established” that the situation was unconstitutional), 
the Minority Ombudsman launched an attack from another direction. In his submission 
for an ex-post review, he claimed that the provisions of the electoral law were discrimina-
tory and thus unconstitutional, because they prescribed a general 5% electoral threshold. 
This threshold also applied to parties organized on a national or ethnic basis, when it was 
well-known that only 10% of Hungary’s population belonged to minority groups, so they 
obviously had no realistic chance of getting the necessary amount of votes.35 However, 
the Constitutional Court saw the matter differently and, relying on a restrictive inter-
pretation of the prohibition of discrimination, rejected the submission: “The provisions 
sought to be annulled by the petitioner do not discriminate between voters or parties on 
the grounds of their national or ethnic minority affiliation. […] The conditions are equal 
for everyone, so the possibility of negative discrimination cannot even arise.”36 As for 
positive discrimination, no one has a constitutional right for that, since the application 
thereof falls within the competence of the legislator.37 Consequently, the parliamentary 
representation of minorities can be provided by the Parliament “in other constitutional 
ways”, the Constitution does not contain a mandatory provision for the solution outlined 
by the Minority Ombudsman.38
The Court did not provide further guidance on possible “other constitutional ways” either 
in its 2001 decision or afterwards. Although in Decision no. 45/2005 – dealing mainly 
with minority affiliation – the Court confirmed that the representation of minorities and 
their collective participation in public life is a fundamental constitutional right,39 in con-
32  Order 24/1994. (V. 6.) AB, II. par. 8.
33  Ibid. II. par. 9. This was confirmed by Presidential Order 760/I/2003 AB, which also rejected a submission 
concerning the parliamentary representation of minorities, claiming that the legislative omission in that regard 
had already been established.
34  kállai 2012, pp. 48–49. Interestingly, this myth of omission was embraced by former Minority Ombuds-
man (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities) Ernő Kállai as well as legal 
scholars, e. g. Zsuzsanna cSaPó: A kisebbségek parlamenti képviseletének kérdése az “Új Alkotmány” küszöbén. 
[The issue of parliamentary representation of minorities on the verge of the “New Constitution”.]. Kül-világ, 
2011/1–2, pp. 82–101; kurunczi 2019, p. 103.
35  Decision 1040/B/1999. AB, I. par. 2.
36  Ibid. III. 5.
37  Ibid. III. 6.
38  Ibid. III. 7.
39  Decision 45/2005. (XII. 14.) AB, III. 9.
56
nection with the concrete implementation thereof it only stated that the legislator has a 
wide decision-making power, which can only be limited by other fundamental rights.40
After reviewing the changes in the constitutional and statutory regulations, the Court 
came to the evasive conclusion that with regard to the method of minority representation, 
“no clear constitutional principle has emerged since 1990. The legislator experimented 
with different solutions and this search for a path was allowed by the text of the Consti-
tution”.41 These findings, in the present case, applied mainly to minority self-governance, 
and it is at least thought-provoking that the issue of constitutional omission regarding 
parliamentary representation was not even mentioned by the Constitutional Court. What 
is more, this time the Court referred to its previous Decision no. 35/1992 (of a notoriously 
uncertain interpretation) as one whereby “in order to enforce the right of minorities to es-
tablish self-governments (sic!), the Constitutional Court […] found a legislative omission 
violating the Constitution, because the Parliament had not enacted the law on the rights 
of minoritiesˮ.42 As the Parliament has since adopted the law – argues the Court –, no 
omission can be found anymore. So, while the original decision (no. 35/1992) established 
a breach of the Constitution with regard to the general representation of minorities, which 
may include parliamentary representation as well (as assumed by Order no. 24/1994), De-
cision no. 45/2005 cautiously stayed away from the matter of parliamentary representa-
tion and limited itself to examining representation in the form of self-governance, which 
was the actual subject-matter of the submission.
Although we did not learn from the Constitutional Court in what form the parliamentary 
representation of minorities can be provided constitutionally, we at least know in what 
form it cannot. A 2006 decision – based on an objection to the National Election Com-
mission’s decision rejecting an initiative to hold a referendum – stated beyond doubt that 
“delegating elected leaders of national and ethnic minorities to the Parliament would be 
contrary to the principles of equality and directness”.43 Therefore, it is not possible for the 
national leaders of minorities – who are otherwise duly elected on the basis of a separate 
law – to automatically become members of the National Assembly due to their position, 
as this would result in unequal suffrage, similarly to the preferential mandate in the local 
government.44
Decision no. 53/201045 came as a shock for adherents of the “myth of omission”. In 2007 
a citizen had enough of the idleness of the National Assembly (still not enacting the 
necessary legislation on the parliamentary representation of minorities) and initiated a 
referendum on the issue. The National Election Commission duly authenticated the signa-
ture sheet, but its decision was objected to in front of the Constitutional Court. According 
to the objection, the initiative was unconstitutional because it concerned an organizational 
issue that falls within the competence of the Parliament. Pursuant to the Constitution, it 
was indeed impossible to hold a referendum on such an issue, so the Constitutional Court 
40  Ibid. III. 6. par. 2.
41  Ibid. III. 7. last paragraph.
42  Ibid. IV. 2. par. 3.
43  Decision 14/2006. (V. 15.) AB [4] par. 2.
44  Cf. Decision 34/2005. (IX. 29.) AB
45  Decision 53/2010. (IV. 29.) AB
57
upheld the objection.46 More importantly for the purposes of our discussion, the objection 
also considered the initiative inadmissible because “a possible negative result [of the ref-
erendum] would be contrary to the legislative obligation arising from the unconstitutional 
omission declared by Decision no. 35/1992 of the Constitutional Court”.47 The Court did 
not seek to resolve the contradictory situation arising from its previous decisions, instead 
it simply noted that “the said decision found a legislative omission solely because the Na-
tional Assembly did not enact a law providing for the right of national and ethnic minor-
ities to organized self-government and the »terms and conditions« thereof. The National 
Assembly fulfilled this task in 1993” (emphasis added).48
To sum it up, it is unclear from the relevant decisions of the Constitutional Court whether 
the Parliament made up for its unconstitutional omission or exercised its legislative free-
dom when in 2011, two decades after the ominous Decision no. 35/1992, it finally enacted 
a law on the parliamentary representation of nationalities. Whatever the truth may be, the 
Constitutional Court was certainly not vehement in defending the right of minorities to 
parliamentary representation. As for the final solution, the legislator seemingly accepted 
the advice of the Constitutional Court, since the status of nationality advocates does not 
match that of the Members of Parliament, thus it does not threaten the principle of equal 
suffrage.49 Nevertheless, the Parliament “generously” abolished the 5% electoral thresh-
old, although it had no constitutional obligation to do so.50 Whether the current regulation 
will stand the test of time is yet to be seen.
4. The right of minorities to self-governance
The establishment of minority self-governments is one of the possible ways in which 
minority groups can realize their right to representation (and participation in the public 
affairs). Minority self-governance in general has two main forms: territorial and personal 
autonomy. In Hungary, the system of minority self-governments is based on the personal-
ity principle, with the involvement of some territorial elements. In the model of personal 
autonomy, minority bodies are elected only by those belonging to the given minority, 
and the power of these bodies extend only to the minority. Since in this model minority 
bodies typically have competences on the fields of education, culture and media, this type 
of autonomy is often referred to as cultural autonomy.51
The Constitutional Court has repeatedly held that when creating rules on the establish-
ment, competence and position in the administrative system of minority self-governments 
– since the Constitution itself does not regulate these issues –, the legislator has a wide 
margin of discretion, limited only by the provisions of the Constitution, in particular those 
46  Ibid. III. 2.
47  Ibid. I. 1.
48  Ibid. III. 3.
49  Cf. Decision 14/2006. (V. 15.) AB
50  Decision 1040/B/1999. AB
51  For more information on autonomy for minorities, see Tamás korhecz: Autonómiák és regionális modellek 
Európában. [Autonomies and regional models in Europe.]. In: Ildikó Réka SzakácS (ed.): Nemzetpolitikai 
ismeretek. [About national politics.]. Szeged, SZTE ÁJK, International and Regional Studies Institute, 2017, 
pp. 145–189.
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on fundamental rights.52 In spite – or precisely because – of this, the regulation on minor-
ity self-governments has been widely criticized.53 It is no coincidence that the majority of 
the submissions to the Constitutional Court on minority issues concern this topic. Since 
the establishment of minority self-governments is inseparable from the identification of 
right-holders (Who belongs to a minority?), many relevant questions and Constitutional 
Court’s decisions have already been discussed in my previous article.54 Also, the previous 
section of this paper dealt with the prohibition of obtaining preferential seats for repre-
sentatives of local minority self-governments. Yet, the functioning of minority self-gov-
ernments entails many other issues which will be discussed in the following.
In 1997 a petition alleged the unconstitutionality of a provision of the (1993) Minorities 
Act which, in the absence of special statutory provisions for local minority self-govern-
ments, provided for the application of the general rules for local (municipal) govern-
ments. According to the petitioner, local minority self-governments and municipal gov-
ernments differ from one another in all relevant aspects, including their electoral commu-
nities and regulatory powers. The two legal institutions are in fact so unlike that no analo-
gy can possibly exist between them.55 The Constitutional Court found no constitutionally 
relevant connection between the impugned provision of the Minorities Act and the cited 
article of the Constitution (Article 43), as the latter concerns local governments, while 
the institution of minority self-government rests on Article 68 on the rights of national 
and ethnic minorities. Article 68 of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right to 
minority self-governance, however, it does not regulate how these self-governments shall 
be established, their position in the state organization or their relations with state bodies. 
Consequently, the legislator has a free hand in these matters. Thus, the Constitutional 
Court had little to say about the legal status of minority self-governments: they have 
statutorily defined, independent tasks and powers integrated into the local government 
system, and they participate in the administration of local public affairs.56 Apparently, the 
judges did not appreciate the fact that the functions of a municipality and those of a mi-
nority community are fundamentally different, and for the Court „the exercise of public 
affairs [was] a sufficient reason to treat unequals equally”.57
The Constitutional Court also rejected a constitutional complaint and a submission re-
garding the electoral procedure for minority self-governments at the national (coun-
try-wide) level and in the capital city.58 According to the petitioner, the relevant pro-
visions unjustifiably impede the exercise of the right of minorities to self-governance, 
as the establishment of national self-governments and those in Budapest is subject to 
a three-quarters quorum – as opposed to the 50+1% ratio which is generally applied in 
Hungarian public law. In the meantime, the impugned legislation had been amended in 
52  Cf. e.g. Decision 45/2005. (XII. 14.) AB
53  See e.g. Balázs MajTényi: A magyarországi kisebbségi önkormányzati rendszer elvei és működése. [Principles 
and operation of the minority self-government system in Hungary.]. In: Fundamentum, 2001/3, pp. 34–42.
54  nagy 2020, pp. 60–77. Relevant court cases include Order 181/E/1998 AB, Decision 45/2005 (XII. 14.) 
AB, Decision 168/B/2006 AB, and Decision 41/2012 (XII. 6.) AB.
55  Decision 435/B/1997. AB, I. 2.
56  Ibid. III. 3.
57  Judit TóTh: Kisebbségi jogok az Alkotmánybíróság előtt. [Minority rights before the Constitutional 
Court.]. In: gyulavári – kállai 2010, p. 308.
58  Decision 300/B/1999. AB
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accordance with the petitioner’s intention, and the Constitutional Court obviously did not 
found the 50+1 % quorum rule to be unconstitutional. As regards the constitutional com-
plaint, it was rejected by the Court on the ground that the petitioner had not exhausted the 
remedy available under the Electoral Procedure Act. The fact that pursuant to previous 
legislation the Roma, the Armenian and the Romanian minorities had not managed to 
establish their self-governments in the capital city, obviously „did not disturb the prin-
cipled judgement”59 of the Constitutional Court. After all, in 2002 new elections would 
take place, and until then, the national self-governments would represent the interests of 
the minorities concerned in Budapest. In the Court’s view, the legislator’s omission to 
organize new self-government elections in the capital (complying with the new quorum 
provision) did not reach the level of unconstitutionality, because „there is an organization 
that performs the tasks of the non-functioning self-government in the capital”.60
The status of minority advocates61 was also discussed in front of the Constitutional Court. 
A 2002 decision62 found that a local government decree had created a constitutional omis-
sion by failing to set a fee for the minority advocate. The mayor justified this on the 
grounds that in the municipal elections held in 1998, the minority candidate received 
enough votes to become a full member of the board of representatives of the local govern-
ment, so he received the same amount of honorarium as the other representatives, there 
was no need to set a separate honorarium for him. The Constitutional Court proclaimed 
that if the local government decides to set a fee for the board representatives – who nor-
mally perform their work in a social capacity –, then it shall set a fee for the minority 
advocate as well. This amount shall be an addition to the honorarium of representatives, 
since the advocate’s activities in the interest of the minority community involve addi-
tional tasks and responsibilities. The decision did not include any substantive statement 
regarding minority self-governance.
It is somewhat surprising that while the remuneration of minority advocates was provid-
ed for in law, for a long time there was no clear rule as to whether an honorarium could 
be established for a minority representative of the local government. The opinion of the 
Court once again remained unknown, since following a submission for the establishment 
of unconstitutional legislative omission, Act no. CXIV of 2005 remedied the uncertain 
legal situation. Since thus the submission became devoid of purpose, the Constitutional 
Court terminated the proceedings.63
Another unconstitutional omission was alleged in 2000 because the legislator did not 
provide the right for the local minority self-government to initiate a local referendum. 
According to the act on local governments in force at the time, the following persons 
59  TóTh 2010, p. 307.
60  Decision 300/B/1999. AB, III. 5.
61  Under the act on local governments in force at the time of the petition, the minority candidate who received 
the most votes in the elections of mayors and local government representatives became the local advocate for 
the given minority. A 2005 amendment to the law abolished the institution of minority advocate and gave its 
powers to the chair of the minority self-government. This latter solution is used by the current Nationalities Act 
as well (Article 105 (2)): “The chair of the local nationality self-government shall attend the board or general 
meetings and committee meetings of the local municipality with the right of consultation.”
62  Decision 46/2002. (X. 11.) AB
63  Order 926/E/2003. AB
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and bodies could initiate a referendum: at least a quarter of the local government repre-
sentatives, committees of the board of representatives, governing bodies of local social 
organizations, and a certain number of voters to be specified in a local government decree 
– the minority self-government did not. The Constitutional Court did not discuss minority 
rights in its reasoning, it only analyzed the right to local self-governance (i.e., the right to 
establish municipal governments). The Court stated that the Constitution only determines 
the indirect and direct exercise of this right, but neither the conditions, nor the personal 
scope thereof. Thus, no unconstitutionality can be established, as the personal scope of 
the right to initiate a local referendum is not regulated by the Constitution but by the act 
on local governments.64
The Constitutional Court has several times addressed the right to consent of minority 
self-governments concerning legislation on issues relevant for minorities. One of the 
submissions requested the annulment of a provision of the Public Education Act, which 
granted the minority self-government the right to consent when adopting or amending the 
budgets of minority institutions maintained by the local government (municipality). In 
the petitioner’s view, the right to consent restricts the fundamental right of local govern-
ments to make independent decisions. The Constitutional Court dismissed the charge of 
unconstitutionality with reference to its previous case law: when restricting fundamental 
rights of local governments the legislator is prohibited from introducing a restriction that 
leads to the emptying and actual withdrawal of the content of the given right,65 and here 
this was not the case. The exercise of the right to consent involves two contradictory 
interests: one is to prevent decisions that infringe minority interests, and the other is the 
interest of the local government not to delay the adoption of its financial regulation for 
an unpredictable period of time. And though the right to consent is undoubtedly a strong 
constraint in the decision-making process – as it may require multiple consultations –, 
the law provides guarantees (e.g. setting up a conciliation forum) to ensure that a mu-
tually satisfactory decision is reached in a foreseeable period of time. Consequently, the 
impugned right to consent “does not restrict the fundamental right of local governments 
to independent decision-making to such an extent that it would ultimately lead to its emp-
tying and thus to the inoperability of local governments”.66 Analyzing the content of the 
right to consent, the Court further explained that this right only allows minority self-gov-
ernments to be involved in the process of making decisions concerning the education of 
minorities, but does not provide either the decision-maker or the subject of the right to 
consent with the capacity to make decisions individually.67
In another decision adopted on the same day,68 the Constitutional Court ruled on a sub-
mission requesting the establishment of unconstitutionality in connection with the 1993 
Minorities Act. The provision in question required the consent of the local minority 
self-government for the adoption of local government decisions covering the education 
of persons belonging to a minority. According to the petitioner, the provision is contrary 
to the constitutional requirement of rule of law, because it is not possible to determine 
64  Decision 18/B/2000. AB, III. 1.
65  792/B/1998. AB, III. 1.
66  Ibid. III. 2.
67  Ibid. III. 1.
68  Decision 713/B/2002. AB
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exactly what is meant by “extending also to the education of persons belonging to a mi-
nority”. Due to the uncertainty of the norm, it is not applied in practice, which makes it 
impossible to exercise the right of minorities to consent. The legislator is further respon-
sible for an unconstitutional omission, because it did not create the legal conditions for 
the exercise of the right to consent.69 After recalling its case law on legal certainty and the 
rule of law, the Constitutional Court examined all elements of the impugned part of the 
provision to see whether they are indeed so indeterminate that taken together they may 
lead to arbitrary decisions or even indecision. The Court easily ascertained the meaning 
of the words “education” and “also” with grammatical interpretation, and it did not con-
template much about the concept of “belonging to a minority”, either, as that was clearly 
defined in the Minorities Act. For the Court, the fact that there was no official register 
certifying who is considered to belong to a minority did not make the very concept of 
“belonging to a minority” incomprehensible or obscure.70 The picture of course becomes 
obscurer when it comes to the exercise of minority rights, especially the right to vote, but 
that is another matter…
Decision no. 657/B/2004. also concerned the right to consent of minority self-govern-
ments. The submission raised several aspects as being unconstitutional, but it did not 
contain “substantive, constitutionally relevant justification”, worthy of the Constitutional 
Court’s attention, except in connection with the local government’s decree on the budget 
of minority institutions maintained by the local government.71 This issue had already 
been discussed by the Constitutional Court, but the petition contained a new argument 
compared to Decision 792/B/1998 and therefore proved to be suitable for a substantive 
examination. The Court sought answers to the questions of whether the right to consent 
constitutes participation in legislation by minority self-governments, and if so, whether 
they have constitutional empowerment for this – since law-making is a public authority 
which can only be authorized by the Constitution.72 After a lengthy explanation on legal 
technicalities (including on the difference between the budget and the law promulgating 
the budget), the Constitutional Court concluded that the examined rule of the Public Edu-
cation Act required consent not for the adoption of a local government decree as a norma-
tive decision (meaning: law), but for the determination of the budget of minority public 
education institutions as an individual decision.73 Therefore, minority self-governments 
have no legislative powers. So then, what does the right to consent mean? According to 
the Court, the right to consent of minority self-governments is rooted in a fundamental 
right, and does not affect the autonomy of local governments vis-à-vis the central govern-
ment. The law only provides for a division of labor between the maintainer local govern-
ment and the minority self-government, based on the fundamental right of minorities to 
participate in public life.74
Following the line of cases related to the right to consent of minority self-governments, a 
petitioner claimed that the (former) Minorities Act had been amended unconstitutionally, 
69  Ibid. I.
70  Ibid. III.
71  Decision 657/B/2004. AB, III. 7.
72  Ibid. III. 2.
73  Ibid. III. 3–4. 
74  Ibid. III. 6.
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because the amendment was adopted without the consent of minorities, in violation of the 
constitutional provision stating that national and ethnic minorities shall share the sover-
eign power of the people.75 The Constitutional Court once more remained reluctant to 
explore the meaning of the term “constituent part of the State”76, it merely stated that this 
concept does not entail that laws concerning minorities can be created or amended only 
with the consent of minorities. As an explanation, the Court cited the provision of the 
Minorities Act itself, the very subject of the constitutional review, using a circular argu-
mentation: “The Constitution […] does not regulate the rights of minorities with regard 
to draft legislation affecting minorities, the obligation to provide for the right to consent 
cannot even be inferred from the Constitution, and [the Minorities Act] gives national mi-
nority self-governments not the right to consent but the right to consult” (emphasis add-
ed).77 In the same case, the Minorities Act was also challenged because it did not ensure 
the effective public autonomy of minority self-governments, it only provided for cultural 
autonomy. The Constitutional Court again avoided addressing the legal status of minority 
self-governments, instead it cited the disputed provision of the Minorities Act on the defi-
nition of minority public affairs,78 and then concluded without any explanation: “there-
fore, the Act does not limit the concept of public minority affairs to cultural autonomy”.79
Based on the above decisions, I must agree with Tóth’s conclusion that, in the eyes of 
the Constitutional Court, minority self-governance is not much different from civil rep-
resentation in terms of the status of minority self-governments under public law. Accord-
ing to the Court, the public autonomy of minority self-governments must be established 
within the conceptual framework of minority public affairs as regulated by the Minorities 
Act, which is in fact exhausted in cultural autonomy (even if the body claims otherwise).80
5 . The language rights of minorities81
Both the previous Constitution (Article 68) and the current Fundamental Law (Article 
XXIX) granted three language rights to national minorities: to use their mother tongues 
(without specifying in which private and public spaces), to use names in their own lan-
guages, and to receive education in their mother tongues. A total of six cases have been 
submitted to the Constitutional Court in connection with these rights – none of them 
concern education.
75  Decision 168/B/2006 AB
76  See the relevant cases in nagy 2020, pp. 50–60.
77  Decision 168/B/2006. AB, III. 2.
78  A minority public affair is “any affair related to the provision of certain public services to persons belong-
ing to minorities, the independent conduct thereof and the creation of the necessary organizational, personal and 
financial conditions, in order to enforce individual and collective minority rights enshrined in this Act, to ex-
press the interests of persons belonging to minorities, in particular to nurture, preserve and enhance the mother 
tongue, and to implement and preserve the cultural autonomy of minorities via minority self-governments”. Act 
no. LXXVII of 1991, Article 6/A, (1) 1. a), as modified by Act No. CXIV of 2005. (Translation by the author.)
79  Decision 168/B/2006. AB, III. 8.
80  Cf. TóTh 2010, p. 138.
81  This section is a shortened and revised version of the following article: Noémi nagy: „Nyelvében él 
a nemzet(iség)”, avagy a magyarországi nemzetiségek nyelvi jogainak alkotmánybírósági védelme. [“A 
nation(ality) lives in its language”, or the protection of the linguistic rights of Hungary’s nationalities by the 
Constitutional Court.]. In: Fundamentum, 2019/3–4, pp. 86–98.
63
5.1. Language of place names in official documents
The use of languages in place names – a minority right not especially guaranteed by the 
Constitution itself, but by the Minorities/Nationalities Act – was raised only once, in a 
quite peculiar case in 1999, which aimed at the ex-post constitutional review of the law on 
birth registers, marriage procedures and naming.82  Pursuant to the challenged provision, 
in foreign-born Hungarian citizens’ birth certificates (and in documents issued on the 
basis thereof) the foreign name of the place of birth as well as the Hungarian designation 
thereof – if known – must be indicated, along with the country of birth. In the petitioner’s 
opinion, the foreign language designation of the country and the place of birth should be 
omitted if Hungary’s jurisdiction had ever extended to the given locality and the Hungar-
ian name is known, otherwise the person can be discriminated against in many situations. 
Quite clearly, the facts of the case have nothing to do with the protection of Hungary’s 
national minorities. Rather, the change in the name of a locality having formerly belonged 
to Hungary affects ethnic Hungarians who became minorities abroad due to the territorial 
changes after World War I. Many such individuals – ethnic Hungarians who are citizens 
of neighboring countries of Hungary – decide to immigrate to Hungary where they can 
easily acquire Hungarian citizenship. These people often face discrimination in practice 
(in job interviews, in official proceedings, etc.) when on the basis of their official docu-
ments their former citizenship is revealed and they are identified as foreigners by their 
“original” kin-Hungarians. Of course, since these immigrants are ethnic Hungarians, they 
do not constitute a minority under Hungarian constitutional law. However, interestingly 
enough, the decision of the Constitutional Court contains principled statements concern-
ing minority rights.
The Constitutional Court found the petition unfounded because the impugned provisions 
could not be materially related to any of the constitutional rights allegedly violated (right 
to human dignity, participation in public affairs, right to hold public offices, right to work, 
free choice of work and occupation). As for the matter of discrimination, the Court stated 
that whether a Hungarian citizen was born abroad or in Hungary is an objective fact. 
Since “different regulations are based on different facts”, the regulation was found to be 
non-discriminatory and non-arbitrary, on the contrary: “necessary for the realization of 
the goals of civil registration”.83 
Turning to the language issue, the Court ruled that the choice of the language of official 
proceedings and the determination of administrative place names are part of state sover-
eignty. Exercising its sovereign authority, the State may or may not grant additional rights 
to minorities living in its territory.84 Such an additional right is contained, for example, 
in Article 53, c) of the (former) Minorities Act, which obliges local municipalities to 
display the signs of place names and street names in the given minority language if the 
local minority self-government so requested.85 However, this right of minorities – opined 
82  Decision 36/1999. (XI. 26.) AB
83  Ibid. IV. 3.
84  Ibid. III. 1.
85  This right is also guaranteed by the Nationalities Act (Article 6 (1) d) currently in force, albeit not only 
conditional upon the request of the local nationality self-government, but also requiring a ten percent ratio of 
the given nationality, as registered in the census.
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the Court –, does not extend to the use of non-Hungarian forms of place names in the 
proceedings of civil registration.86 This finding is peculiar for two reasons. Firstly, the pe-
tition did not intend to indicate the name of a locality in Hungary in a minority language 
(which possibility was indeed provided for in the Minorities Act), on the contrary: the 
petitioner objected that a foreign place name could not be indicated only in the Hungarian 
language (whenever a given locality was previously under Hungary’s jurisdiction, thus 
its name in Hungarian was known). The reference to minority rights in the Court’s deci-
sion is, in fact, completely unexpected and logically inappropriate.
Another oddity of the finding is that it confuses two completely different spheres of lan-
guage use: the language of personal documents and the language of topographical indi-
cations. In my opinion, the present issue was not about whether the “additional right” 
of minorities in relation to topographical indications extends to the language of official 
documents or not, but that these are two different areas and therefore subject to separate 
regulation.87 This is easy to realize, since a personal document must be accepted by the 
authorities as valid throughout the country, while place name signs must be displayed 
only in a given geographical area. It is therefore not entirely clear how the Constitutional 
Court arrived at the issue of topographical indications based on the facts concerning the 
language of official documents – precisely, the language of a single entry –, in any event, 
Decision no. 36/1999 is very important for minority language rights. This was the first de-
cision of the Constitutional Court to discuss the language rights of minorities, in addition, 
it reveals the restrictive theoretical approach of the Court: the choice of the language of 
official proceedings and the establishment of place names are matters of state sovereignty, 
and in this context, any rights granted to minorities should be interpreted as “additional”.
5.2. The right of minorities to use their names
Decision no. 58/2001,88 adopted in the matter of petitions seeking a posterior review of 
unconstitutionality, is once again based on a factual background which had nothing to do 
with national minorities. The decision is nevertheless well-known among Hungarian con-
stitutional lawyers, as it is of paramount importance for the constitutional interpretation 
of the right to a name in general.89  For the purposes of this paper, I will only examine the 
aspects relevant for the language rights of minorities.
The only minority-relevant aspect of the case is that one of the petitioners, an ethnic Hun-
garian, referred to the constitutional provision protecting the right of national and ethnic 
minorities to use their names in their own language, arguing a contrario that citizens of 
86  Decision 36/1999. (XI. 26.) AB, III. 3.
87  Cf. the logic of regulation in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (Article 10) and 
the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Article 11). 
88  Decision 58/2001. (XII. 7.) AB
89  For more information on the right to a name, see: László kiSS: A névjog mint alkotmányos alapjog. [The 
right to a name as a constitutional fundamental right.]. In: Jura, 2002/2, pp. 45–58.; Zoltán Megyeri-Pálffi: Név 
és jog. A névviselés jogi szabályozásának fejlődéstörténete Magyarországon. [Name and law. The evolution of 
the legal regulation of naming in Hungary.]. PhD dissertation. Debrecen, 2011. pp. 53–56, 79, 85–90, 93–95, 
113–116, 141, 146–149, 168; Péter Tilk: Az emberi méltósághoz való jog „új” összetevője: a névjog. [The “new” 
component of the right to human dignity: the right to a name.]. In: Magyar Közigazgatás, 2002/11, pp. 651–662.
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Hungarian ethnic origin shall also have this right.90 Indeed, the right to have a name is 
not recognized by the Constitution as an independent fundamental right; it is expressis 
verbis provided for as a right of minorities. Nevertheless, according to the case law of the 
Constitutional Court, the right to a name is protected as a fundamental right deriving from 
human dignity, one of the manifestations of the right to identity. In the standard interpre-
tation of the Court, every human being has an inalienable right to have and bear his or 
her own name expressing his or her identity. This right cannot be restricted by the State, 
but other elements thereof – in particular choosing, changing and amending one’s name 
– can, within the limits of the constitutional test of necessity–proportionality.91 Referring 
to an earlier decision (No. 995/B/1990), the Constitutional Court stated in principle that a 
name may also be a carrier of national affiliation,92 and that the classification of the right 
to change one’s name as a fundamental right can be justified by the right to a person’s 
national(ity) identity.93
The Court could have summarily rejected the petition referring to the above, instead it 
thoroughly examined the legal regulation on the right of nationalities to choose their 
names – expressing judicial activism which is an unusual approach for the Court in mi-
nority issues. Pursuant to the relevant provision of Legislative Decree no. 17 of 1982 on 
birth registers, marriage procedures and naming, only forenames contained in the Hun-
garian Book of Forenames with a supplement on the forenames of nationalities may be 
registered, furthermore, members of nationalities living in Hungary or persons whose 
mother tongue is a minority language – without having to prove that they belong to a 
nationality – may bear a forename appropriate to their nationality. In turn, according to 
the Minorities Act, a person belonging to a minority has the right to “freely” choose his 
own forename and the forename of his child, to have his forename and family name reg-
istered in accordance with the rules of his mother tongue, and to have them indicated in 
official documents. In short, the Minorities Act provided for the “free” choice of names 
for national and ethnic minorities, whereas the legislative decree on naming used the term 
“appropriate to nationality”. In the Constitutional Court’s opinion, the two terms do not 
have the same meaning, as choosing a name “freely” offers a wider scope of options than 
what is designated by “appropriate to their nationality”. Thus, there is indeed a collision 
between the two statutory provisions, which, however, does not necessarily cause uncon-
stitutionality: only if one of the provisions of the Constitution is violated.94
90  Decision 58/2001. (XII. 7.) AB, I. [1], par. 3.
91  The Constitutional Court applies two measures in its practice on discrimination and the restriction of 
(fundamental) constitutional rights: the stricter „necessity–proportionality test” in case of fundamental rights, 
and the simpler “reasonableness test” in case of rights which are not considered as fundamental. Based on the 
latter, the Court has to ascertain only whether the classification of persons can be justified by objective reasons 
or not. According to the necessity–proportionality test, a restriction of a fundamental right is constitutional 
when it is indispensable, that is, if the protection or enforcement of another fundamental right or liberty or the 
protection of other constitutional values cannot be achieved in any other way. In addition, the importance of the 
objective pursued and the severity of the violation of the fundamental right caused by it must be in proportion. 
When restricting a right, the legislator shall choose the least severe means to achieve the given objective. See: 
Gábor halMai – Attila TóTh (eds.): Emberi jogok. [Human rights.]. Budapest, Osiris, 2003. pp. 390–391. Cf. 
Decision 30/1992. (V. 26.) AB and Decision 1006/B/2001. AB, III. 4.1.
92  Decision 58/2001, III. [2], par. 6.
93  Ibid. III. [4], par. 10.
94  Ibid. IV.2.6. par. 2–4.
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The Constitutional Court then turned to analyze Article 68 (2) of the Constitution which 
set out the following: “The Republic of Hungary shall provide for the protection of na-
tional and ethnic minorities. It shall ensure their collective participation in public affairs, 
the fostering of their own cultures, the use of their mother tongues, education in their 
mother tongues and the use of names in their own languages”. This provision makes it 
clear that Hungarian citizens who identify themselves as belonging to a minority partic-
ipate in public life, foster their own cultures and use their mother tongues with regard to 
their nationality, and their right to use of names in their own language is also linked to 
their nationality. Therefore, the “free” choice of names provided by the Minorities Act 
does not mean as being without any restrictions: this freedom of persons belonging to a 
nationality is connected to their nationality status, it must be interpreted as “appropriate 
to nationality”. So, the relevant provision is not in conflict with the Constitution, on the 
contrary: it can be deduced directly from it.95 
I do not agree with Judit Tóth in that the Constitutional Court, when interpreting the 
content of the provision of the Minorities Act on the free choice of names, did actually 
turn a statutory provision into a constitutional standard.96 Although we have several times 
witnessed this attitude by the Court, the standard applied here was Article 68 (2) of the 
Constitution itself, the interpretation of which shows that the exercise of minority rights 
is in all cases linked to the minority status of the right-holders.
Consequently, in the Court’s opinion, there are certain restrictions on the choice of names 
for citizens of both Hungarian and other ethnicity, which cannot be deemed unconsti-
tutional. The essence of this constraint is the same for both groups: the traditions and 
customs of the given nationality, which are summarized in the Hungarian Book of Fore-
names. The choice of names of nationalities is also limited to this, they cannot bear any 
forename they want to. Thus, there is no discrimination between citizens of Hungarian 
ethnic origin and citizens belonging to a minority.97 
Interestingly – and quite unusually in minority cases – the Constitutional Court drew 
attention to something which was not included in the petitions and which leads us to the 
controversial issue of minority self-identification. This circumstance is that minorities 
do not have to prove their nationality, which can lead to abuses. The majority decision 
warned that, although the legislator obviously did not intend to allow persons who are not 
members of a minority to exercise the right to use a nationality name, the current manner 
of regulation does not exclude such a possibility. The development of such an undesirable 
practice should be prevented by the State by further clarifying the relevant provisions.98
In a previous case concerning a name change, the Constitutional Court was far less thor-
ough and, by a presidential order, in only four sentences rejected the petitioner’s request 
for permission to change the maiden name of his deceased mother. According to the pe-
titioner, the name in question reveals his Roma origin and puts him at a significant disad-
vantage in terms of employment. Alas, the Constitutional Court found that the challenged 
95  Ibid., IV.2.6. par. 5–6.
96  TóTh 2010, p. 317.
97  Decision 58/2001, IV.2.6. par. 7–8.
98  Ibid. IV.2.6. par. 9.
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provision “cannot be linked to the right to work and the prohibition of discrimination in 
any constitutionally relevant aspect”, so the petition is clearly unfounded.99 For a Hun-
garian scholar, this means that the limitability of the right to a name is so strong that even 
the enforcement of the constitutional standards of name change could be neglected.100 I, 
however, consider that since by the time of this case (1996–97) the Constitutional Court 
had not yet laid down the constitutional framework for the interpretation of the right to 
a name, what is more, it did not even link the facts of the case to the right to a name or 
to minority rights, there was no constitutional standard to be enforced. Here, the Court 
can only be blamed for rejecting the petition without substantive examination. Undoubt-
edly, the elaboration of the framework for the interpretation of the right to a name as a 
fundamental right caused quite a headache for the justices, which might be the reason 
why Decision no. 58/2001 (discussed above) was issued more than ten years101 after the 
submission of the first relevant petition.
5.3. The language of the minutes of the minority self-government
The Constitutional Court has dealt with the language of the minutes of the board of rep-
resentatives of the local minority self-government in two instances, but without making 
any substantive statement. The first petition requested the establishment of unconstitu-
tionality and annulment of a provision of the 1993 Minorities Act (as amended in 2005). 
Article 30/F set out that in case the minutes were taken both in the minority language and 
in Hungarian, the version in the minority language shall be considered as authentic. The 
Court called on the petitioner to supplement his constitutional complaint, who, however, 
did so after the deadline, so the complaint was rejected.102
The same issue was raised by the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights in 2012,103 who 
asked for the annulment of certain provisions of the new (2011) Nationalities Act. The 
highly detailed submission raised concerns about, inter alia, the provisions on the lan-
guage of the minutes of nationality self-governments. Pursuant to the former Minorities 
Act, the minutes of the board meetings had to be prepared bilingually (in the minority 
language and Hungarian), or exclusively in Hungarian – in the former case the minority 
language version was considered authentic (this rule was objected to in the previous pe-
tition, rejected by the Court). In contrast, (the original) Article 95(1) of the Nationalities 
Act prescribed that the minutes of the self-government should be drawn up in Hungarian 
and, if the meeting was not held in Hungarian, in the language of the deliberations – both 
versions being authentic. According to the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, the 
obligation to prepare bilingual minutes of board meetings held in a nationality language 
unnecessarily and disproportionately restricts the right of nationality self-governments 
to use their mother tongue. For the same reason, the regulation also violates the obliga-
tions set out in the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (hereinafter: 
99  Presidential Order 924/I/1996. AB
100  TóTh 2010, p. 317.
101  kiSS 2002, p. 45.
102  Order 3208/2012. (VII. 26.) AB




Language Charter), because it discourages nationality self-governments from holding 
their meetings in their own language.104
The Commissioner’s remark seems logical: if the minutes shall be prepared in the Hun-
garian language in any event, then it is easier to hold the meeting itself in Hungarian in 
order to avoid unnecessary work. Thus, the regulation indeed made the use of nationality 
language more difficult. Whether or not this violated a fundamental constitutional right 
is another matter. It would have been interesting to see the opinion of the Constitutional 
Court in this regard, to find out whether the regulation would have passed the test of 
necessity–proportionality. All the more so because the 2012 decision of the Court, in con-
trast to its previous minority-related case law, contained an extensive part of international 
law. The decision not only reviewed the rules of international law on minority (language) 
rights that bind Hungary (in particular the provisions of the Language Charter and the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities), but it also referred 
to the monitoring materials adopted in the context of implementation of these treaties.105 
Before the publication of the decision, however, the Parliament had amended the chal-
lenged provision, therefore the Constitutional Court terminated the proceedings on this 
issue. Pursuant to the amended Article 95 (1) of the Nationalities Act, the minutes of the 
board meetings of nationality self-governments shall be drafted in the language used at 
the meeting or – based on the decision of the board – in Hungarian.106 This solution is 
undoubtedly the most favorable one for the use of minority languages.
5.4. Use of minority languages in administrative and judicial proceedings
The latest decision (order) of the Constitutional Court on the use of minority languages 
was adopted on 27 September 2016.107 Interestingly, here the right to use one’s mother 
tongue was interpreted as a human right, and only Justice Czine’s concurring opinion 
emphasized the relevance of the case for minority protection.
In the case, Russian- and Ukrainian–Ruthenian-speaking petitioners had requested the 
judicial review of an administrative decision and then applied to the Curia (the Supreme 
Court of Hungary). In their submission to the Constitutional Court, they alleged infringe-
ment of the right to use their mother tongue. They claimed that they had been deprived of 
this right already in the administrative proceedings because the official decisions had not 
been translated for them. Later, in the judicial phase, they had to take care of the transla-
tion, bear the costs of it, they were disadvantaged due to their lack of understanding of the 
Hungarian language, the court distorted the facts, and the procedure was deliberately de-
layed. On the basis of all this, their fundamental rights to human dignity, to the use of their 
mother tongue, to fair procedures and to the prohibition of discrimination were violated.
The Constitutional Court rejected the petition. In a rather succinct reasoning, it accepted 
the position of the Curia, with virtually no further comment, stating only that “there ex-
ists no unconstitutionality that would have substantially affected the judicial decision”. 
104  Ibid. 15.
105  Decision 41/2012 (XII. 6.) AB, [14] – [17]
106  Cf. Act no. LXXVI of 2012, Article 79 (3). In force as of 27 June 2012.
107  Order 3192/2016. (X. 4.) AB
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Furthermore, the Court did not see “a matter of fundamental constitutional importance” in 
the connection between the legal interpretation of the contested court decisions concern-
ing the use of the mother tongue and the provisions of the Constitution referred to by the 
petitioners: “From these constitutional provisions it does not follow that the petitioners 
should have the fundamental right to use their mother tongue in official and judicial pro-
ceedings free of charge in all cases.” 108 Nevertheless, to show its generosity, the Court 
provided for the translation of its order into the petitioners’ mother tongues.
Perhaps feeling the ackward succintness of the judgment, one of the justices considered it 
necessary to supplement the order of the Court. In her concurring opinion, Justice Czine 
set out that since the petitioners are Ukrainian citizens of Russian and Ukrainian-Ruthe-
nian mother tongue, respectively, with a residence in Hungary, they belong to the nation-
alities of Hungary listed in the annex to the 2011 Nationalities Act.109 As such, they are 
entitled to protection under Article XXIX of the Fundamental Law, including the right to 
use one’s mother tongue. She pointed out that this minority right is guaranteed by several 
international treaties as well as domestic procedural laws. In the present case, the petition-
ers claimed a violation of their right to use their mother tongue in both the administrative 
and the judicial procedures, as the relevant documents were not translated for them. The 
Curia, on the other hand, asserted that the court hearing the case did appoint an interpret-
er for the petitioners, did order professional translations and did translate the judgment 
into the petitioners’ mother tongues. Moreover, the petitioners’ submissions were written 
largely in Hungarian, which proves that at least one of them is proficient in the Hungarian 
language. Justice Czine emphasized that the rights of nationalities, in particular the right 
to use their mother tongue in judicial procedures, enjoy special constitutional protection, 
and that the Constitutional Court refused a substantive examination only because the 
circumstances of the particular case did not warrant it.110
6 . Final conclusions
Although Hungary’s legislation on the protection of minorities is generally considered 
advanced and comprehensive, gaps remain to be filled and dysfunctional elements to 
be sorted out by the Constitutional Court. Based on the evaluation of the relevant case 
law, however, the contribution of Hungary’s supreme judicial body in the protection of 
minorities seems much less significant than expected. The general attitude of the Consti-
tutional Court towards minorities is characterized by a complete lack of judicial activism. 
In fact, the Court avoided to address head-on the petitions whenever possible, usually on 
the grounds that they did not contain a specific constitutional problem, the regulation of 
the matter in question belongs to the legislator’s competence, or, that it is not up to the 
Court to deal with practical issues. Although the Court many times had the opportunity 
108  Ibid. [28]
109  Under the previous legislation (cf. Article 1(1) of the 1993 Minorities Act), only Hungarian citizens were 
possibly considered as minorities. In 2014, the scope of the Nationalities Act was extended to foreign nationals 
residing in Hungary. Cf. the original Article 170(1) of the Nationalities Act which was repealed by Article 238. 
d) of the same act as of 29 July 2014.
110  After this paper had been submitted, the Constitutional Court adopted a new decision on the language use 
of nationalities in judicial and administrative proceedings: Decision 2/2012 (I. 7.) AB, 15 December 2020. For 
a summary of this case, see Márton Sulyok’s chapter in this volume.
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to exercise its legal power to conduct ex officio examination or to extend the scope of the 
submission because of the factual context, it very rarely did so (a welcome exception is 
Decision no. 58/2001).
As I have already proven in the first study of my research,111 the Court failed to provide a 
constitutional interpretation on the concept of minorities and precise guidelines on iden-
tifying persons belonging to national minorities, that is, the very subjects of minority 
rights, which are in fact unavoidable first steps in the process of exercising minority 
rights. As for individual minority rights, the same judicial restraint can be seen. In most 
cases, the Court used a circular reasoning, conveniently relying on definitions provided 
by the Minorities/Nationalities Act or other sectoral laws, instead of providing its own 
interpretation based on the Constitution/Fundamental Law. The Court many times prac-
tically gave a free hand to the legislator, such as concerning the legal status of minority 
self-governments or the parliamentary representation of minorities. As regards the latter, 
the Court not only did not move the issue forward, but with its contradictory decisions it 
might have even contributed to the prolonged settlement thereof.
Another shortcoming of the Court’s minority-related jurisprudence is that it is not built 
upon the valuable experience of international minority protection mechanisms (except 
in a handful of cases after 2012). This is worrisome because Hungary is party to all rel-
evant multi- and bilateral treaties on minority rights, therefore there are legally binding 
international obligations that the State has to consider when adopting and implementing 
laws on minorities. Disregarding the applicable international standards is “theoretically 
undesirable and in practice creates serious problems”.112 
Besides referring to the legislator’s wide discretion in choosing how to fulfill its consti-
tutional obligation, the Court’s other favorite tactics is procrastination. Many times the 
Court delayed the adoption of its decision until eventually the legislator remedied its 
unconstitutional omission or amended the challenged provision in the desired direction, 
therefore the Court could completely avoid addressing the issue on the merits. This un-
willing attitude is further testified by the fact that in almost 100% of the cases the Court 
rejected the petition, whether it was submitted in favor of or against minority interests. 
So the Court is not hostile towards minorities, rather it is neutral: it preferably stays away 
from the politically sensitive issues of minority protection like a cat from hot porridge.
Of course, it is a defensible position that judicial activism by constitutional courts is not 
at all desirable. In my opinion, however, this is not the case with minority protection. First 
of all, due to their small numbers, Hungarian nationalities do not have sufficient capacity 
to assert their interests; politics can easily neglect their wishes. Secondly, international 
legal standards for minority protection are much more flexible than human rights in gen-
eral, thus the discretion of the legislator in regulating minority rights is much wider than 
in the case of other human rights. Thirdly, the possibilities for enforcement are much 
more modest, as for most minority rights the final forum is the Constitutional Court, while 
for the protection of other human rights, victims can easily turn to the European Court of 
111  nagy 2020.
112  Justice Kovács’s dissenting opinion to Decision 45/2005. (XII. 14.) AB, III/2/1.
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Human Rights (ECtHR) or other international fora. In turn, a complaint can be filed with 
the Strasbourg court only for violation of a right enshrined in the European Convention 
on Human Rights or any of its Additional Protocols, therefore the ECtHR’s minority-re-
lated case law is essentially based on the prohibition of discrimination, it is rather limited 
and, in case of minority language rights, practically non-existent.113
Considering the above, it is quite disturbing that the Constitutional Court has so far failed 
to define the constitutional minimum standards for the protection of minorities. The defi-
ciency is becoming more and more acute, since Hungary undertook extensive internation-
al commitments to protect national minorities and minority languages more than twenty 
years ago. Finally, the Constitutional Court’s prominent role in public life puts it into the 
best place to convey the message to both the minority and majority members of the soci-
ety: minority rights are indeed worth protecting and promoting.
113  Noémi nagy: Language rights as a sine qua non of democracy – a comparative overview of the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union. In: 
Central and Eastern European Legal Studies, 2018/2, pp. 247–269.
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Anikó Szalai:1
Mapping the implementation of minority protection in 
Central European countries by the Council of Europe2
1 . Introduction
This article examines the implementation of the 1995 Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in relation to six Central European states, 
namely Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania.3 Focus is placed on 
the development between the period of the first report and the last report, which arches 
over approximately twenty years. All six countries have similar historical-political back-
grounds, starting with the close relationship in the Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, later 
being communist-socialist countries until the end of the Cold War. This generally means 
similar legal heritage, while in the field of minority protection significant differences can 
be identified. Owing to the 1920 Peace Treaty of Trianon, after World War I, there was 
and there is still an inherent difference between the political objective and understand-
ing of minority protection in these countries. Another factor influencing the present-day 
situation is that while Slovakia, Romania and Hungary experienced a generally peaceful 
regime change, the dissolution of Yugoslavia was heavily burdened by armed conflicts. 
The imprint of that is still visible in the reports on Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia, and in 
parallel in the opinions of the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe on the imple-
mentation of FCNM. A common issue among all six states is the dire social and economic 
situation of the Roma community, including discrimination in the field of work and work 
condition and segregation in the field of education.4
Owing to the closer relationship, first Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia are examined, then 
followed by Romania, Slovakia and finally Hungary.
1  PhD, associate professor, Head of International and Regional Studies Institute, Faculty of Law, University 
of Szeged
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights 
as Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level 
of legal education.
3  For an analysis on the first twenty years of the application of the FCNM, see e.g.: Erzsébet S. Szalayné: 
A nemzetközi jogi kisebbségvédelem színe és fonákja: 20 éves a Kisebbségi Keretegyezmény. [The color and 
background of the protection of minorities in international law: the Framework Convention for Minorities is 20 
years old.]. In: Közjogi Szemle, 2018/1, pp. 11-15.
4  For detailed analyses of the situation of Roma in Europe see e.g.: Anikó Szalai: Protection of the Roma 
Minority under International and European Law. The Hague, Hollandia: Eleven International Publishing, 2015
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2 . Serbia
The initial state report was submitted by Serbia and Montenegro in 2002, only three 
years after the conclusion of the war in Kosovo in 1999. The country was still in a very 
fragile state and it dissolved in 2006. This was the last event in the history of the dissolu-
tion of Yugoslavia, starting in 1991. Problems characteristic of such a situation is clearly 
recognizable in the opinion of the Advisory Committee.5 The constitutional structures 
have undergone fundamental changes and the legislative background of human rights 
and minority protection has developed significantly. Nevertheless, the legal status of the 
relevant legislation adopted by the former federal authorities was unclear and limited the 
cooperation between the federal and state authorities which had resulted in discrepancies. 
Clarification of the competences, completion of the legislative work with regard to estab-
lishing detailed legal guarantees for the protection of national minorities below the level 
of the already established constitutional rules and provisions and monitoring of the im-
plementation are only a few of the mentioned concerns.6 At such a transitional stage there 
is a level of uncertainty as to the future of division of responsibilities between various 
governmental structures and about the stability of institutions. “Uncertainty and flux, as 
well as a certain lack of coherence, also characterises the status of the relevant legislation, 
including new legislation on the protection of national minorities.”7
The Advisory Committee noted that “the legacy of the aggressive nationalistic policies of 
the Milosevic regime” were widely felt in the society and that this legacy had complicated 
the task of the authorities to implement human rights and measures of minority protection. 
The rebuilding of inter-ethnic tolerance and effective equality were great challenges.8
Besides the deficiencies of legislation, the actual implementation and execution of many 
of the minority rights requires active participation, direct investment and financial in-
volvement from the state which was extremely difficult while facing serious economic 
difficulties.9
Similarly to the Croatian situation, owing to the armed conflict of the 1990s and the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, Serbia also faced a range of difficulties in terms of confirmation 
of citizenship and reducing statelessness.10 This was especially dire for the Roma, many 
of whom did not possess personal documents, which resulted in significant difficulties of 
identification and confirmation of citizenship, as well as hampered their access to public 
services and social assistance etc.11
Serious problems has been identified by the Advisory Committee in relation to the lan-
guage use of minorities and declared that it was the obligation of the state to provide for 
topographical indications and inscriptions at the minority language and to ensure the 
5  Opinion on Serbia and Montenegro, adopted on 27 November 2003, Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 02 March 2004, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)002
6  Ibid. p. 3.
7  Ibid. p. 7.
8  Ibid. p. 6.
9  Ibid. p. 8.
10  Ibid. p. 10.
11  Ibid. p. 14.
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public use of the minority language.12 It was noted that wide variations existed between 
regions in terms of efforts taken to protect languages and cultures of national minorities, 
referring to the comparison of Vojvodina with other parts of Serbia.13
The latest fourth opinion of the Advisory Committee on Serbia was issued in 2019 and 
it highlights that Serbia is a multicultural country with a diversity of national minori-
ties, and even though the legal framework is solid, sectoral discrepancies exist and the 
implementation of laws is not adequately monitored. A clearly visible contrast exists be-
tween the different levels of protection of minority rights in the Autonomous Province 
of Vojvodina and in Central or Southern Serbia. Due to lack of systemic data collection, 
for example on the level of representation of national minorities in the state administra-
tion, some of the improvements are hard to establish. The Serbian state shall set up and 
operate a sustainable human rights-based data collection framework with proper legal 
safeguards.14 Such data collection and database is essential, among others, for producing 
long-term and measurable progress on the representation of national minorities in the 
public administration.15
Roma still face de facto discrimination with regard to citizenship status, housing, health 
care, education and employment. The state shall establish, implement, monitor and pe-
riodically review a comprehensive strategy aimed at the revitalization of inter-ethnic re-
lations. The subject of which is not only the majority population’s relationship to Roma, 
but all the nationalities of Serbia.16 For example the Advisory Committee urged Serbian 
authorities to develop exchange programs between communities as soon as possible in 
order to promote multicultural and intercultural perspective at every level of education.17 
Another deficiency of education is the lack of proper history curricula and teaching mate-
rials which would foster respect for all groups in society and provide broad knowledge on 
minorities who are an integral part of Serbian society. The state shall promote historical 
and contemporary research in this field, as well as the state should develop possible mod-
els for bilingual and multilingual education.18
3 . Croatia
Croatia has been a party to the FCNM since 199819. It has submitted the state report in 
all 5 cycles. Croatia’s first report, prepared in 1999, extensively refers to the history, 
12  Ibid. p. 22. On minority languages in Europe, see e.g.: Gábor kardoS: The European Charter for Regional 
or Minority Languages – Specific Features and Problems of Application. In: Marcel SzaBó – Laura gyeney 
– Petra Lea láncoS (eds.): Hungarian Yearbook of International law and European Law (2019). Den Haag, 
Hollandia: Eleven International Publishing, 2020, pp. 259-272.; Noémi nagy: Language rights as a sine qua non 
of democracy – a comparative overview of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. In: Central and Eastern European Legal Studies, 2018/2, pp. 247-269.
13  Ibid. p. 37.
14  Fourth opinion on Serbia, adopted on 26 June 2019, Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 18 December 2019, ACFC/OP/IV(2019)001, p. 1-2.
15  Ibid. p. 38.
16  Ibid. p. 5.
17  Ibid. p. 29.
18  Ibid. p. 30.
19  Date of ratification: 11 October 1997; entry into force: 1 February 1998.
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legislation and demography issues of the country.20 It was evident that the legacy of the 
1991-1995 conflict severely complicated the implementation of the FCNM and it had 
negative effect on wide-ranging difficulties, especially with respect to the protection of 
the Serbian minority. The Croatian government introduced normative improvements al-
ready at the second half of the 1990s, but in 1999 it still lacked a proper constitutional 
law on national minorities and the process was painfully slow. The Advisory Committee 
found in its opinion that particularly at the local level reluctance among certain author-
ities could be seen, “not only with regard to remedying the negative consequences of 
past discriminatory practices and other minority-related problems, but also with regard 
to ensuring that such problems do not occur in today’s Croatia”21. At the time of the 
adoption of the opinion of the Advisory Committee, the area that necessitated the most 
urgent attention was the protection of the minorities in the field of employment and the 
situation of the Roma minority, especially their segregation in education and the situation 
of women.22
The opinion of the Advisory Committee already at its introductory remarks highlighted 
the need for special measures in order to rebuild “inter-ethnic tolerance and true and ef-
fective equality in society”23. 
Identification of national minorities had inconsistencies in the legislation and it seemed 
problematic that the 1997 version of the Croatian Constitution listed only 10 ‘autochtho-
nous’ national minorities, while the Constitutional Law of Human Rights and Freedoms 
and the Rights of National and Ethnic Communities or Minorities, adopted in May 2000, 
included 22 minorities and envisaged also the inclusion of others in this list. For example, 
the Constitution did not consider the Bosniacs, Slovenes and Roma to be autochthonous 
minorities in Croatia, and the influence of this limited listing was also visible in the elec-
toral system.24
The collection of statistical data on minorities has long been a problematic issue across 
Europe, on the one hand it is sensitive data which has to be handled with appropriate legal 
safeguards, while on the other, the knowledge of the numerical representation of certain 
groups is necessary for reaching the balance in legislation. The Advisory Committee was 
of the opinion that personal data relating to the affiliation with a minority shall be collect-
ed by authorities during census and deemed it especially relevant owing to the massive 
population movements that had taken place on the territory of the former Yugoslavia ow-
ing to the 1991-1995 armed conflict.25 Wide discrepancies between the official statistics 
and the actual numbers on the ground can seriously hamper the ability of the state to fully 
and effectively implement, ensure and monitor the measures taken.26
20  Report submitted by Croatia pursuant to Article 25 (1) of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities, 16 March 1999, ACFC/SR(1999)005.
21  Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 6 April 2001 by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 6 February 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, p. 2.
22  Ibid. p. 8, 12-13, 16.
23  Ibid. p. 4.
24  Ibid. p. 5.
25  Ibid. p. 6, 8.
26  Ibid. 8.
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By 2015 the shortcomings were repaired, all 22 national minorities are entitled to pro-
tection, though the Advisory Committee’s opinion highlights that minority protection is 
only provided for citizens. The Committee argues that Croatia should pursue an inclusive 
approach, especially with respect to stateless persons.27
While the Advisory Committee acknowledged the improvements in a wide range of Cro-
atian legislation compared to the state of law during and in the close aftermath of the 
Balkan conflict, it also noted that general and specific anti-discrimination legislation was 
sporadic and did not cover, for example, the fields of education and housing. The problem 
was especially visible in relation to the repossession of property by persons belonging to 
national minorities, especially Serbs and Hungarians, who left their properties owing to 
the war.28
With respect to the implementation of other articles, the Advisory Committee emphasized 
that more financial support shall be given to minorities for preserving of and practicing 
their culture. Intercultural dialogue shall be strengthened and expanded, with special re-
gard to telecommunication which shall better promote inter-ethnic understanding. The 
issue of war crimes shall be treated without ethnic bias. 29
The legislation on anti-discrimination has improved significantly by 2015, since Croatia 
implemented the EC Equality Directives in 2009. It is noteworthy that the population is 
increasingly aware of the complaint procedure to the Equality Body and to the Ombud-
sperson, which is indicated by a steady rise in the annually received number of com-
plaints.30
The Advisory Committee found it problematic that the numerical threshold for the ob-
ligatory introduction of minority language in contacts with the local authorities remained 
high, and it urged municipal and town authorities to provide for the official use of mi-
nority languages in their discretionary power. It urged the Croatian Government to enter 
into bilateral cooperation in order to solve the shortcomings of textbooks in minority 
language.31 
There was generally a high level of unemployment for the total population of Croatia, and 
this had been a worse burden for minorities. Certain laws adopted in the mid-1990s had 
aggravated that situation further. The Advisory Committee urged Croatia to adopt such 
27  Fourth Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 18 November 2015, Advisory Committee on the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 29 November 2016, ACFC/OP/
IV(2015)005rev, p. 6.
28  Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 6 April 2001 by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 6 February 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, p. 7.
29  Ibid. pp. 8-10.
30  Fourth Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 18 November 2015, Advisory Committee on the Frame-
work Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 29 November 2016, ACFC/OP/
IV(2015)005rev, p. 8.
31  Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 6 April 2001 by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 6 February 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)003, p. 11-12.
77
a new law on minorities, that increases “the stability and foreseeability of the legislative 
framework pertaining to national minorities”32.
Even though Croatia has already submitted its state report in the Fifth Cycle in 2019, there 
is no Advisory Committee opinion available yet. Thus, for comparison hereby the opinion 
issued in the Fourth Cycle in 2015 is examined. Fifteen years’ time passed between the 
adoption of the first and last available opinions and improvement is still not clearly vis-
ible. Even though the authorities have overall been constructive and cooperative toward 
the Advisory Committee, the situation of minorities has deteriorated owing to an increase 
in nationalism and political radicalization. While the legal framework is well-constructed 
and favorable, the practical application is hindered by the absence of a systematic gov-
ernment strategy to promote inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation. Problems have es-
pecially been visible in areas that were heavily affected by the conflict in the 1990s.33 The 
opinion identifies hate speech and repossession of private property as areas of significant 
issues to be improved. While hate speech is endangering the hard-won peace and security 
of the country, the slow legal procedures to repossess and reconstruct private property lost 
or taken during the conflict more than twenty years earlier is impeding the rule of law and 
such basic human rights as access to justice and the right to fair trial.
Even though the Ombudsperson issued recurring recommendations on the more effective 
promotion and monitoring of the recruitment of persons belonging to national minorities 
in public administration and the judiciary, the recommendations have not been followed 
at the local level. The level of participation at local elections, especially for the national 
minority councils has not increased and there has been no advance in the funding of these 
councils nor in their competencies.34
Significant efforts have been made with respect to the Roma community, especially in the 
field of improvement of living conditions, access to rights and access to pre-school for 
Roma children.35
The use of minority languages and scripts have improved significantly in several local-
ities and regions, for example the use of Italian language scripts on public buildings in 
Istria. However, there have been many protests against the use of Serbian language and 
Cyrillic letters in the City of Vukovar and it “exposed a serious lack of awareness of or 
consideration for human and minority rights amongst some parts of local government”. 
Regretfully the application of the Croatian law on the use of languages and scripts of 
national minorities remains suspended in some localities.36
The report notes that most of the civilian victims of the war have not received any official 
recognition of their suffering neither any form of compensation yet. This is especially 
32  Ibid. p. 15.
33  Fourth Opinion on Croatia, adopted on 18 November 2015, Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 29 November 2016, ACFC/OP/
IV(2015)005rev, p. 3.
34  Ibid. p. 4.
35  Ibid. p. 4.
36  Ibid. p. 5.
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true in relation to members of minority groups, such as Serbs and Roma. The Advisory 
Committee urges the recognition of the status and rights of all civilian war victims and 
calls for the acceleration of appropriate legislative steps based on the principle of equali-
ty. Besides legislative shortages, it is also relevant that national minorities are persistently 
and disproportionately underrepresented in the judiciary, which results in the lower level 
of trust in the judiciary by person belonging to national minorities.37
The general cultural policy shall integrate the promotion of minority cultures as an inte-
gral and valued part of Croatia’s diverse cultural heritage. Celebration of minority cul-
tures shall not be isolated from the majority cultural events. There is an apparent lack 
of effort on the side of the government to systematically promote reconciliation and in-
ter-cultural dialogue, there is no state strategy for this issue.38 
The legislative framework for protection of minority languages has developed, neverthe-
less, the Advisory Committee encourages Croatia to withdraw the reservation to Article 
7.5 of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (namely that protection 
is provided for non-territorial minority languages as well) and to monitor the proper exe-
cution of the law at the local level.39
4. Slovenia
The first state report of Slovenia was received by the Advisory Committee in 2000, with 
16 months of delay to the original expected date, and the Advisory Committee published 
the first opinion on Slovenia in 200540.
As the FCNM does not provide a definition for the term ‘national minorities’ and leaves 
the definitional issues to the state parties, Slovenia, as all other member states of the 
FCNM, established its own definition, according to which national minorities in Slovenia 
are “the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian National Minorities”41. Since one of the 
duties of the Advisory Committee is to ensure that such definitions are in line with the 
related international human rights legislation, they asked for a more detailed concept of 
the definition from the Slovenian Government which in return replied that the autoch-
thonous settlement by Hungarian and Italian national minorities actually was conceptu-
alized in “ethnically mixed areas”. As the explanation refers to geographical as well as 
demographical elements, the Advisory Committee expressed concern on the fact that na-
tional minorities living outside of these areas may not have enjoyed the rights ensured in 
FCNM. Another source of concern of the Advisory Committee was the possible exclusion 
of Roma community owing to this definition and with the expression of “ethnically mixed 
areas”, even though the Slovene officials ensured that the FCNM also applies to the Roma 
37  Ibid. p. 13.
38  Ibid. p. 16.
39  Ibid. p. 23. 
40  Opinion on Slovenia, adopted on 12 September 2002 by the Advisory Committee on the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 14 March 2005, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2005)002
41  Ibid. p. 7. On the definition of minority see e.g.: Minorité: Peuple qui n’a pas réussi. In: Hervé aScencio 
– Mathias forTeau – Jean-Marc Sorel (eds.): Dictionnaire des idées reçues en droit international: Mélanges à 
l’honneur d’Alain Pellet. Éditions Pedone, Paris 2017, pp. 381-387.
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people. Roma national minority’s domestic legal status was not the same as the Hungarian 
and Italian minorities. Referring back to the definitional issues, “autochthonous” term 
used for defining Hungarian and Italian minorities does not fully fit for the Roma people 
and there is no “autochthonous” character legally defined for Roma people.42
Historical events shaping the current challenges faced by national minorities were visible 
in Slovenia since it became independent in 1991 from the former Yugoslavia, resulting 
in that people living in Slovenia from other Yugoslav Republics had become foreigners. 
Some of these people applied for and obtained Slovene citizenship while some of them 
chose not to. Called as non-Slovenes of Former Yugoslavia or as ethnic communities 
which is the term different from Hungarians, Italians and Roma people, these people 
were left out of the application of the FCNM, as the Slovene Government indicated. Their 
existing education facilities were abolished and were provided with no other language 
education.43
Slovenia successfully integrated the Hungarian and Italian national minorities providing 
them proper environment to access education, exercise their culture and languages. Legal 
framework is well-established and well-practiced in this sense, but situation is not the 
same for the Roma community. Funding resources at municipal level are available more 
in favor of the other national minorities than the Roma community44. Street signs are de-
signed bilingual in the places considered “ethnically mixed areas”, mostly populated with 
Hungarian and Italian national minorities. For the Hungarian national minority, bilingual 
primary schools are available even though course materials in Hungarian are not yet at 
the demanded level. For the Italian minority, there are kindergartens, primary schools and 
public secondary schools teaching in Italian. The situation for Roma people is not the 
same as the previously mentioned national minorities and Roma children have a restricted 
access to those opportunities. Similar to the other countries of the region, Roma children 
were placed in special schools designed for mentally handicapped children.45
Media access and content creation for Hungarian and Italian national minorities were 
already being funded by the state, and representatives of these minorities have a special 
place reserved in the organs of Slovene radio and television. It was noted that the Slove-
nian Government introduced a program about providing funds for publishing and broad-
casting opportunities for the ethnic communities outside of the Hungarian, Italian and 
Roma minorities in 1992. Media content in Romani language is available, even though 
in a restricted manner.46 
The use of the languages belonging to national minorities at public administration level is 
ensured for Hungarian and Italian languages by the Public Administration Act, however, 
there is a lack of skilled personnel. Romani language, however, is not considered as a 
communication language in the public administration.47
42  Ibid. p. 7.
43  Ibid. p. 10.
44  Ibid. p. 12.
45  Ibid. p. 17.
46  Ibid. p. 13.
47  Ibid. p. 16. On the language rights of minorities in public administration see e.g.: Noémi nagy: Language 
rights of European minorities in the administration of justice, public administration and public services: 
International developments in 2019. In: European Yearbook of Minority Issues, 2021, p. 18.
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Persons belonging to national minorities participation in the political life in Slovenia has 
developed positively.48
The last opinion of the Advisory Committee on Slovenia was delivered in 2017 on the 
fourth report. The opinion acknowledges Slovenia’s efforts to effectively protect the 
rights of the national minorities and to fully implement the FCNM, even though the latter 
aim has not been achieved yet.49
First of all, the last report once again ensures the difference between the Italians, Hungar-
ians and Roma people in terms of enjoying better protection of their rights, even though 
much tangible steps were taken and resulted successful to improve protection of Roma 
people’s rights.50
Previously noted as a concern in the first report that the terms and distinction of ‘au-
tochthonous’ or ’non-autochthonous’ still existed but without a significant impact on the 
policies targeting Roma people since their specific needs were already included in several 
programs and strategies. Differently, the Sinti community expressed to benefit from the 
rights ensured in the FCNM. Also, Albanians, Bosnians, Montenegrins, Croats, Mace-
donians and Serbs were recognized as new national communities. Cultural, media and 
language-related issues of the citizens of the Republics of Former Yugoslavia was legally 
initiated by the parliament adopting the Declaration on the Status of National Commu-
nities of Members of Nations of the Former SFRY in the Republic of Slovenia in 201151.
It is clearly observed that there are two public officials actively contributing to the fight 
against discrimination in Slovenia. Ombudsperson plays an active role in collecting the 
complaints from national minorities (submitted mostly by Roma people) regarding mal-
administration they face at public institutions. It was noted that the Ombudsperson’s rec-
ommendations to the public authorities were being implemented very slowly and there 
was a lack of political will of the authorities to find solutions regarding the problems of 
Roma people52.
A newer Advocate of the Principle of Equality was created to investigate complaints 
lodged by the victims of discrimination and was given effective powers in investigation 
such as ordering adoption of measures, even though as they are not equal to imposing 
fines or sanctions.53
As positive steps, programs and strategies aiming to foster equality of Roma people were 
taken, together with the successfully ended legislative proposals regarding their “illegal” 
residence and access to education. Even though it works slowly and sometimes remains 
inefficient, Roma Community Council plays an active role in reporting problems, offer-
ing solutions and increasing interaction between Roma community and the state actors.54
48  Ibid. p. 20.
49  Fourth opinion on Slovenia, adopted on 21 June 2017 by the Advisory Committee ont he Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, 25 January 2018, ACFC/OP/IV(2017)003
50  Ibid. p. 1.
51  Ibid. p. 8.
52  Ibid. p. 14.
53  Ibid. p. 5-6.
54  Ibid. p. 6.
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The AC noted that there is an increase of hate speech and intolerant discourse from 2015 
onwards, mainly directed towards recent migrants, asylum seekers and refugees and 
based on religion and ethnicity, as the Ombudsperson noted but could not investigate 
since such complaints are out of her competences. 55
Overall improvements and tangible steps in language affairs for national minorities and 
especially Roma are that all legal entities governed by public law have an obligation to 
communicate and work in the language of the national minority when requested, includ-
ing for judicial proceedings. Measures are also in place to ensure that administrative 
forms and acts are available in both languages and that e-administration portals are also 
available.56
5 . Romania
Romania submitted its first report in 1999 and the Advisory Committee prepared its opin-
ion in 2002, starting with a general satisfaction with Romania’s efforts to consider the 
protection of national minorities rights in the country.57 
As the FCNM leaves the margin to the countries in defining the term ‘national minorities’, 
Romania considered Magyars/Szeklers, Gypsies, Germans/Swabians/Saxons, Ukraini-
ans, Russians/Lipoveni, Turks, Serbs, Tatars, Slovaks, Bulgarians, Jews, Croats, Czechs, 
Poles, Greeks and Armenians as national minorities. The position of Csango people who 
requested from the relevant authorities to be recognized as a national minority was not 
clear yet, since the Romanian law did not provide a framework for the conditions to be 
considered when recognizing a national minority, therefore by the time the first report 
was created, they could not receive any benefit from the FCNM.58
Since data is the main input for initiating a policy matter, the AC urged Romania to take 
actions to solve the problem existing in large discrepancies between official statistics of 
the Government and the estimates of national minorities about the numbers of persons 
belonging to national minorities in Romania.59
Most of the national minorities in Romania enjoy access to minority language education, 
textbooks and teachers. The Constitution and the Act on Education expressly guarantee 
members of national minorities the right to learn and to be taught in their mother tongue. 
The AC noted that Hungarian, German, Ukrainian, Serb, Slovak and Czech minorities 
could fully benefit from learning in their own languages, but unfortunately no school was 
noted teaching in Romani. In the past, Turks, the Tatars, the Russians and the Bulgari-
ans were also taught in their own languages, however they were faced with a shortage 
55  Ibid. p. 7.
56  Ibid. p. 25.
57  Opinion on Romania, adopted on 6 April 2001, by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, Strasbourg, 10 January 2002, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2002)001
58  Ibid. p. 5-6.
59  Ibid. p. 7.
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of textbooks in their own languages.60 The Advisory Committee declared that attention 
should also be paid to minorities of smaller number.61
Besides these commendable efforts, the socio-economic situation of Roma gave rise to 
deep concern, especially the numerous acts of discrimination and the recurring cases of 
police brutality.62
Even though inter-community relations had improved compared to the previous period, 
and a climate of greater tolerance had developed, the Advisory Committee found that 
certain media outlets had still been strengthening negative stereotypes especially about 
Roma, Jews and Hungarians. It concluded that the principles of promotion of a culture of 
tolerance should be taught to journalist.63
The last opinion available for Romania64 was issued in 2018. The general evaluation sec-
tion of the opinion concludes legislative and policy issues, for example pointing out that 
there is still no legislation comprehensively protecting minority rights in Romania, since 
the Law on the Status of National Minorities was not adopted and was under discussion 
at the Parliament65.
There are two positive developments reported in enlarging the scope of the application of 
the FCNM: Hungarian Csangos and providing e-learning platform, courses and cultural 
events for the Aromanian language. However, even though they are applied to be classi-
fied under the national minorities, their applications received no action.66
Since the first report, successful data collection mechanisms have been established which 
provide better and reliable inputs on the number of persons belonging to national minor-
ities.67
There are two institutions active in fighting against discrimination: the National Council 
for Combating Discrimination and the Ombudsperson. They both receive and investigate 
complaints lodged by natural persons and are both given ex officio powers. Budgetary 
shortages of the National Council were importantly noted in the opinion by the AC68.
Even though the Strategy for the Inclusion of Romanian Citizens Belonging to the Roma 
minority is considered as a positive policy improvement, the AC criticized the fact that 
representatives of the national minorities were not included at the drafting stage and their 
feedback after the strategy published were not taken into consideration. Very importantly, 
the AC notes that the implementation of the strategy operates mostly through the help of 
60  Ibid. p.13.
61  Ibid. p. 2.
62  Ibid. p. 10.
63  Ibid. p. 20.
64  Fourth Opinion on Romania – adopted on 22 June 2017 Published on 16 February 2018.ACFC/OP/
IV(2017)005 
65  Ibid. p. 5.
66  Ibid. p. 6.
67  Ibid. p. 11.
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EU funds, drawing an image on the public that the national minorities’ issue is related to 
the EU and not to the state.69
The previously noted extreme use of police power on Roma people were intervened by 
trust building actions between the national minority communities and police, as well as 
providing relevant trainings for the police. 70
The overall evaluation of the cultural life of the national minorities shows that they have 
sufficient funds (mostly Hungarian, German, Roma and Ukrainian benefit). However, 
cases reported in the opinion reflect serious areas of concerns. One of them is related to 
state refusal of the use of the name Szeklerland’, its symbols and traditions of the Hun-
garian national minorities in Covasna and Harghita county, and the other one is the failed 
application to UNESCO for taking on the list of cultural heritage one of the Hungarian 
populated city, referring to problems in the documentation. “The Advisory Committee 
finds this regrettable.”71
In some counties, the street names and signs still remain only in Romanian, even though 
the 20% rule is applicable in these cases. Furthermore, in few counties (e.g., where Hun-
garians constitute more than 20% of the population), either the street signs were not 
updated to be bilingual, or the existing bilingual signs were replaced with only the Ro-
manian ones.72
Overall teaching practices in national minorities’ languages at school was evaluated quite 
positively by the Advisory Committee. It was observed that in order to ensure inter-com-
munity dialogues, children belonging to majority population could be given more knowl-
edge on the minorities’ culture and history. To do that, more qualified teachers at an 
adequate number could be recruited. The legal efforts banning segregation is positive, but 
there are still few practices on the contrary.73
6. Slovakia
Slovakia has been a party to the FCNM since 199874. While the initial state report was 
submitted in 1999, the last one was submitted in the fifth cycle in 201975. Even though the 
first state report was not prepared as detailed as the Advisory Committee expected, it gave 
a certain degree of explanation about the back then current situation regarding national 
minorities in the country. According to the first Advisory Committee’s opinion76, positive 
indicators as well as fields open for improvement was noted.
69  Ibid. p. 14.
70  Ibid. p. 21.
71  Ibid. p. 17.
72  Ibid. p. 29.
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74  Date of ratification: 14 September 1995; Date of entry into force: 1 February 1998
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Among those positive indicators, governmental efforts were made in constructing in-
ter-community relations with Hungarian minorities and there were positive attitudes to-
wards Hungarians where they are in majority of the population, since social interaction 
between people seemed to be constant. The Treaty on Good Neighborliness and Friendly 
Co-operation signed in 1995 between Slovakia and Hungary was appreciated. Positive 
improvements were observed in the introduction of education languages in Hungarian, as 
well as in Czech, and in Ruthenian group languages (German, Polish and Ukrainian). Fur-
thermore, the minority language program which aimed to increase availability of the con-
tents prepared in minority languages in the public television and radio was welcomed77. 
Also, education materials were evaluated as they were free from negative expressions 
attempting to negatively identify national minorities. Related to positive implications in 
minority languages, Law on the Use of National Minority Languages entering into force 
in 1999 was also reported even though certain weaknesses were noted as it will be dis-
cussed below.78
On the institutional side, the Advisory Committee noted that a Council of National Mi-
norities and Ethnic Groups which is a consultation body to the authorities assisting in 
decision-making related to minorities consist of the representatives of the minorities in 
majority that used to be of government officials79. Additionally, the Ombudsman set up 
by the government was perceived positive in the report80, the institution that would heav-
ily provide inputs for the Advisory Committee’s further reports (e.g., the fourth report). 
The Government’s plans to reform public administration in an inclusive way that it could 
ensure effective participation of national minorities in public affairs were also welcomed.
Besides the above-mentioned positive developments, several concerns were placed in 
the report. First and the foremost concerns noted in the report were related to Roma mi-
norities, from several point of views. For example, collection of Roma people’s personal 
data by law enforcement officials without a certain legal basis and necessary legal safe-
guards, as well as without their consent, was criticized81. In education and use of minor-
ity languages, the country seemed to fail in protecting the interests of Roma minorities 
effectively. Even though the government realized the problem, it was reported that Roma 
children were placed in special schools which was designed only for mentally handi-
capped children, even though some of them did not have any mental handicap. Roma lan-
guage, on the other hand, is still not recognized in a wide array, the schools lack teachers 
available in teaching Roma language, as well as in other minority languages. During the 
practice of minority language programs, Roma language radio programs seemed to have 
a little broadcasting time and, despite the education materials, media strengthens negative 
perception towards Roma and other national minorities, and the existed legislation lacked 
necessary sanctions in case of in-compliance.82 
The report identifies serious discriminative implementations towards national minori-
ties and especially Roma minorities in different fields; from health care to education, 
77  Ibid. p. 16.
78  Ibid. p. 10
79  Ibid. p. 12.
80  Ibid. p. 6.
81  Ibid. p. 2
82  Ibid. p. 9
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employment to housing. Moreover, where discrimination occurred, it is unclear whether 
necessary investigation or trials were held, since the government could not have present-
ed data about.83 Slovakia also did not have consistent official statistics about the national 
minorities which made it difficult to refer any demography-related research. 
Regarding the use of minority languages, the report identified a lack of resources in terms 
of developing staff and resources in education and public institutions, as well as raising 
society’s awareness towards these languages. “Even though Article 34 of the Constitution 
guarantees the right of Slovak citizens belonging to national minorities to receive educa-
tion in their mother tongue, there are only very limited legislative provisions concerning 
the implementation of this constitutional guarantee.”84
Finally, the report noted about the existence of racially motivated violent crimes includ-
ing the persons belonging to small immigrant groups, even though the situation was al-
ready recognized by the government.85
The last available Advisory Committee’s opinion on the Slovak Republic’s compliance 
with the FCNM is dated in 201486. The report discloses more in-detail evaluation on the 
articles considered in line with the FCNM. As a general evaluation, it could be stressed 
that some of the problems noted in the first report remained unsolved, and more anew 
problems were noted in specific cases. Additionally, positive developments were explic-
itly mentioned. 
Issues raised in the first report and remained unsolved could be summarized as follows: 
While it was visible also in the first report, Article 34 of the Constitution guaranteeing 
the right of Slovak citizens to receive education in their own languages was criticized in 
this report since it limits the application only to those of Slovak citizens, since there are 
national minorities in the country having different citizenship, such as Czech nationals.87
Positive metrics in terms of taking steps to create statistical data was welcomed by the 
Advisory Committee. For example, “A Population and Housing Census” helped to identi-
fy the most frequently used languages, as well as defining the demographic situation from 
the aspect of their living conditions88. Another research was conducted for identifying 
the obstacles the national minorities are facing in employment generated positive results, 
meaning that, they do not face particular obstacles in labor market, however, the unem-
ployment rate among Roma national minorities is quite high (80-90%)89.
Previously referred in the summary of the first opinion, the Ombudsperson’s reports were 
actively considered in drafting the present opinion and in identification of the obstacles 
the national minorities face with in public institutions. Based on the complaints the Om-
budsperson received, she initiated the Parliament to have a discussion specific to “human 
83  Ibid. p.6.
84  Ibid. p.12.
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and minority rights violations, including the right to education for Roma children and the 
misconduct of police forces” but it was dismissed by the Parliament.90
One of the most noticeable negative developments observed in the country in terms of ef-
fective protection of the rights of the national minorities was noted as abolishment of the 
Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights position in 2012 and moving the Council for 
Human Rights, National Minorities and Gender Equality under the authority of the Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs91. The Later established Government Plenipotentiary for Roma 
Communities, instead of the abolished position, was placed under the Ministry of Interior 
which was observed as a threat towards having a healthy environment for analyzing and 
making policies in favor of national minorities. It was also noted that the Ministry treats 
Roma people as a security challenge.92
Most of the previously reported challenges the Roma people face with continue based on 
the Advisory Committee’s analysis. There is still no governmental strategy to tackle with 
anti-Roma propaganda going on within the society and the media. Media actively uses 
tools to increase prejudices towards Roma people while providing almost no content in 
Romani language. Assessment on representativeness of the other national minorities’ lan-
guages shows a similar output even though it is more positive than in the Roma specific 
case. Also, there is not much effort taken to raise awareness in the society about anti-dis-
crimination, even though it is known that Roma people were referred as lazy, criminal or a 
burden in the society. Furthermore, it was noted that anti-Roma propaganda was actually 
practiced by the far-right politicians during their election campaign. 93 
Concerns raised in Roma children’s education in the first opinion report still goes on; 
Roma children are often being placed in schools designated for handicapped children, as 
the Ombudsperson has continuously proved so.94 However, a positive metric was noted 
since teacher assistants (to assist teachers in integration of Roma students) were em-
ployed in schools where Roma population is high. In culture specific assessments, al-
though the local and central government actively contributed to opening new museums 
and culture centers focusing on national minorities both in content and in visitors, the 
Advisory Committee noticed that the museums could draw a better image about Roma 
people and their cultural heritage.95
While Roma people are still underrepresented at local and central elected bodies, other 
national minorities are increasingly represented in these bodies. However, it is a problem 
for all national minorities to participate in the public administration and very few of them 
could earn a position at administrative bodies.96
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Language specific assessments show that there were minor issues identified in public as 
“incidents of harassment based on the use of minority languages” in southern Slovakia 
and mainly Hungary, but the major problem regarding the use of Romani language, for 
example, the proficiency of the officials working at municipalities is still inadequate.97
In education the available education material in minority languages seems still to be in 
low quality, few in quality and with inaccurate translations.98
Among the positive developments, the adoption of Anti-Discrimination Act and the 
amendments applied consistently considered as an effective tool to fight against discrim-
ination towards national minorities. Safeguarding the Act with an institutional set-up, 
namely, the Slovak National Centre for Human Rights enhances effective monitoring of 
the Act. Another legal development was noted in criminal law which foresees punishing 
racial violence against migrants and minorities as extremist offenses, even though still 
the investigations are inefficiently handled and cases referred to the courts are quite few. 
As it was previously reported in the first opinion, police violence continues, but few steps 
were taken in order to raise awareness in law enforcement, such as delivered trainings. 
The Minority Language Act was amended and it now includes a provision for providing 
traffic signs also in minority languages, at least, at municipality level. The broadcasting 
in national minority languages was strengthen with extra legislative measures. The final 
positive development belongs to the continuous international cooperation between Hun-
gary and Slovakia which was upgraded with a new agreement aiming to develop infra-
structural and economic conditions in southern Slovakia.99
7 . Hungary
The first state report which was delivered in May 1999 described the relevant legislation 
as well as the practices existing in the country relevant to the protection of national minor-
ities. The first opinion report100 acknowledged Hungary’s legal efforts in providing a high 
level of protection for national minorities was appreciable. However, few issues were 
taken under concern. For example, statistics made available by the Government seemed 
far different from the estimations made on the demographic data on national minorities. 
This was due to strict rules protecting people to register themselves in official databases 
based on their ethnicity or nationality, but it was suggested that Hungary should have 
found other ways to create consistent statistics about national minorities.101
In general and repeatedly, Hungary provided a good level of protection for the rights 
of the national minorities in its legislative framework, with few issues of concern. Act 
LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities allows setting up local 
and national self-governments for national minorities, as well as right to be represented 
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in the National Assembly, however, the representatives of the national minorities were 
left out of the law-making procedure. Furthermore, no practice was yet experienced in 
these senses. Also, a person not belonging to a certain minority never could be elected as 
a representative of that minority (the so-called “cuckoo-problem”)102. 
Throughout the opinion of the Advisory Committee, most of the raised concerns are re-
lated to the Roma/Gypsy community. Among those, “well-documented cases of physi-
cal attacks/injury and threats against Roma/Gypsies”103 and weak investigation practices 
consist the priority action area. Following and in connection with that, lack of public 
awareness about national minorities, as well as specific to Roma/Gypsy community, giv-
ing as a reason that public do not have proper media tools to be informed about their cul-
tural and social life. In fact, the AC notes that Roma people face with “extremely difficult 
social-economic circumstances” as well as discriminatory and negative images are drawn 
in the public104. Roma community is given less broadcasting time than the other national 
minorities, in practice, which could have been used for raising public awareness on these 
problems.
Education and language related problems general to the national minorities were related 
to a lack of qualified teachers and textbooks which creates an obstacle for providing prop-
er education for national minorities in their language. Specific to Roma children, Hungary 
also followed the wrong applications of Slovenia and Slovakia where they were placed 
in special schools designated for mentally handicapped children. Moreover, extremely 
low number of Roma students could gain a diploma from secondary and high schools. 
Also, there was a reported de facto separation of schools into Roma and non-Roma by 
public in a way that not sending their children to Roma populated schools, decreasing the 
number of students, therefore causing decreases in funds. Besides these observations, the 
existence of the legal tools allowing the use of national minority languages in public in-
stitutions in relation to the administrative issues at local level and laws allowing national 
minorities to use their names in their own language were noted as positive. Even though 
not many practices were yet experienced, the domestic law allowing use of bilingual 
street tables and signs and use of minority languages in judicial proceedings were per-
ceived positively.105
The last state report on Hungary was received by the Advisory Committee which led to 
the preparation of the fifth opinion report in 2020.106 
The number of national minorities defined by the law was raised to 13 as it includes Ar-
menians, Bulgarians, Croats, Germans, Greeks, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Rusyns, Serbs, 
Slovaks, Slovenians and Ukrainians. Applications of the persons to be identified as Bunje-
vci were rejected twice by the authorities. Szekler and Russian minorities are also applied 
in the same way, fulfilled the criteria to be recognized as national minorities, however, 
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Szekler’s application was rejected as they constitute “modern Hungarian nation”107 and 
Russian’s application was rejected as they did not fulfil the criteria considering having a 
residence over a century in Hungary108.
Regarding the lack of data specific to minorities referred in the first report, organized 
census served to fulfil this gap, however, several complaints were lodged about the con-
tent of the census questions which helps identifying a person’s ethnicity or nationality. 
Moreover, the planned census in 2021 foresees asking people’s names directly. Bunjevci 
people’s answers were not separately considered from Croats, leaving policy makers lack 
of information specific to this community, especially in relation to the recognition of 
Bunjevci as part of the nationalities.109
Legislative developments regarding the fight against discrimination and equal treatment 
remained unchanged, but cases about the well-functioning of the Equal Treatment Au-
thority (ETA) were noted. According to the AC, ETA does not have the capacity to fulfil 
its duties at maximum, since the number of staff and their salaries are not properly placed. 
Also, ETA’s outcomes reporting discriminative acts towards minorities, especially Roma 
cannot be effective since it could not order compensation. ETA has efficient tools (e.g., 
advertisements and publications) in terms of melting the communication problems be-
tween the public, public institutions and national minorities.110
Cultural activities of the national minorities were properly taken into account and funded 
by the related ministries, even though structural changes in allocation of funds occurred 
without involving the representatives of national minorities in the decision-making pro-
cess.111
Based on the outcomes of the researches112 conducted on measuring the public position 
towards minorities, the AC noted that there is an increased negative perception towards 
immigrants, as well as asylum seekers and refugees. Rise of far-right oriented speeches 
lessens the tolerance towards the national minorities, as well as foreigners residing in 
Hungary. The AC is in a position for Article 6 to be applied inclusively as it could include 
all persons regardless of their differences, and calls the government officials to oper-
ate intercultural communication programs and have the political will to tackle with the 
problems due to the fact that no tangible step was taken to solve the mentioned problem. 
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Spring 2018, p. 7.
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Further, legislative amendments should be taken to fight against discrimination and hate 
speech, as the states should protect all persons from ethnically based violence and should 
comprehensively criminalize such actions.113
The AC noted that national minorities, in practice, suffer from exercising their right to es-
tablish religious institutions and such institutions face with discrimination in comparison 
with the big religious institutions in terms of gaining legal personality and tax status.114
Even though the law allows everyone to use his own language in public administration 
procedure, and to request to use one’s own name in one’s own language, still a lack of 
practice stands as an issue to be solved. For example, the AC noted that “magyarisation” 
of the names (e.g., using Hungarian letters in writing) in practice blocks the full enjoy-
ment of the right to use one’s own name in one’s own language.115
The use of national minorities’ language in media continues comprehensively and good 
practices do exist in this sense. There are wide range of broadcasters offering contents 
in different national minorities’ languages, even in 24 hours a day, and also including 
for Roma community. The lack of qualitative and quantitative measures evaluating the 
content of these broadcasters remains a problem. Also, it was criticized that people could 
access to the channels offered in neighboring countries only if they pay for the content, 
limiting their right to engage with media channels in their own language.116
In Hungary, attending kindergarten was made obligatory for the children in 2015 which 
had also encouraged Roma children to attend kindergartens. Scholarship opportunities of-
fered for Roma students encouraged them to participate in education. However, lowering 
the school leave age from 18 to 16 had negative impacts on Roma students whose school 
participation significantly decreased.117
A solution to the previously reported problem on placing Roma students to special schools 
designated for mentally handicapped children was due to the European Court of Human 
Rights, Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary case (Application No. 11146/11, judgment of 29 
January 2013).118
Finally, experienced segregation of Roma and non-Roma students in particular regions 
in Hungary was realized even though concrete problems were not properly addressed. As 
the AC noted, segregation triggers discrimination and prejudices towards Roma people 
and negatively affects their social inclusion, as well their participation in the labor mar-
ket.119 It was also stated that Roma students do not explicitly benefit from structural sup-
port from the local authorities since several competences in this sense were transferred to 
the national self-governments or to the central government. In line with that, it must be 
stressed that schools designated for Roma students are managed only under state support 
113  Fifth Opinion on Hungary, p. 13.
114  Ibid. p.16.
115  Ibid. p. 18.
116  Ibid. pp. 16-17.
117  Ibid. p. 19.
118  Ibid. p. 19.
119  Ibid. pp. 19-20.
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or owned only by the state, contrary to the other national minorities, leaving a degree of 
gap between understanding the local specific needs of Roma people.120
Based on the latest AC opinion, the overall assessment of the political participation of 
national minorities is positive. Especially for Roma people, significant policies and strat-
egies are being implemented which target lifting the general life-matters of Roma people, 
but also increasing their political inclusion. For example, the Hungarian National Social 
Inclusion Strategy 2011- 2020 is being monitored by the Roma Coordination Council 
and that is also delivering inputs for the policy-makers in case revision of the strategy. In 
order to prevent from and fix the situation related to segregation referred in the education 
part, Inter-Ministerial Committee for Social Integration and Gypsy Matters specifically 
delivers opinions. The Human Rights Work Group established by the Ministry of Justice 
also has a Thematic Work Group for Roma Matters. The articipation of the representa-
tives of Roma people in these committees or during the policy-making procedure relevant 
to them could ensure finding efficient solutions for the problematic areas.121
Unemployment still stands as a serious problem especially among Roma women. The AC 
notes that Roma people face with more obstacles than the others in accessing to the labor 
market. The above-mentioned Strategy leaves a section evaluating this issue and notes 
that Roma people do not participate in labor market not only because of their level of 
education, but also as a result of discrimination.122
Reduction of housing benefits which were already poorly covering the actual Roma peo-
ple’s housing needs caused difficulties. Their housing conditions, in fact, are not in the 
level of expectations, meaning that they are under the standards.123
Even though Health Improvement Offices were set up in the districts where minorities 
populated, no tangible information was found indicating any improvement for Roma peo-
ple to access to health-care services. Roma people cannot access health-care services 
as a result of several obstacles: discriminative treatments at the hospitals, poverty and 
language obstacles etc.124
Hungary took part in inter-governmental meetings aimed at mutually ensuring and pro-
tecting the rights of the national minorities, are still in place with regard to the Croat, 
Romanian, Serb, Slovak, Slovene and Ukrainian minorities. Hungary has also established 
good communication channels with Germany in protecting Germans in Hungary.125
120  Ibid. pp.19-20.
121  Ibid. p. 23.
122  Ibid. p. 23.
123  Ibid. p. 25.
124  Ibid. p. 27.
125  Ibid. p. 28.
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8 . Conclusions
The great efforts of two decades by the Council of Europe have resulted in a more unified 
and higher level of protection for the whole region. The more systematic collection of 
statistical data has shown a clearer situation and made minority protection possible at a 
higher level.
Although there are significant differences among these six states with regard to the size of 
the population, the historical attitude toward minorities and the number and size of minor-
ities living in each state, it is clear from the comparison of the reports and opinions that 
there are lot more similarities than differences. The Yugoslav crisis and armed conflict of 
the 1990s still exerts some influence on the legislation of Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia. 
Also, we can see the unifying effect of EU membership (out of the six analyzed countries 
only Serbia is not an EU member state).
The biggest common problem of these six states is the situation of the Roma minority. 
Even though great improvement has been reached compared to the situation of the time 
of the first reports, there are still considerable issues that need to be tackled. These cover 
the fields of education, labor, employment and socio-economic issues. Systematic segre-
gation and discrimination have been fought with, but subtle forms of it still exist.
The systematic collection of data has improved the implementation and monitoring of 
minority protection.
The work of the Council of Europe is commendable and there is a clear development in 
the state of protection for all national minorities.
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Katinka Beretka:1
Practice of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Croatia in Field of National Minority Rights, with Special 
Regard to the Linguistic Rights of the Serbian Community 
in Croatia2
1 . Contextualization of the subject
In accordance with the prevailing conceptions of the international literature “the terms 
historical, traditional, and autochthonous minorities – the ‘old minorities’ – refer to com-
munities whose members have a distinct language, culture, or religion as compared to 
the rest of the population and who have become minorities through the redrawing of 
international borders, having seen the sovereignty of their territories shift from one coun-
try to another;”3 still ‘new minorities’ are defined as groups formed by individuals and 
families with migratory background, who have left their homeland because of economic 
or political reasons (refugees, migrants). On the other hand, there is a serious difference 
between the various categories of new minorities, especially when this notion is explored 
in a different context, in the light of developments in the Western Balkans since the early 
1990s.
In the last three decades, countries in the region have, without exception, faced a number 
of challenges resulted by political, economic and social transformation since the break-
up of socialist Yugoslavia. In addition to building up friendly bilateral relations among 
the newly constituted independent nation-states in the Balkans, the states had to make 
serious efforts to alleviate conflicts within their borders, which often arose as a necessary 
outcome of the changes in the ethnic-linguistic-religious structure of the respective state’s 
population. The former constituent peoples of the member states of the Socialist Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina) suddenly had found themselves in minority position with similar or the 
same status, rights and duties as traditional minority communities (namely, nationalities 
of the SFRY). Citizens who neither belong to national majority of the given country of 
the Western Balkans, nor held position of national minorities until the fall of the federal 
1  PhD, associate professor at the Faculty of Legal and Business Studies “Dr Lazar Vrkatić” in Novi Sad, 
University UNION.
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights as 
Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level of 
legal education. The original version of this paper in Serbian is going to be published in the Annul for Sociology, 
edited by the University of Niš, Faculty of Philosophy.
3  Roberta Medda-windisCher: Old and New Minorities: Diversity Governance and Social Cohesion from the 
Perspective of Minority Rights. In: Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, European and Regional Studies 2017/1, pp. 
25–42 at pp. 26–27.
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structure, also called new minorities.4 They have begun to improve their institutions 
only in recent times, or they are still in the phase of organization,5 in comparison with 
the traditional/old minorities who are much more effective in enforcement of their rights 
because of experience in long-lasting fights for them. Although there is an opinion that 
differentiation of these minority categories has sense only in context of political attitudes 
towards them and in reality, both kinds are treated equally,6 each state has sovereign right 
to categorize or not categorize its ethnic groups, and to make or not make difference re-
garding the legal status of old and new minorities. For the sake of example, in Slovenia 
the Hungarian and the Italian national community are “autochthonous communities” by 
the Constitution itself, and whose rights are regulated in special law7,8 still the Roma peo-
ple (the Roma community) enjoy wide range of rights by special law, as well, but without 
constitutionally recognized autochthonous status.9,10 The other minority groups, includ-
ing new ones, have only limited rights: e.g. they can use their mother tongue in official 
communication only through interpreter. The constitutional categorization of minorities 
in this example is not the result of the size of a given minority population in Slovenia, but 
“the length of their continuous coexistence with the majority Slovenian people in certain 
parts of today’s Slovenia throughout history, and probably their cultural and religious 
closeness to the majority people.”11
In the Republic of Croatia there is no legal differentiation between national minorities 
similar to the Slovenian model. In the historical foundations of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia, Croatia is defined “as the national state of the Croatian nation and 
the state of the members of autochthonous national minorities: Serbs, Czechs, Slovaks, 
Italians, Hungarians, Jews, Germans, Austrians, Ukrainians and Ruthenians and the oth-
ers who are citizens,”12 who are guaranteed equality both with other minorities and the 
national majority. The legal definition of national minority also does not divide minorities 
into separate groups: “a national minority […] shall be considered a group of Croatian 
citizens whose members have been traditionally inhabiting the territory of the Republic of 
4  Dario kunTić: Minority Rights in Croatia. In: Croatian International Relations Review 9 2003/30-31, pp. 
33−39, at 35.
5  Siniša TaTalović: Nacionalne manjine i hrvatska demokracija. [National minorities and the Croatian de-
mocracy]. In: Politička misao 43 2006/2, pp. 159–174, at p. 172.
6  Nada raduški: Srbi od konstitutivnog naroda do nacionalne manjine. [Serbs from a constituent nation to 
a national minorty]. In: Srpska politička misao 36 2012/2, pp. 443−459, at p. 445.
7  Status and special rights of the Italian and Hungarian national community is regulated by the Law on 
Self-Governing National Communities. Zakon o samoupravnih narodnih skupnostih, Uradni list RS, št. 65/94 
in 71/17. 
8  Ustav Republike Slovenije (Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia), Uradni list Republike Slovenije, št. 
33/91-I, 42/97 – UZS68, 66/00 – UZ80, 24/03 – UZ3a, 47, 68, 69/04 – UZ14, 69/04 – UZ43, 69/04 – UZ50, 
68/06 – UZ121,140,143, 47/13 – UZ148, 47/13 – UZ90,97,99 in 75/16 – UZ70a, Art. 5 and 64.
9  Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia, Art. 65.
10  Status and special rights of the Roma community is regulated by the Law on the Roma Community in the 
Republic of Slovenia.  Zakon o romski skupnosti v Republiki Sloveniji, Uradni list RS, št. 33/07.
11  Petar Teofilović: Praksa Ustavnog suda Slovenije u oblasti prava nacionalnih manjina. [Practice of 
the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in field of national minority rights]. In: Petar Teofilovic (ed.): Nation, 
Community, Minority, Identity: The Protective Role of Constitutional Courts. Innovariant, Szeged, 2020, p. 219.
12  Ustav Republike Hrvtaske (Constitution of the Republic of Croatia), Narodne novine, br. 56/90, 135/97, 
113/00, 28/01, 76/10, 5/14, Historical foundation, Par. 2
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Croatia and whose ethnic, linguistic, cultural and/ or religious characteristics differ from 
the rest of the population.”13
According to the population census held in 2011, 7.67% of the 4.284.889 registered inhab-
itants is (was) a member of a national minority, but none of the minority groups crossed 
the threshold of 1%, except the Serbian national community that constitutes 4.36% of the 
total population in Croatia.14 Because of their specific political-historical position Serbs 
in the Croatian society are still between integration and assimilation, and towards whom 
members of the Croatian nation maintain the biggest social distance.15 Regardless of the 
formal protection of minority rights, including collective rights, provided for in various 
legal regulations, Serbs, due to their territorial dispersion, can rarely fully exercise them,16 
especially in case of enforcement of language rights before public bodies. During the fifth 
monitoring cycle of the application of the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages in Croatia,17 the Committee of Experts has highlighted that “difficulty us-
ing Serbian and the Cyrillic script were identified as a particular problem” and “Serbian 
speakers often refrain from using the Cyrillic script because of fear of resentment.”18 This 
constatation of the Committee has been confirmed in the sixth, ongoing cycle as well, 
even though they added that the deficits in some fields have even worsened. The first 
and especially emphasized recommendation of the Committee was to extend equal and 
official use of Serbian and its script in regional and local authorities to additional munici-
palities; but the importance of this field is underlined by the fact, too, that the further four 
recommendations (from the total six) referred to official use of languages as well (and 
one-one to information and education). It was recommended to take measures in order 
to promote submission of written applications, publication of official texts and forms in 
Serbian (Cyrillic script), to use Serbian in public services provided by administrative au-
thorities and promote the use or adoption of place names in this language.19
In 1954, in Novi Sad (Serbia) the leading writers and linguists of the Serbo-Croatian, 
as the language was named in Serbia, and Croato-Serbian language, as it was named in 
Croatia – agreed on the unification of the terminologies of the Serbian and the Croatian 
language, and production of common orthography (the so-called Novi Sad Agreement) 
that was more than desirable for the newly formed community of friendly nations in the 
atmosphere of brotherhood-unity (Bugarski 2004, 28). But the common language stopped 
to officially exist by the breaking up of Yugoslavia: “A child of the Yugoslav idea from 
the very start, it shared its fate and was now buried, appropriately enough, in the same 
13  Ustavni zakon o pravima nacionalnih manjina (Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities), 
Narodne novine, br. 155/02, 47/10, 80/10, Art. 5.
14  Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske: Popis 2011 jer zemlje čine ljudi ‒ Popis stanovništva, 
kućanstava i stanova 2011 ‒ Stanovništvo prema državljanstvu, narodnosti, vjeri i materinskom jeziku [Census 
2011 because people make countries – Census of population, households and flats in 2011 – Population 
according to citizenship, ethnicity, religion and mother tongue]. Zagreb, Statistička izvešća, 2013, p. 11.
15  raduški 2012, p. 451.
16  Ibid. p. 452.
17  The Charter entered into force in Croatia on 1 March, 1998. Currently the sixth monitoring cycle is pend-
ing, and the final recommendation of the Committee of Ministers is waiting for. 
18  Committee of Experts, Report of the Committee of Experts presented to the Committee of Ministers of 
the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 16 of the Charter, Sixth Report. Croatia. Strasbourg, 10 March 
2020. No. MIN-LANG (2019) 18, p. 16.
19  Ibid. pp. 47–48
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tomb with the federation whose precarious unity it had symbolized and in part supported” 
(Bugarski 2004, 30). That is why it is not surprising that the use of the Cyrillic alphabet, 
which is the only alphabet mentioned by name in the Constitution of the Republic of Ser-
bia, and which is in official use on the territory of Serbia without the need for further legal 
elaboration (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, Art. 10)20, has become the political 
symbol of identity politics of the Serbian nation both within the Serbian borders and in 
the diaspora. “Some Serbs and Montenegrins equalize the Cyrillic script with ethnicity, 
even with the orthodox religion, still the Latin script with something that is strange to 
their own culture, with something foreign, with the Catholicism” (Bagdasarov 2018, 51). 
“The Croatian language and the Latin script shall be in official use in the Republic of 
Croatia,” but under conditions specified by law another language and its script may be 
introduced into official use in individual local units, as well.21 The fact that the Cyrillic 
script is distinctly named in the given constitutional provision – “another language and 
the Cyrillic or some other script may be introduced into official use” (Constitution of the 
Republic of Croatia, Art. 12, para. 2) – points out the relevance of this social-political 
theme not only in the Croatian society as such but at the level of the highest legal act, the 
constitution, too.
In the last times, regulation of the status of different languages in official communication 
has got more attention which is stipulated by two processes: 1) formation of new nation 
states in which the state power tries to homogenize otherwise heterogenous population 
by a common language (state language or official language), and 2) exchanged role and 
extended functions of states in almost every field of social life has increased the number 
of interactions between citizens and public authorities that might be more efficient and 
effective only in language.22 Having in mind that nation states have often emerged on 
multilingual, multicultural territories where people used different languages, it is under-
standable that forcing use of one single, acceptable language – usually the language of 
national majority – on the rest of the population might cause resistance by other national-
ities, both old and new national minorities. On the other side, these linguistic rights have 
the most (direct) contact with politics, and as such may more reliably reflect the actual 
political and social relations in the country.   
Besides general presentation of legal regulation of nationalities’ linguistic rights in Cro-
atia and basic competences and portfolio of the Constitutional Court’s practice in field of 
protection of these rights, the paper is searching for the answer to the question whether 
the Constitutional Court of Croatia succeeded to remain politically neutral in usually 
politically motivated or inspired processes when it had to make decision about right of 
minorities on use of their mother tongue and script in official use – especially in case of 
linguistic rights of the Serbian community living in Croatia. Or whether at least he was 
trying to be protective of national minorities.
20  Ustav Republike Srbije (Constitution of the Republic of Serbia), Službeni glasnik Republike Srbije, 98/2006.
21  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 12.
22  Tamás korheCz: A hivatalos nyelvhasználat szabályozása Svájcban [Regulation of official use of langauge 
in Switzerland]. In: Létünk, 2013/special edition, pp. 92–112. at pp. 95–96.
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2 . Language rights of national minorities in Croatia
The Article 15 of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, even though scantily regu-
lates minority rights, guarantees equality for members of any national minority, as well as 
freedom to express their nationality, freedom to use their language and script, and cultural 
autonomy, and right to elect their representatives to the Croatian Parliament. The legisla-
tor is tasked with the further refinement of minority rights who has adopted the so-called 
Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities. Although it is called a constitu-
tional law, it is an ordinary organic law passed by the Croatian Parliament by two-thirds 
majority vote of all representatives.23 This qualified majority is required for alteration of 
the state borders of Croatia,24 restriction of human rights during a state of war or emer-
gency,25 initiating the proceeding for the impeachment of the President of the Republic in 
the Croatian Parliament and deciding upon his/her liability by the Constitutional Court,26 
ratification of international treaties27 and joining associations with other states.28 Accord-
ing to the Constitution, two-thirds majority is required only for the amendment of the 
Constitution itself,29 and it is not a condition for adoption of any other “ordinary” organic 
law, except the Constitutional Law on minority rights.30 Other organic laws “which elab-
orate the constitutionally defined human rights and fundamental freedoms, the electoral 
system, the organization, authority and operation of government bodies and the organiza-
tion and authority of local and regional self-government shall be passed by the Croatian 
Parliament by a majority vote of all representatives.”31 The fact that the same majority 
is necessary for the adoption of the law on minority rights and the amendment of the 
Constitution points out the enormous importance of this material in the country; in which 
the demand for political compromise is much more expressed regarding this issue than 
in any other field – at least by the constitution-maker. On the other side, in Croatia, in the 
hierarchy of legal sources the Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities 
neither ranked higher than other laws, nor ranked equally with other real constitutional 
laws, as the Constitutional Law of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia that 
has character of constitutional law not only by its name but by the special procedure of 
its adoption, as well: it shall be passed in the proceeding prescribed for the amendment 
of the Constitution.32 According to the Constitutional Court of Croatia, falsa nominatio 
does not change the legal nature of a law.33 Thus, in the case of conflict between the two 
mentioned constitutional laws the court gave priority to the Constitutional Law on the 
23  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 83, Par. 1.
24  Ibid. Art. 8.
25  Ibid. Art. 17, Par 1.
26  Ibid. Art. 105, Par. 2–3.
27  Ibid. Art. 133, Par. 2.
28  Ibid. Art. 135, Par. 3.
29  Ibid. Art. 138.
30  Two-thirds majority is required for the adoption of the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Croatia, as well, but contrary to the Constitutional Law on minority rights this law is a “real” 
constitutional law that should be adopted in the procedure prescribed for the amendment of the Constitution, 
still the Constitutional Law on minority rights, according to the Croatian Constitutional Court, is an organic law. 
31  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 83, Par. 2.
32  Ibid. Art. 127.
33  Point 5 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, No. U-I-774/2000 as 20 
December 2000.
98
Constitutional Court over the Constitutional law on minority rights.34 This issue may 
seem theoretical, but in the practice of the Constitutional Court of Croatia it has gained its 
practical dimension in the event of a conflict between the Constitutional Law on Minority 
Rights and other organic or “ordinary” laws. One of the examples will be analyzed later 
because of its close connection with the subject of this paper.35 
The Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities contains the classic catalog 
of individual and collective minority rights, as right to use of their language and script, 
private and public, as well as official use; education in their language and script; the use 
of their insignia and symbols; cultural autonomy through the preservation, development 
and expression of their own culture; practicing their religion and establishing their re-
ligious communities; access to the media and public information services in their lan-
guage and script; self-organization and association in pursuance of their common inter-
ests; proportional representation in public authorities; and participation of the members 
of national minorities in public life and local self-government through the Council and 
representatives of national minorities.36 Of course, minority rights are regulated by many 
other special laws that are referred to directly or indirectly by the Constitutional law itself, 
e.g., the Law on The Use of Language and Script of National Minorities.37
Speaking about the linguistic rights of national minorities it is important to note that, on 
the one side, the Constitutional law guarantees typical language rights, mostly those relat-
ed to the official communication, still on the other side, other rights in which someone’s 
native language is not the primary subject of protection, but the realization of this group 
of rights is unimaginable without free use of mother tongue, such as the right to education 
or information.38 Anyway, most human rights are solidly connected with the dilemma 
of the so-called freedom of language: it actually means that a “full-blood” realization 
of almost any basic human right is impossible (neither for the national majority, nor for 
national minorities) without universal recognition of their right to use mother tongue or 
freely chosen other language. For the sake of example, freedom of speech does not worth 
a straw without freedom of use of someone’s language, or without freedom of language 
itself,39 or whether right to education has sense if a kid does not understand the language 
in which the lecture is conducted. However, we have to emphasize again, that the paper 
focuses only on those cases before the Croatian Constitutional Court that directly concern 
use of minority languages in official communication. 
Because of its character of framework law, the Constitutional Law on Minority Rights 
does not go into details regarding any group of rights but contains guidelines for their 
34  Point 5–8 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, No. U-I-1029/2007 of 
07 April 2010.
35  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, No. U-III-4856/2004 of 12 March 2007, 
the case of bilingual ID.
36  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 7.
37  Ibid. Art. 12, Par. 2.
38  Katinka BereTka: A nyelvi jogsértések szankcionálhatóságának tételes jogi és nemzetközi jogi dimenziói. 
[Probability of sanction imposition for violation of linguistic rights in domestic and international law]. In: 
Tanulmányok 2019/2, pp. 41–58. at p. 43.
39  György andráSSy: A nyelvszabadságról és a nyelvszabadság jelentőségéről. [On freedom of language and 
its significance]. In: Létünk, 2013/special edition, pp. 7–19. at p.12.
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further regulation by other special laws. It provides that members of national minorities 
may use their native language under equal conditions with Croatian, if members of the 
respective national minority make at least one third of the population in the territory of a 
self-government unit;40 but equality in the official use of a minority language and script 
shall also be practiced when so envisaged in international treaties and when so stipulated 
in the statute of a local or regional self-government unit, pursuant to the provisions of the 
special Law on the Use of Languages and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia.41 Otherwise, this law, instead of a one-third census, stipulates a stricter condition: 
for the introduction of one minority language into official use, members of that national 
minority should make up the majority in the local population.42  This collision might be 
explained by the chronological order of the adoption of the Constitutional law and the 
Law on use of languages (the Constitutional law was passed later), and harmonization of 
the texts has not been completed up to now. In accordance with the principle lex posterior 
derogat legi priori, a later law repeals the earlier one, namely the Constitutional law that 
contains a softer condition in the current case.43
The sixth periodical report of Croatia presented during the monitoring of the application 
of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages in Croatia indicates that, 
based on the required threshold from the law, Czech, Hungarian, Italian and Slovakian 
is introduced into official use in one-one local municipality, while Serbian in 23 munici-
palities. Two municipalities have voluntarily introduced the equal and official use of the 
Czech language, three municipalities the Hungarian, 19 municipalities the Italian and 
one-one municipality the Serbian and the Ruthenian language, even though the respective 
minority does not cover one-third of the local population in any of the cases.44
To fulfill one of the conditions to join the EU,45 Croatia has ratified the two most impor-
tant international-regional document of the Council of Europe: the already mentioned Eu-
ropean Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities.46 In its annual reports, the European Commission 
referred to the constatations that experts made during the monitoring of the application 
of the mentioned conventions, and deemed that the practice of the use of minority lan-
guages is correct in general,47 even though the Commission did not go deeper concerning 
the real situation of minorities and their languages. Besides multilateral treaties, Croatia 
signed bilateral ones, too, with Italy, Hungary, Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Czechia, 
40  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 12, Par. 1.
41  Ibid. Art. 12, Par. 2.
42  Zakon o uporabi jezika i pisma nacionalnih manjina u Republici Hrvatskoj (Law on the Use of Language 
and Script of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia), Narodne Novine, br.  51/00, 56/00, Art. 4, Par. 1. 
43  Antonija peTričuŠić: Ravnopravna službena uporaba jezika i pisma nacionalnih manjina: izvori domaćeg 
i međunarodnog prava. [Equal official use of language and script of national minorities]. In: ZPR 2, 2013/1, 
pp. 11–39. at p. 18.
44  Committee of Experts 2020, p. 8.
45  Marina andeva – Katinka BereTka: The (Non)-Existing EU Standards in National Minority Protection 
as Prerequisites for Successful European Integration: The Case of Macedonia and Serbia. In: Thirteenth 
annual international academic conference on European Integration Europe and the Balkans, Skopje: University 
American College, 2018, pp. 165–184, at p. 168.
46  Croatia ratified the Framework Convention on 11 October, 1997, and entered into force on 1 February, 1998. 
47  TaTalović n.d., p. 8.
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and Austria in the field of protection of rights of national minorities.48 Although bilat-
eral treaties might serve as legal sources of minority language rights according to the 
Constitutional law on minority rights, instead of regulating new rights or conditions of 
realization of these rights, they contain soft law measures without effective mechanisms 
for control of their fulfilment. 
Pursuant to the Constitutional law on minority rights, official use of minority languag-
es means use of a language in representative and executive bodies, in procedures be-
fore administrative bodies of local and regional self-government units, in first-instance 
procedures before government bodies, in first instance court proceedings, in procedures 
conducted by the Public Attorney’s Office, notaries, public and legal persons with public 
powers,49 and the Law on the Use of Minority Languages and Script should regulate in 
detail all the circumstances of equal and official use of minority languages before these 
authorities and organizations. For the sake of example, in case of bilingual or multilin-
gual operation of local and/or regional representative and other bodies text of seals and 
stamps, nameplates and headings of official documents in minority language shall contain 
letters of the same size as the Croatian version, materials and calls for sessions, minutes 
and decisions, and other official information shall be published in minority language, 
as well.50 Furthermore, citizens may ask for notarial documents in minority language 
and bilingually printed official forms,51 and their private documents written in minority 
language should be recognized as valid,52 but the law is silent on the possibility of oral 
communication between clients and officials in minority languages. 
With regard to the use of the language of a national minority in proceedings, it is impor-
tant to note that the equality of the Croatian and minority languages can only be achieved 
when all procedural actions are taken over in the minority language, as well; which prac-
tically means that all participants, starting from the party, through the recorder all the way 
to the judge, official conducting the procedure, speak (or at least understand) the same 
language. If the client should ask for assistance of an interpreter (which right is otherwise 
guaranteed, for example, to the suspected, accused or prosecuted person who do not un-
derstand the language used in the court, irrespectively of his/her ethnicity),53 there is no 
right to use mother tongue in parallel with Croatian in proceedings. The law on the use of 
languages and script of national minorities provides that clients may use their language 
in the proceedings, to make statements in the chosen language,54 and the language of the 
first submission made by the client seems to be the language in which the client would 
communicate hereafter.55 Later the client may submit documents either in Croatian, or in 
his/her native language, according to free choice.56 The first official written information 
shall always be submitted in Croatian and all other languages that are introduced into 
48  Mirjana radaković – Ljubomir Mikić: Priručnik o Ustavnom zakonu o pravima nacionalnih manjina. 
[Manual on the Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities]. Zagreb, WYG savjetovanje d.o.o, p. 14.
49  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 12, Par. 3.
50  Law on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities, Art. 8.
51  Ibid. Art. 9.
52  Ibid. Art. 5, Par. 2.
53  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 29, Par. 2, Point 7.
54  Law on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities, Art. 12. Par. 1.
55  Ibid. Art. 13. Par. 2.
56  Ibid. Art. 16. Par. 2.
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official use in the territory of municipality, town or county,57 and the competent authori-
ty should provide conditions for client’s involvement in the chosen language, including 
transcriptions of acts adopted during the proceeding, both in Croatian and in the language 
the client used.58 Appeal proceedings are conducted in the Croatian language and Latin 
script.59 According to the formulation of the mentioned provisions, it can be concluded 
that in Croatia the right to real multilingual proceedings does not exist; minority languag-
es might be used only at first instance, probably through an interpreter. Contrary to the 
Croatian model, in Serbia the Law on Official Use of Languages and Scripts regulates this 
issue more clearly: “The first instance administrative, criminal, civil or any other proce-
dure in which citizen’s rights and duties should be decided on is conducted in the Serbian 
language. The procedure may be conducted in a language of a national minority, as well, 
that is in official use in the authority or organization that governs the proceeding.”60
In field of visual use of languages, traffic signs, names of streets, squares and settlements 
shall be displayed bilingually or multilingually in the entire territory of the local munici-
pality or only in some parts of it, in accordance with the municipality’s or town’s statute; 
but the statute may regulate, as well, whether traditional minority names may be publicly 
used, and if yes, in which parts of the village.61 The Constitutional law on minority rights 
prescribes that local statutes and/or the Law on the use of minority languages may create 
measures in order to preserve classic names and designations in areas where members 
of national minorities traditionally live or live in significant number, and to name settle-
ments, streets and squares after personalities and events that are/were important for the 
history and culture of the respective minority group in Croatia.62
The official use of languages is subject to other material63 and procedural laws, too64, 
that might be relevant for regulation of linguistic rights in general; however, according 
to the examined practice of the Croatian Constitutional Court who have mainly built its 
decisions upon on the above mentioned two laws,65 deeper analyses of any other laws is 
irrelevant in this paper. 
3 . Short summery of the competences of the Constitutional Court of Croatia
The Republic of Croatia has adopted the German-Austrian constitutional court system 
that is also seemed to be the classic European-continental model. Regarding the consti-
tutional legal status of this body, there is no noteworthy difference between Serbia and 
Croatia: in both states this is the only special judicial authority which is vested by the 
57  Ibid. Art. 13. Par. 1.
58  Ibid. Art. 14.
59  Ibid. Art. 19. Par. 1.
60  Zakon o službenoj upotrebi jezika i pisama (Law on Official Use of Languages and Scripts), Službeni 
glasnik Republike Srbije, br. 45/91, 53/93, 67/93, 48/94, 101/2005 – dr. zakon, 30/2010, 47/2018 i 48/2018 – 
ispr., Art. 12 Par. 1–2. 
61  Law on The Use of Languages and Script of National Minorities, Art. 10.
62  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 13.
63  Act on birth registers, IDs, travel documents and, local municipalities, etc.
64  Act on civil, criminal and administrative procedure, etc.
65  The constitutional law on minority rights and the law on the use of minority languages.
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competence to determine the explicit and the implicit meaning of constitutional legal 
norms by checking on the conformity of any act with the constitution, and to grant legal 
priority of the constitution over laws and any other acts.66
The Constitutional Court of Croatia primarily “decides on the conformity of a law with 
the Constitution”, “on the conformity of other regulations with the Constitution and the 
law,” and “may assess the constitutionality of laws and the constitutionality and legality 
of other regulations that have ceased to be valid”67 (which is called normative control 
or review of constitutionality and legality) furthermore, “decides on constitutional com-
plaints against individual decisions of state bodies, bodies of local and regional self-gov-
ernment units, and legal entities with public authority when these decisions violate human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the right to local and regional self-gov-
ernment.”68 Regarding the possible outcomes of the proceedings, during the normative 
control, in case of determining the inconsistency of laws and other regulations with the 
Constitution and / or laws, the court may repeal the entire regulation or some parts there-
of, or may annul the subject of constitutional and legality assessment in toto or in parte, 
bearing in mind the intensity of the violation of the Constitution, the law, and the interests 
of legal security: “if they infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by 
the Constitution; if they unreasonably put individuals, groups or associations in a more 
favorable or unfavorable position.”69 
Resolving constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court may accept the complaint 
and repeal the disputed act as a whole or in part (just some its provisions) by which a 
constitutional right has been violated; in case of passing a new act to replace the act that 
was repealed by the court decision the competent body is obliged to obey the legal opin-
ion and eventual instructions of the Constitutional Court. The second option is to refuse 
the constitutional complaint as not grounded.70 In these procedures the court examines 
only those violations of the constitutional rights that were expressed in the constitutional 
complaint, or in other words, the applicant shall state constitutionally relevant reasons 
of violation.71 The court does not consider those cases when the complaint does not deal 
with the violation of a constitutional right, or any other right of material or procedural 
character.72 In this context, constitutional right means a human right or fundamental free-
dom, or right to local and regional self-government, guaranteed by the Constitution.73 
But any violation of the Constitution does not lead automatically to the acceptance of 
the constitutional complaint: the violation of right has to be of such an importance and 
66  Slobodan vučeTić: Uloga ustavnog suda u procesu tranzicije u Srbiji. [The role of the Constitutional 
Court in the process of transition in Serbia] In: Ustavni sud Srbije – u susret novom ustavu – Zbornik radova – 
referati. [The Constitutional Court of Serbia – meeting the new constitution − Collection of works − Reports]. 
Beograd, Ustavni sud Srbije, 2004, pp. 13−19 at p. 13.
67  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 125, Par. 1, Items 1‒3.
68  Ibid. Art. 125, Par. 1, Item 4.
69  Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske (Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of 
the Republic of Croatia), Narodne novine, br. 99/99, 29/02, 49/2002 – prečišćen tekst, Art. 55.
70  Ibid. Art. 73–77.
71  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-540/1999 of 17 May 2000.
72  Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 71, Par. 1‒2.
73  Ibid. Art. 62, Par. 1.
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intensity that justifies assessment of the court about the existence of the violation of the 
applicant’s constitutional right.74
Looking at the figures of the submitted constitutional complaints and requests/proposals 
for normative control from 2000, namely in the period that constitutes the timeframe 
of this research, a continuous increase can be detected in both the number of normative 
controls and procedures initiated by constitutional complaint; but there is no significant 
percentage difference in distribution of subjects of one or another kind of procedure in 
comparison with the statistics of the first decade (1990-1999).75 Domination of cases re-
garding constitutional complaints in the activity of the Constitutional Court is the logical 
consequence of the universal character of this special legal remedy that might be lodged 
with the court literally by everyone “who deems that the individual act… has violated his/
her human rights or fundamental freedoms.”76 On the other side, it is interesting that there 
were more requests for normative control than constitutional complaints regarding cases 
resolved by the Croatian Constitutional Court in field of minority rights. 
From the almost hundred thousand resolved cases in the last twenty years, only few ten 
were dealing with (alleged) violation of minority rights in Croatia (according to the re-
sults of the research conducted by the author examining the available cases of the Cro-
atian Constitutional Court, published on its official website).77 For example, in Hungary 
the percentage of cases of this kind is under 1% in the last three decades.78 In Croatia 38 
decisions adopted in 51 cases are mostly results of normative controls (four times the 
Constitutional Court merged the cases because of common decision making regarding 
preferential representation of members of national minorities in representative bodies). 
In 20 reviews of constitutionality of laws and six reviews of constitutionality and le-
gality of lower legal acts, the Constitutional Court has annulled provisions of laws and 
other regulations eight times, still in the other proceedings, requests were refused or not 
accepted. Three decisions were made concerning legality of elections, one decision con-
cerning constitutionality and legality of state referendum when the court has determined 
that the proposed referendum question was not in accordance with the Constitution, and 
further eight proceedings were analyzed, as well, instituted by constitutional complaints 
in which complaints were refused as not grounded, each time. It is important to note that 
during the selection of cases that are determined as cases related to minority rights in the 
constitutional court practice of Croatia, only those cases were selected in which there is a 
clear motivation to protect the rights of national minorities or majority people in relation 
to other ethnic communities. Those court decisions that in some way may have points of 
contact with minority rights (for example, the universal human right to education), but are 
74  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, No. U-III-2432/2008 of 07 October 2009.
75  Resolved cases by the Croatian Constitutional Court in the period between 1990 and 30 June, 2020. 
See: https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Pregled_rijesenih_predmeta_u_razdoblju_od_1990._
do_30._lipnja_2020.pdf, Applications to the Croatian Constitutional Court in the period between 1990 and 
30 June, 2020. See: https://www.usud.hr/sites/default/files/dokumenti/Pregled_primljenih_predmeta_u_razdo-
blju_od_1990._do_30._lipnja_2020.pdf
76  Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 62.
77  For the constitutional court practice in Croatia visit: https://sljeme.usud.hr/usud/praksaw.nsf.  
78  Noémi nagy: ‚Nyelvében él a nemzet(iség)’ avagy a magyarországi nemzetiségek nyelvi jogainak alkot-
mánybírósági védelme. [‚The nation(ality) lives in its language or protection of language rights of nationalities 
in Hungary before the constitutional court’]. In: Fundamentum, 2019/3-4, pp. 86–98, at p. 86.
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not primarily aimed at protecting a specific right of a national minority (for example, the 
right to education in mother tongue, namely in the language of a national minority), were 
not classified in the analysis group.
The fact that comparing with the numbers in general statistics among the cases related to 
minority rights there are significantly more requests or proposals for assessing constitu-
tionality and legality than constitutional complaints, as a rule reflects the logical behavior 
of members of minority communities not only in Croatia but also in general. Fear from 
eventual repression, misunderstanding of rights and mechanisms for their enforcement 
are only few examples of possible reasons why members of minorities do not ask for 
protection before the Constitutional Court. Otherwise in most of the analyzed cases ap-
plicants of the constitutional complaints were lawyers or employees in the public sector 
who, regarding their profession, already knew the basic human and minority rights, and 
who stated in the respective cases that their ethnicity as a basis for positive discrimination 
was not considered during electoral procedure or employment, contrary to the law79.
Regarding their themes the cases are various: 1) proportional representation in public 
administration and judiciary, 2) preferential representation in representative bodies and 
right to double vote during elections of these bodies, 3) issues concerning bodies of cul-
tural autonomy of national minorities, and 4) official use of native language (regulation 
of official status of minority language either at local, or at regional level, visual use of 
languages on nameplates of towns, streets, squares, on seals, bilingualism of public doc-
uments). In the next chapter, we deal with cases from this last group in order to find an-
swers to the questions: whether the Constitutional Court has consistently interpreted the 
right of national minorities to official use of their mother tongue in different proceedings; 
whether the court acted protectively towards all minorities in the same way, and finally, 
whether he based the decisions on the letter and/or the spirit of the Constitution.
4.  Constitutional court practice in field of official use of minority languages – 
case studies
The Association of Croatian Doctors of Military Volunteers 1990-1991 (Udruga hrvat-
skih liječnika dragovoljaca 1990-1991) has requested the review of constitutionality of 
the Article 4−20 of the Law on use of languages (actually the entire Section 2 of the Act) 
and the Article 10 of the Constitutional Law on minority rights (in two separate pro-
posals), affiliated with the freedom of use of mother tongue privately and publicly, and 
freedom of display of signs, titles and other information in minority language, because 
the respective provisions are not in accordance with the Article 16 of the Croatian Con-
stitution that says: “Freedoms and rights may only be restricted by law in order to protect 
the freedoms and rights of others, the legal order, and public morals and health.” The 
Association stated that the allegedly unconstitutional legal provisions did not regulate any 
restrictions for members of national minorities regarding use of languages in order to pro-
tect rights of other persons on use of their language. Notwithstanding, the Constitutional 
79  Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-4681/2008 of 30 June 2010, 
No. U-III-4079/2010 of 17 November 2010, No. U-III-5760/2008 of 17 November 2010, No. U-III-2989/2010 
of 31 May 2012, No. U-III-1286/2012 of 11 December 2014, No. U-III-1897/2013 of 05 March 2015.
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Court rejected the Association’s both proposals because the concrete reasons for insti-
tuting a normative control must be presented in understandable, precious way to decide 
about the essence of the subject; according to the court, this requirement was not fulfilled 
in these proceedings80.
However, the practice of the Croatian Constitutional Court in the field of minority rights 
is not so simple than it was exposed in the previous example. In this section we present 
in detail two important decisions that are seemed to be foundation-stones of the court’s 
practice in determining the basic constitutional values of the Croatian society, and a less 
known decision that illustrates quite well the court’s approach to politically sensitive 
themes. Off course, there are more proceedings in which the Constitutional Court decided 
about linguistic rights of minorities, but they are not so relevant for enforcement of rights 
of new minorities, more preciously the Serbian minority community. For example, the 
Italian Union in Rijeka (Talijanska Unija, Rijeka) has disputed some of the provisions of 
the Law on Territories of Counties, Cities and Municipalities in the Republic of Croatia 
because the Articles did not contain the names of some local municipalities in Italian, 
only in Croatian. The Constitutional Court drew the applicant’s attention on the compe-
tence of the local municipalities in Croatia to introduce a minority language into official 
use by the local statute, even if the legal conditions were not fulfilled regarding the size of 
the respective minority population in the given city, municipality; and in accordance with 
the language’s official status public titles, including municipality and city names should 
be displayed in the official, minority languages, as well, in the concrete case in the Italian 
language. It follows that the court did not accept the proposal to initiate the normative 
control procedure81. The second subject, materially similar to the previous one, contains 
a reverse request. The Community of Croatian Associations in Istria (Zajednica hrvatskih 
udruga u Istri) initiated a review of constitutionality and legality of the Ruling on Giving 
Names to Streets and Renaming Streets in the Territory of the Bale Settlement No. О.U. 
3/3-94 of 14 September 1994. “By enforcing the aforementioned Ruling, the proponent 
considers that Article 12 of the Constitution has been violated, which stipulates that the 
Croatian language and Latin alphabet are in official use in the Republic of Croatia be-
cause it finds that mostly Italian street names avoid the use of the Croatian language. He 
considers that the disputed Ruling does not have a sufficient representation of deserving 
personalities of the majority people in the naming of streets and that it lacks the Croatian 
language as the official language of the Republic of Croatia, and that the rules of Croatian 
grammar and spelling are not respected”82. The Constitutional Court has decided that the 
request was not grounded because: 1) the Statute of Bale regulates equality of Croatian 
and Italian and the Latin script in official use of languages, and grants the right to display 
names of streets, squares, settlements and other geographic localities bilingually, and 2) 
correction of eventual grammatical mistakes and deficiencies is a competence of the pub-
lic administration, but not of the Constitutional Court.
80  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-I-1000/2013 of 19 June 2018 and 
No. U-I-1003/2013 of 19 June 2018.
81  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-I-1682/2003 of 26 October 2005.
82  Point 2 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-2432/2008 of 7 
October 2009.
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Table 1. Cases before the Constitutional Court of Croatia in field of official use of minority 
languages (composed by the author)
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4.1. Identity card in the Serbian language and Cyrillic script 
The Police Department of the Primorje-Gorski Kotar County rejected the request of the 
applicant of the constitutional complaint from Rijeka to get a bilingual, more preciously 
a trilingual ID card: in Croatian and English and Latin script, and in the Serbian language 
and the Cyrillic script. The applicant of the constitutional complaint appealed against the 
Police Department’s decision to the Ministry of Interior Affairs of the Republic of Croatia. 
Because the Ministry did not act on the appeal, the applicant filed a lawsuit in the Admin-
istrative Court of Croatia because of silence of the administration. In accordance with the 
Administrative Court’s order the Ministry finally adopted the second-distance decision 
that has confirmed the first-instance decision of the police department, namely rejected the 
request again to issue a bilingual/trilingual ID card, so, the applicant of the constitutional 
complaint has extended his claim, which was submitted to the Administrative Court, on 
the content of the second-instance decision. In the analyzed case, the proceeding before 
the Constitutional Court was initiated against the Administrative Court judgment No. Us-
9774/03-11 of 14 October 2004 which rejected the lawsuit challenging the Ministry’s sec-
ond-instance decision No. 511-01-72-UP/II-943/1-03 of 3 October 2003.
The applicant of the constitutional complaint has referred to his right from the Article 9, 
paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Law on minority rights that regulates the possibility to 
print and fill in the form of ID cards in language and script of a national minority, as well. 
According to his words, right to bilingual document “belongs to each member of a nation-
al minority who asks for it, anywhere in the Republic of Croatia; notwithstanding whether 
the respective local municipality where the person has his registered residence and has 
requested issuance of his ID card regulates equality of minority language and script in 
official use”83. The applicant explained his position by the fact that the Constitutional Law 
in the provision on the right to bilingual identity card84 does not mention the official status 
of the minority language at all, nor does it refer to another law.
In the Constitutional law bilingual ID card as such is specially mentioned. There is no 
word about other public documents or forms in the given legal provision, there is no 
need for further elaboration in other laws in order to realize this right, that is, otherwise, 
the case with the right to personal name regulated in the same provision. According to 
the Constitutional law, “members of national minorities shall have the right to use their 
family name and first name(s) in the language they use… , in accordance with current 
regulations of the Republic of Croatia”85. On the other side, according to the sectorial law 
on ID cards the basic rule is that the form of an ID card should be printed in Croatian 
and English and Latin script, and to be filled in exclusively in the Croatian language. The 
form for needs of a concrete person – member of national minority may be printed in mi-
nority language, as well, and to be filled in in the respective minority language and script, 
besides Croatian, if a special law or a treaty regulates so.86 Law on use of languages that 
has character of special law in this case prescribes: if a minority language is introduced 
83  Point 2 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-4856/2004 of 12 
March 2007.
84  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 9. Par. 2.
85  Ibid. Art. 9, Par. 1.
86  Zakon o osobnoj iskaznici (Law on ID cards), Narodne novine, br. 11/2002, Art. 8.
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into official use in the municipality, city or county, public documents shall be issued 
bilingually or multilingually and other official designation forms shall be also printed in 
more languages87. Similar solution is accepted by the bilateral treaty concluded between 
Serbia and Croatia on mutual protection of national minorities: “the contracting parties 
commit themselves to granting official use of languages and script of national minorities 
in territories where members of national minority live, in accordance with the internal 
legislation and adopted international legal standards, as follows: … in case of issuance of 
notarial documents, verifications and certifications; … in use of bilingual forms of state 
authorities ”88.
Because the Constitutional law unconditionally recognizes the right to bilingual ID card 
in the entire territory of the state, on the one side, and the Law on use of languages binds 
realization of this right to the official status of the respective minority language, on the 
other side, a typical example of collision between the two laws exists. However, the court 
did not enter into deeper analysis of this problem: on the contrary, it has interpreted the 
discussed Article 9, paragraph 2 of the Constitutional Law together with its Article 12, 
paragraph 3 that prescribes that detailed elements and mode of the official use of minority 
languages shall be regulated by the Law on use of languages and scripts of national mi-
norities, notwithstanding that the Constitutional Law does not refer to the provisions of 
this legal act in the concrete Article. “Actually, the court has given priority to a sectorial 
law over the Constitutional Law when it decided the case and rejected the constitutional 
complaint89, disregarding the fact that in this way it has denied enforcement of a linguistic 
right”90.
Based on the Maxim lex specialis derogat legi generali, the special law (either the Law 
on use of minority languages, or the Law on ID card) should apply that corresponds to 
the Constitutional Court’s approach in this issue. But whether it is fair to apply an act, 
either of general, or special nature, that contains less rights? This question is especially 
interesting in light of the practice of the Constitutional Court, deciding about an electoral 
case in which it has adopted a reverse decision.91 According to the court’s explanation, 
the Constitutional law prescribes “that minimum of rights that members of national mi-
norities must have in field of minority representation in representative bodies of local and 
87  Law on the Use of Language and Script of National Minorities, Art. 9, para. 1.
88  Zakon o ratifikaciji sporazuma između Srbije i Crne Gore i Republike Hrvatske o zaštiti prava srpske i 
crnogorske manjine u Republici Hrvatskoj i hrvatske manjine u Srbiji i Crnoj Gori (Law on Ratifikacion of the 
Treaty between Serbia and Montenegro and the Republic of Croatia on the Protection of Right of the Serbian 
and the Montenegrin Minority in the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian Minority in Serbia and Montenegro), 
Službeni list SCG – Međunarodni ugovori, br. 3/2005, Art. 6, para. 2, point 4, 6.
89  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-4856/2004 of 12 March 2007.
90  Katinka BereTka: Ustavnosudska praksa u Republici Hrvatskoj u oblasti zaštite prava nacionalnih 
manjina. [Constitutional court practice in the Republic of Croatia in field of protection of national minority 
rights]. In: Petar Teofilovic (ed.): Nation, Community, Minority, Identity: The Protective Role of Constitutional 
Courts. Innovariant, Szeged, 2020, pp. 41–58. at p. 271. 
91  In the Brod-Posavina County the members of the Serbian national minority did not get adequate rep-
resentation in the county’s parliament, because the Croatian State Electoral Commission has based its deci-
sion on the Article 20 of the Constitutional Law instead of the Article 104 paragraph 1 of the Law on local 
elections. The latter would guarantee one parliamentary seat for the Serbian community, still according to 
the Constitutional Law (that was applied in the respective case) they got zero mandate. The Constitutional 
Court has annulled to the electoral results (decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. 
U-VII-3122/2013 of 4 June 2013).
109
regional municipalities (counties) (5% of the local population or right being regulated by 
the local/regional statute), still by a special law, in this case by the Law on local elections 
[…] this right might be even extended”92. In this case the situation was converse than in 
the case on bilingual ID cards, because the Constitutional Law as lex generalis contain 
more rights than the lex specialis.
“According to the Croatian constitutional practice, the Constitutional Law seems to be lex 
generalis if it is in conflict with a special law, notwithstanding, whether it contains more 
rights for national minorities or not, in comparison with the sectorial law (lex special-
is)”93. The Constitutional Court did not discuss at all the opportunity of the issuance of ID 
cards in Serbian and Cyrillic script in a local municipality, in which territory the Serbian 
language did not have the status of equal official language because that was not regulated 
by special law; even though the court should be guided by principles that ensure “respect 
for the members of national minorities and other citizens of the Republic of Croatia to 
promoting understanding, solidarity, tolerance and dialogue among them”94 in case of any 
doubt regarding the interpretation of the Constitutional Law’s provisions and other acts 
in field of minority rights.
In a hypothetic case of accepting the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court 
decision would create potential for issuing ID cards in the Serbian language and Cyrillic 
script in the entire territory of Croatia that was not the legislator’s goal in accordance with 
the court’s latent explanation. Such extensive interpretation of the legislator’s intention 
might be seemed even as court activism in the respective case: “Court activism arises 
when courts are concerned not only about adjudication of legal disputes, but their goal 
is to create social policies by which their capture much more people and interest than in 
deciding individual cases”95.
On the other side, the applicant of the constitutional complaint has based its claim on 
the violation of constitutional rights guaranteed in the Article 14, paragraph 1 (prohibi-
tion of discrimination), the Article 14, paragraph 2 (equality before law), the Article 15, 
paragraph 4 (freedom to use minority language and script), the Article 29, paragraph 1 
(right to a fair trial) and Article 32 of the Constitution (liberty of movement and freedom 
to choose residence) which rights, according to the Constitutional Court’s analysis, were 
not violated by the refusal to issue a bilingual ID card; as it was already stated noticed in 
the previous chapter the court examines the possible violation of rights only within the 
reasons explicitly indicated in the constitutional complaint. The applicant of the constitu-
tional complaint would probably have a better chance of “winning” if he invoked a breach 
of legal certainty due to a clear conflict between the regulations in the present case.
92  Point 3 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-VIIA-3004/2013 of 
26 May 2013.
93  BereTka 2020, pp. 272.
94  Constitutional Law on The Rights of National Minorities, Art. 8.
95  Arsen bačić: O sudskom aktivizmu ili o političkoj ulozi sudova. [On court activism or political role of 
courts] In: Politička misao –Croatian political science review, 2008/2, p. 106.
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4.2. Referendum question on official use of minority languages
The Citizen Initiative “Headquarters for the Defense of the Croatian Vukovar” (Stožer 
za odbranu hrvatskog Vukovara) submitted a request to the Croatian Parliament on 13 
December 2013,96 to call for a referendum with the following question: “Do you agree to 
amend the Article 12 paragraph 1 of the Constitutional Law on The Rights of National 
Minorities (‘Narodne novine’, No. 155/02., 47/10., 80/10. and 93/11) as follows: “Equal-
ity in the official use of a minority language and script shall be exercised in the territory 
of a local self-government unit, state administration and judiciary if the members of a 
national minority make at least one half of the population of that unit”?“ Based on the 
parliament’s request to determine the constitutionality of the question’s content and ful-
fillment of the constitutional preconditions for calling a referendum, the Constitutional 
Court determined that although the conditions were met, this issue was not in accordance 
with the Constitution97. 
The Constitutional Court found that the proposed amendment to the legal norm was in-
correctly formulated, because Article 12, paragraph 1 of the Constitutional law on minor-
ity rights spoke of the territorial use of minority languages, and the state administration 
and the judiciary are not administrative-territorial units. But the court did not engage with 
further interpretation of that part of the question because increasing the census threshold 
from one-third to one-half by itself was against the Constitution. 
During the validity period of the previous law on minority rights (1991-2002), a stricter 
condition was in force regarding the threshold for the introduction of a minority language 
into official use. Instead of the currently applicable one-third, in municipalities (but not 
in cities) the respective minority community had to make up at least one-half of the local 
population in order to introduce its language into official use98. But it does not mean the 
possibility of returning to the old state.
Since the Constitution, as a rule, does not determine any preconditions for the introduc-
tion of minority languages in official use in local self-government units, but leaves it to 
the legislator, the Constitutional Court could not find a clear legal basis in the Constitu-
tion. Instead of referring to an explicit constitutional restriction, the court emphasized that 
the implicit features of a democratic society should be considered, which are reflected in 
pluralism, tolerance, freedom of thought, expression of ethnicity and emphasis on mi-
nority consciousness99. “The individual right of persons belonging to national minorities 
to freedom to use their language and script… requires from the Croatian people, as the ma-
jority, tolerance and understanding, a constant reminder of the values of the Constitution 
96  Registered under No. 361-13-03-1787, class: 014-01/13-01/06.
97  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-VIIR-4640/2014 of 12 
August 2014.
98  Ustavni zakon o ljudskim pravima i slobodama i o pravima etničkih i nacionalnih zajednica ili manjina 
u Republici Hrvatskoj (Constitutional Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and Rights of Ethnic and National 
Communities and Minorities in the Republic of Croatia), Narodne novine, br. 65/91., 27/92., 34/92. – pročišćeni 
tekst, 51/00., 105/00. – pročišćeni tekst, Art. 7, para. 2.
99  Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-VIIR-4640/2014 of 12 
August 2014, Point 10.2.
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and the limits of permissible behavior towards minorities set by the Constitution”100. So, 
from the non-existence of written provisions in this issue the court could not make “a 
conclusion on the a priori and unconditional admissibility of increasing the threshold for 
the official use of the language and script of national minorities. In this matter, the Con-
stitution sets requirements arising from a democratic society based on the rule of law” 
(point 10). Therefore, any change affecting the exercise of linguistic rights of national 
minorities, including an increase in the threshold for the official use of a minority lan-
guage must be reasonably justified, which according to the court’s interpretation implies 
the following elements: 1) to have a clear legitimate aim that it is in the public interest; 2) 
must be necessary (or proportional to a legitimate aim) in the conditions of a democratic 
society, and 3) there must be an urgent social need for change in a given area101. 
The Constitutional Court decision about the referendum question is of enormous impor-
tance because of more reasons: on the one side, it determines the basic, universal consti-
tutional values which cannot be given up or deviated from, on the other side, it is based 
on the spirit of the Constitution instead of the mostly favorized method of constitutional 
interpretation: the textualism. However, this decision has another important dimension, 
the political one. Although the referendum question referred to the amendment of the 
Constitutional Law that applies equally to all national minorities in Croatia, it is no secret 
that it was motivated by life facts and factual circumstances that govern Vukovar: “The 
Cyrillic alphabet in the City of Vukovar suffered to finally explain the goal of the pro-
posed referendum by the right of citizens to “decide what they want with Vukovar and 
what rules must prevail in Vukovar but also in the whole of the Republic of Croatia” as 
it stated in the point 28 of the decision in which the court quoted the referendum request 
of the Organizing Committee. According to the Constitutional Court, there is no reason 
to doubt that all actions of the signatories of the initiative and the Organizing Committee 
were taken in good faith, in order to solve some problems as a result of the war through 
a referendum. But the attack on one alphabet, in this case Cyrillic, as a universal civiliza-
tional heritage of humanity that determines the very identity of the Croatian constitutional 
state is a deeply disturbing, even irrational act. Reading the second part of the decision, 
we have the feeling that the Constitutional Court is trying to justify its decision and ex-
press latent solidarity with the initiators of the referendum: “The Constitutional Court 
believes that the Organizing Committee and the citizens of Vukovar, as well as all signa-
tories in the Croatian Constitution and never agree to actions contrary to the Constitution, 
no matter how difficult it may sometimes be to accept the implications arising from some 
of its requirements”102.
In this subject the Constitutional Court has adopted a really advanced view regarding the 
interpretation of the constitutional provisions in field of minority rights, even though the 
decision was overshadowed by the mentioned political elements of the explanation. “It 
100  Ibid. Point 13.
101  Ibid. Point 14.
102  Ibid. Point 29.
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is impossible to resolve political disputes and conflicts totally by law, without danger of 
turning “juridization of politics” in “politization of the constitutional court’”103. 
4.3. Use of the Serbian language in Vukovar
The last case that attracted the attention of the political, professional and lay public both 
in the country and abroad in July 2019 was the decision of the Constitutional Court to 
repeal certain provisions of the Statutory Decision on equal official use of languages and 
scripts of the Serbian national minority in the city of Vukovar, which decision, in addition 
to the classical language rights, also touches on some sensitive issues in the process of 
reconciliation between the two nations.
Back in 2013, the Government of the Republic of Croatia submitted a request for nor-
mative control of Article 22 of the Statutory Decision on Amendments to the Statute of 
the City of Vukovar104 which exempted the entire territory of Vukovar from the use of the 
Law on the Use of Languages and Scripts of National Minorities in the Republic of Croa-
tia.105 Although according to the results of the 2011 census, the percentage of the Serbian 
local population was more than one third in Vukovar106, and the the city was obliged by 
law to introduce the Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet in equal official use, this was 
not done because “the area of the City of Vukovar is a place of special reverence for the 
victims of the Homeland War”107; and until the conditions of Article 8 of the Constitution-
al Law on the Rights of National Minorities are met108, the Croatian language together 
with the Latin alphabet will remain the only official language in the city. In 2014, the 
Constitutional Court repealed the disputed Article 22 of the Statutory Decision, explicitly 
accepting the position of the Government of Croatia that said: the provision “is in direct 
conflict with the highest values of the Constitution and the constitutional order of the 
Republic of Croatia and as such cannot exist in a democratic state governed by the rule of 
law”109. The City of Vukovar was given a year to regulate the individual rights of persons 
belonging to national minorities in the field of official use of languages and scripts on its 
territory, which was done within the deadline. The City Council of the City of Vukovar 
amended its Statute and the Statutory Decision on Equal Official Use of Languages and 
103  Duška šarin: Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske kao institucionalni zaštitnik ljudskih prava i temeljnih 
sloboda. [The Constitutitional Court of the Republic of Croatia as an institutional defender of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms]. In: Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu [Collection of works of the Faculty 
of Law in Split]. 2015/3, p. 756.
104  Statutarna odluka o izmjenama i dopunama Statuta Grada Vukovara (Statutory Decision on Amendments 
to the Statute of the City of Vukovar), Službeni vjesnik grada Vukovara, No. 7/13.
105  Until the amendments made by the Statutory Decision, Article 61 paragraph 3 of the Statute of the City 
of Vukovar prescribed that members of the Serbian national minority had the right to free use of the Serbian 
language and Cyrillic alphabet in both private and public life, including official communication in the Vukovar 
self-governing area (point 4 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. 
U-II-6110/2013 of 12 August 2014).
106  Državni zavod za statistiku Hrvatske 2013, pp. 46−47.
107  Art. 1, Par. 1 of the Statutory Decision on Amendments to the Statute of the City of Vukovar.
108  Art. 22 of the Statutory Decision on Amendments to the Statute of the City of Vukovar.
109  Point 4 of the Decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-II-6110/2013 
of 12 August 2014.
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Scripts of the Serbian National Minority in the City of Vukovar110 according to court 
orders in 2015, against which the Committee on Human Rights and National Minority 
Rights submitted a request for assessment of constitutionality and legality in 2016. The 
procedure was completed in July 2019.
In this second procedure, due to direct opposition to Articles 8, 9 and 11 of the Law on the 
Use of Languages and Scripts of National Minorities, the Constitutional Court repealed 
Article 5, paragraphs 1−2 of the Statutory decision on equal official use of languages in 
parts which conditioned the right of members of the City Council from the Serbian na-
tional minority to receive session materials in their own language and script by submitting 
a special request and providing earmarked budget funds, and Article 6, paragraph 1 due to 
the connection of the right of citizens to transcripts of documents in the Serbian language 
and Cyrillic by the existence of a legal interest. Article 6, paragraph 2 was repealed with-
out reference to a specific legal basis, considering that “there is no acceptable reason”111 
“why the printing of the text of stamps in the same font size in all languages in official use 
should be ensured only when conditions are met”112.
On the other hand, maintaining Article 7 of the Statutory Decision on Equal Official Use 
of Languages in force, which states: “[c]ollective rights of the Serbian national minority 
in the City of Vukovar are ensured when the conditions from Article 61, paragraph 3 of 
the Statute of the City of Vukovar are met,” the Constitutional Court acted more like a 
politician. The City Council of Vukovar considers the achieved level of understanding, 
solidarity, tolerance and dialogue among the citizens of Vukovar and “decides on the 
possibility or need to expand the scope of individual rights of members of the Serbian 
minority live in the City of Vukovar with new rights from the catalog of rights provided 
by the law on the use of languages and scripts of national minorities in the Republic of 
Croatia”113. According to the Constitutional Court, “there is no reason why this provision 
should be repealed in the circumstances of the present case”114, but at the same time this 
provision “must not be abused in such a way as to be a mere promise of the rights of per-
sons belonging to national minorities”115, 116. Bearing in mind that in the framework of this 
paper we primarily deal with the linguistic rights of minorities, we do not analyze in par-
ticular how the Constitutional Court has coped with this specific political reality. It is only 
important to note that instead of citing a specific constitutional provision, he gave a very 
110  Statutarna odluka o ostvarivanju ravnopravne službene uporabe jezika i pisma srpske nacionalne manjine 
na području Grada Vukovara (Statutory Decision on Equal Official Use of Languages and Scripts of the Serbian 
National Minority in the City of Vukovar), Službeni vjesnik Grada Vukovara, br. 7/15.
111  Point 27.2 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-II-
1818/2016 of 2 July 2019.
112  BereTka 2020, p. 284.
113  Art. 61, Par. 3 of the Statute of the City of Vukovar, and Art. 5, Par. 3 of the Statutory Decision on Amend-
ments to the Statute of Vukovar (Statutarna odluka o izmjenama i dopunama Statuta Grada Vukovara, Službeni 
vjesnik Grada Vukovara, br. 7/15)
114  Point 28.1. of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-II-
1818/2016 of 2 July 2019.
115  Ibid. Point 22, 
116  With this reasoning in relation to the Amendments to the Statute, the Constitutional Court rejected the 
request by which the applicant challenged the consent of Article 5, paragraphs 3 and 4, Article 6 and Article 7, 
paragraph 2 of the Amendments to the Statute with the Constitution and the law (decision of the Constitutional 
Court of the Republic of Croatia under no. U-II-1818/2016 of 2 July 2019).
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simple answer that neither the content nor the time frame of the disputed positions re-
garding the collective rights of Serbs in Vukovar are inconsistent with the Constitution117.
This case was given a special place in the last report of the Committee of Experts, in 
which the Committee reminded the competent Croatian authorities of their obligation 
to use the Cyrillic alphabet in the administration, especially because the Cyrillic alpha-
bet is used not only by members of the Serbian but also Ukrainian and Ruthenian com-
munities118. “Public protests against the introduction of the Cyrillic alphabet in Vukovar 
point to the illegitimacy of minority provisions in the eyes of the majority and are much 
more an expression of the government’s failure to explain the need for minority rights 
to Croatian citizens than an expression of collective desire to deny the rights of Serbs. 
In the community of disturbed interethnic relations, we should strive for solutions that 
contribute to reconciliation and re-establishment of disturbed trust, but not at the expense 
of positive legal regulations”119.
Especially in the first proceeding on the use of Serbian in the City of Vukovar the Con-
stitutional Court has really tried to make balance between the majority and minority in-
terests, and stated that prescribing rights in accordance with the law should correspond 
to life facts and factual circumstances in Vukovar, which at the same time “respects the 
needs of the majority Croatian people that stem from the still living consequences of the 
Grate Serbian aggression in the early 1990s and the need for fair and proper treatment 
of the Serbian national minority”120. On the other side, such balancing and political cor-
rectness in any sense calls into question the Constitutional Court’s principled position on 
the necessary refrain from engaging in politics: the court “is not a participant in political 
debates, nor is it an arbiter in resolving political disputes that arise in Croatian society. 
There is no other means to solve the problems than a comprehensive political dialogue 
conducted in good faith, no matter how unpleasant that dialogue may sometimes be”121.
5 . Conclusions
The original question we asked in this paper refers to the manner in which the Croatian 
Constitutional Court approaches the linguistic rights of minorities in the field of official 
communication: whether the court was consistent; with the help of which technique he 
interpreted the relevant provisions of the Constitution; whether he took into account the 
spirit of the Constitution, and not only its text; how much the current policy has influ-
enced decision-making, etc. Based on the analysis of several cases from constitutional 
court practice, it can be concluded that sometimes the court really tried to protect the 
linguistic rights of minorities, even without a specific constitutional basis, basing its de-
cisions on some general values of both the state and the highest legal act. “The individual 
117  Ibid. Points 20.3 and 20.4.
118  Committee of Experts 2020, p. 8.
119  peTričuŠić 2013, p. 37.
120  Point 9 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-II-6110/2013 of 
12 August 2014.
121  Point 33 of the decision of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia under No. U-VIIR-4640/2014 
of 12 August 2014.
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“right to freedom” of use of one’s own language and script has neither a temporary nor a 
transitional character. It forms the essence of the identity of every nation and is universal 
in nature. It belongs to the brightest civilizational achievements of humanity,” as it is in 
the decision on the referendum issue122. However, it would be too idealistic to say that 
the court has every time decided in favor of minorities or minority rights. It is enough to 
remember on his attitude regarding the relationship of the Constitutional law and other 
sectorial laws, when the affirmative provisions of the Constitutional law were often der-
ogated by not so protective special laws.
On the other hand, the court tried to soften his advanced interpretations with explana-
tions that have a more political than legal character, expressing latent sympathy for the 
opponents of minority language rights. According to the literature, such framework, put 
forward by the Constitutional Court, “properly balancing between majority and minority 
legitimate constitutional interests” forms part of the Croatian constitutional identity123. 
Although this statement was made considering the case on the referendum issue, it might 
be applicable on the Vukovar case, as well. Such balancing, however, carries the danger 
that the court contradicts himself regarding judicial neutrality in politically inspired cas-
es, notwithstanding that in the end it did not affect the final decision − at least when it 
comes to the right to official use of the mother tongue of national minorities. The situa-
tion is more complicated in the last example of the paper regarding the expansion of the 
collective rights of the Serbian national community in Vukovar, when the Constitutional 
Court was not so protective and explained the decision in the light of the current political 
situation in the city, but that is another story.
122  Ibid. Point 13.
123  Jurij ToPlak – Đorđe GardaŠević: Concepts of National and Constitutional Identity in Croatian Constitu-




The Interpretation of Positive Discrimination in The 
Practice of Constitutional Courts of Slovenia and Croatia2
1 . Introduction
Positive discrimination, lately often alternatively called affirmative action, is carried out 
by introducing various measures that give advantage over people who have traditionally 
been more powerful to particular minority groups that are often treated unfairly, and thus 
meet obstacles in the enjoyment of guaranteed rights because of their ethnic belonging, 
race, sex or some other personal trait that makes them exposed to discrimination and ine-
quality in comparison to the majority. Measures taken to promote such groups may relate 
to various areas of life, such as employment, education, use of languages, participation 
in governing public affairs, personal status and the like. Their aim is to raise the level of 
enjoyment and protection of guaranteed rights of vulnerable minority groups in order to 
aid those groups to reach equal status, or at least get closer to the rest of the population 
in respect of using the benefits of certain rights when that is not feasible without imple-
menting such measures. They are usually temporary because once their intention is met, 
they need not be applied any more and may be withdrawn, unless where members of 
the minority group would meet serious impediments in enjoying certain rights without 
such measures. The advantages introduced by those measures are not considered to be 
discriminatory against the others, but an instrument to secure equal status to members 
of vulnerable groups in the access to rights guaranteed to all citizens that those groups 
cannot fully enjoy as members of a minority.
The application of such measures may cause conflicts with some constitutional rights 
guaranteed to all or raise other related issues such as who are considered to be mem-
bers of the group entitled to invoke privileges meant to improve their status, whether the 
measures used are adequate to target the existing inequality of minority groups in certain 
areas of life and the like. The application of measures of positive discrimination and the 
consequences they produce may be a matter of judicial review, but in the final instance the 
interpretation of whether they are justified or not fall within the competences of consti-
tutional courts of the countries that introduced such measures. Thus constitutional courts 
play an important role in the explication of the scope and content of constitutional rights 
in general, and in particular of challenged measures of positive discrimination taken.
Republic of Slovenia and Republic of Croatia, independent states since 1990, were 
former members of a federal state of Yugoslavia. Today they are both members of the 
1  Associate professor at the School for Legal and Business Studies “dr Lazar Vrkatić” in Novi Sad, Union 
University Belgrade.
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights 
as Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level 
of legal education.
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European Union (Slovenia since 2004, Croatia since 2013). According to the Eurostat 
data for 2020, Slovenia has about 2.100.000 inhabitants, while Croatia has 4.060.000 
inhabitants.3 Part of the population in both countries are members of several minority 
ethnic groups which make about 17% of the total population in Slovenia,4 and about 
7.6% of the total population in Croatia. Both countries guarantee some special minority 
rights, and their constitutions contain clauses of the application of positive discrimination 
in relation to ethnic minorities as a general criterion and a corrective mechanism that is 
applied in cases where minority rights are curbed by, or in conflict with guarantees of 
some other constitutional rights. Both of them guarantee special rights only to some of the 
ethnic minorities dwelling in their territories – Slovenia to those that are granted a status 
of autochthonous minorities, Croatia to ethnic groups that are present in a portion above 
the defined percentage in the whole or in a part of the state territory.
This paper compares the interpretations of positive discrimination measures in relevant 
decisions of constitutional courts of the Republic of Slovenia and the Republic of Croa-
tia. After an overview of the relevant law in two countries, we analyze whether, to what 
extent and for what reasons these two constitutional courts have supported the use of 
positive discrimination measures related to national minorities and their members so far, 
and whether their approaches provide an effective protection of such special rights. Con-
clusive remarks contain an assessment of the extent and consistency of standpoints of 
the two courts in respect of practical application of measures of positive discrimination.
2. Relevant law relating to minority rights in Slovenia 
The constitution of Slovenia of 19915 contains several Articles relating to the status of 
national minorities living in Slovenia, including those that guarantee some special rights 
to particular ethnic minority groups denoted as autochthonous. The protection of ethnic 
minorities is based on the principle of territoriality (members of autochthonous minorities 
enjoy special rights in the areas nominated by a statute as ethnically mixed), and the prin-
ciple of community (special rights are granted regardless of the size of a particular ethnic 
group or the proportion of its members in the ethnically mixed territory).6
The members of all ethnic groups are guaranteed certain rights that apply to all minori-
ties: the right to freely express belonging to their nation or ethnic group, to nurture and 
3  Eurostat, Country profiles – Population of 1 January (2020); Available online: https://ec.europa.eu/eu-
rostat/tgm/table.do?tab=table&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tps00001
4  The percentage of members of minority ethnic groups rose from 3% in 1953 to 17% in 2002 – Zlata 
PlošTajner: Autochthonous and Newly-Formed Minorities: Two Different Approaches. In: National Minorities 
in South- East Europe, FES, Zagreb, 2000.
5  The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia (RS), Official Gazette of RS no. UZS68, 66/00 – UZ80, 
24/03 – UZ3a, 47, 68, 69/04 – UZ14, 69/04 – UZ43, 69/04 – UZ50, 68/06 – UZ121,140,143, 47/13 – UZ148, 
47/13 – UZ90,97,99 and 75/16 – UZ70a.
6  Sigrid liPoTT: The Hungarian National Minority in Slovenia: Assessment of Protection and Integration 
after EU Accession. In: Romanian Journal of European Affairs, Vol. 13, no. 3/2013, pp. 64-89, at p. 70. See also: 
Antonija peTričuŠić: Slovenian legislative system for minority protection. In: Noves SL. Revista de Sociolin-
guistica, Autumn 2004, pp. 1-9, at. p. 4. Available online: http://www.gen.cat/llengua/noves/noves/hm04tardor/
docs/petricusic,pdf
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express their culture, and use their language and alphabet.7 As for the rest of guaranteed 
minority rights, the constitution makes distinction between three categories of national 
communities living in Slovenia: the autochthonous national communities, the autochtho-
nous Roma community and the other (non-autochthonous) minority ethnic groups. Two 
ethnic minority groups, Italians and Hungarians, have the status of autochthonous nation-
al communities under the constitution, and as such are granted some additional special 
rights regulated in more details by a separate statute.8 This way these two ethnic minor-
ities are given a privileged status among all the others dwelling in Slovenia. The special 
constitutional status of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national communities in 
Slovenia is a result of historical reasons and their traditional presence.9 Besides the root-
edness of these ethnic groups in Slovenia, their status is also based on earlier agreements 
on these matters between Slovenia and Italy, i.e. Hungary. Given that only the Italian and 
Hungarian communities enjoy the autochthonous status under the constitution, special 
rights of such communities are fully guaranteed only to them. Special minority rights and 
the level of their protection are significantly lower in respect of other national minority 
groups. Neither the constitution nor any relevant statute contains the criteria for estab-
lishing if a particular national community is autochthonous or not. There is no widely 
accepted definition of autochthonous minorities in theory.10 This term often has different 
meaning depending on whether it is used to denote indigenous people (when it is mainly 
a descriptive term) or national (ethnic) minority (when it is used to make distinction be-
tween traditional, long time present minorities and immigrants who do not enjoy the same 
level of legal protection).11 The status of minorities in theory and in legislation of concrete 
countries is often linked with their long-term presence in the host country, the length of 
which may vary12 or is not specified at all. In addition, autochthonicity is not considered 
to be a condition for the enjoyment of minority rights. Some other ethnic groups living in 
Slovenia, such as the Croats or Serbs who have been present in Slovenia for several cen-
turies and make a multifold larger portion of the population than the two autochthonous 
ones, are generally considered to be newly formed minorities as a residue from the former 
Yugoslav federation. Although they and the Bosnians required to be recognized the same 
7  The Constitution of Slovenija, Art. 61. 
8  Ibid. Art. 5, and Art. 64. The status and special rights of the Italian and Hungarian autochthonous ethnic 
minorities are regulated by the Act on Self-Governing Ethnic Groups, Official Gazette of RS, no. 65/94 and 
71/17.
9  Vera klopčič: Legal Protection of National Minorities in Slovenia. In: Innovative Issues and Approaches 
in Social Sciences, Vol.11, no. 2/2018, pp. 38-50, at p. 39.
10  The Charter of the Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) defines autochthonous national mi-
norities /ethnic groups as minorities that came into being as a result of the changes of state borders or other 
historical events, and the peoples of Europe who have never established a state of their own and who live as 
a minority in the territory of a state. Available online: https://www.fuen.org/en/article/Autochthonous-minori-
ties-in-Europe Obviously, this definition is too vague since it does not contain any specific characteristic of such 
minorities. On the other hand, the Minority Secretariat of the four autochthonous minorities in Germany uses a 
definition that enumerates the same traits that are used in theory for defining national minorities in general, and 
is not specific for autochthonous ones. See:  https://www.minderheitensekretariat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/
PDFs/2018-02-14_Folder-englisch-MS-2016.pdf 
11 Ana horvaT: Autohtone nacionalne manjine i ustavne promjene 2009-2010, u: Zbornik Pravnog fakulteta 
u Zagrebu, 2010/2, pp. 555-585, at p.562. [Autochthonous National Minorities and Constitutional Changes 
of 2009-2010], in: Collected Papers of Zagreb Law Faculty, 2010/2. pp. 555-585, at p.562). Available online: 
https://hrcak.srce.hr/51988
12  The minimal length is at least 2 generations of a minority members present in the host country. Hungary 
explicitly requires the length of at least 100 years. 
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status and special rights as the Italian and Hungarian communities,13 their arguments for 
such stand have not been recognized so far.
The Roma community enjoys a different kind of special status. The formal difference 
between the Italian and Hungarian community on one side and Roma community on the 
other is that the former are nominated in the constitution as national communities, where-
as the latter is labeled as a community. The Roma community is also an autochthonous 
ethnic group under the constitution but does not enjoy special rights guaranteed by the 
constitution to the Italian and Hungarian autochthonous communities in Slovenia. The 
constitution does not enumerate special rights of the Roma community and its members as 
it does in respect of the autochthonous minorities but provides that their status and some 
special rights are to be regulated by a special statute.14 This was done in 2007 by adopting 
the Act on Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia15, which regulates the status 
and lists some special rights to this ethnic group. Under the Act the Roma community is 
considered autochthonous, whereas their special rights are to be prescribed by statutes 
governing particular areas. The Act provides that the Republic of Slovenia ensures the 
exercise of special rights in the field of education, culture, employment, spatial planning 
and environmental protection, health and social care, information and co-decision-mak-
ing in public matters relating to members of the Roma community.16 Statutes regulating 
the enumerated fields must elaborate special rights of the Roma in those areas. Individual 
members of the Roma community enjoy special rights in multiethnic territories where 
they reside. However, unlike the Italian and Hungarian minorities the population of Roma 
is not concentrated in particular territories but rather scattered over the country. Besides, 
many Roma do not register as members of the Roma community in the census, so the 
number of registered members of Roma community is lower than the requirement set by 
legislation which prevents this minority from enjoying the level of protection that it could 
achieve according to the constitution. Finally, rights guaranteed by the constitution apply 
only to the members of Roma community who have the autochthonous status, while the 
rest of Roma (e.g. those who migrated to Slovenia in the 1990’s) are not entitled to the 
special protection.17
13  See e.g. Svetlana vasović-Mekina: Slovenija i manjine – priznati i nepriznati, Vreme br. 581, 21. 02. 
2002. [Slovenia and Minorities – Recognized and Unrecognized], in: Vreme no. 581, 21. 02. 2002. Available 
online: https://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=308400; Svetlana vasović-Mekina: Manjine – državna tajna, 
Vreme br. 741, 17. 03. 2005. [Minorities – State Secret], in: Vreme no. 741, 17. 03. 2005. Available online: 
athttps://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=409533; D. Su./HINA: Hrvati u Deželi: Dajte nam konačno status 
autohtone manjine  [Croats in Slovenia: Give Us Already the Status of Autochthonous Minority], T-portal, 06. 
04. 2018. Available online: https://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/clanak/hrvati-u-dezeli-dajte-nam-konacno-status-au-
tohtone-manjine-foto-20180406/print
14  The Constitution of Slovenia, Art. 65.
15  The Act on Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of RS, no. 33/07. 
16  Ibid. Art. 3.
17  Antonija peTričuŠić: Slovenian Legislative System for Minority Protection. In: Noves SL. Revista de 
Sociolinguistica, Autumn 2004, pp. 1-9, at p. 2.
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Other national communities18 are not considered autochthonous and thus they enjoy gen-
eral constitutional rights guaranteed to all citizens, but no additional special rights granted 
by the constitution or sectoral statutes to the members of autochthonous ethnic groups. 
Any changes in this direction would require amendments to the Constitution (nota bene, 
one of the arguments against proposals to widen the circle of autochthonous communities 
enumerated in the Constitution states that it would be impossible to reach the required 
majority in the Assembly for such a change). In order to address the issue of new minor-
ities, namely those that migrated to Slovenia from other republics during the existence of 
Yugoslavia (Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians and Serbs), whose 
rights are not regulated by the constitution, the State Assembly of Slovenia adopted the 
Declaration of the Republic of Slovenia on the Status of national communities of the Na-
tions of Former Yugoslavia in February 2011.19 At the beginning of 2018 the draft Act on 
the Implementation of Collective Cultural Rights of National Communities of the Nations 
of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia was 
prepared and sent to the parliamentary procedure, and is still pending.20
The Slovenian Constitution contains a rather extensive list of special rights guaranteed 
to autochthonous ethnic communities and their members. They include the rights to free-
ly use their national symbols and establish their organizations; to develop research and 
publishing activities in order to preserve their national identity; the right to education in 
their own language and to conceptualize such education, while the law defines the areas 
in which bilingual education is obligatory; the right to maintain relations with their kin-
states and people; the right to establish autonomous national communities in the territo-
ries where they live, and to which the state may convey certain tasks from its jurisdiction 
and related budgetary funds. They are guaranteed direct representation in the represent-
ative bodies of multiethnic local communities and in the State Assembly.21 Along this 
line, Article 80 of the Constitution expressly provides that one representative of each of 
the Italian and Hungarian national communities shall be elected to the State Assembly. 
The status and the enjoyment of rights of the two autochthonous communities in the ter-
ritories they inhabit, the obligations of local communities in this respect, and the rights 
that members of autochthonous communities enjoy even beyond territories where they 
live are regulated by the law. The rights of both ethnic communities and their mem-
bers are additionally fostered by the guarantees of their rights regardless of the num-
ber of their members. No general legal act that relates to the enjoyment of rights or the 
status of autochthonous national communities may be enacted without consent of their 
18  Žagar divides those other ethnic minorities and their members, the common trait of which is that they have 
the citizenship of Slovenia, in two groups: very small autochthonous ethnic groups (or rather their remnants), 
and non-autochthonous minority groups who migrated into Slovenia relativelly recently, mostly since 1960’s, 
which include members of national communities from other republics of former Yugoslavia who migrated to 
Slovenia („immigrant“ or „new“ minorities). Mitja ŽaGar: Položaj i prava nacionalnih manjina u Republici 
Sloveniji [Status and Rights of National Minorities in the Republic of Slovenia]. In: Politička misao, 2001/3, 
pp. 106–121, at p. 111.
19  Declaration of the Republic of Slovenia on the Status of National Communities of the Nations of Former 
Yugoslavia in the Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of RS no. 7/11.
20  The text of the current version of the draft act is available online at: http://pisrs.si/Pis.web/pregledPred-
pisa?id=ZAKO7844 
21  Ibid. Art. 64, Par. 1-3.
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representatives, which is effectively a veto-right of the minorities in respect of any law 
that deals with their guaranteed rights.22
According to Art. 12 of the Constitution, besides Slovenian language the languages in 
official use in the local communities where members of the two autochthonous communi-
ties live are also the Italian and Hungarian language and alphabet, respectively. There are 
30 bilingual settlements and 3 bilingual municipalities where Hungarian is in official use, 
and 25 settlements in 4 municipalities where Italian is in official use. 
Many laws regulating various areas contain provisions that elaborate relevant special 
rights of autochthonous minorities in those particular fields. Particularly important are 
the Act on Self Governing National Communities,23 which regulates the status and spe-
cial rights of the Italian and Hungarian national communities in Slovenia, and the Act 
on Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia,24 which defines special rights of the 
Roma community and their members, their participation in enjoying those rights, and the 
authorities of state and local organs in the effective enjoyment of special rights. 
3. Relevant law relating to minority rights in Croatia
Fundamental principles of the constitution of Croatia state that Croatia is a nation state of 
Croatian people and state of the members of national minorities having Croatian citizen-
ship. Altogether 22 national minorities (plus others) are expressly enumerated as those 
who are guaranteed equality with the citizens of Croatian nationality and enjoyment of 
national rights in accordance with democratic norms of the UN and countries of the free 
world.25 The list of constitutionally guaranteed rights of national minorities is much short-
er. Besides general warranty of equality for all members of national minorities, only a few 
rights are explicitly guaranteed by the constitution to all national minorities: freedom to 
express their national belonging, freedom to use their own language and alphabet, and 
cultural autonomy. In addition, besides general electoral right a special right to elect their 
representatives to the Croatian Assembly may be granted to members of national minor-
ities by a statute. Finally, the key provision is that the equality and protection of rights 
of national minorities are regulated by a constitutional law adopted in the procedure for 
adopting organic laws.26 
Organic laws work out the most important constitutional matters (including constitution-
ally guaranteed human rights and fundamental freedoms), and the conditions for their 
adoption are stricter than those for regular laws. However, organic laws that regulate 
the rights of national minorities must be adopted by a qualified 2/3 majority of all depu-
ties,27 which is the highest threshold prescribed for the adoption of laws by the Croatian 
22  Ibid. Art. 64, Par. 4-6.
23  The Act on Self Governing National Communities, Official Gazette of RS no.  65/94 and 71/17.
24  The Act on Roma Community in the Republic of Slovenia, Official Gazette of RS no. 33/07.
25  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Fundamental Principles, section 2, Narodne novine (Official 
Gazette of Croatia) no. 56/90., 135/97., 113/00., 28/01., 76/10. and 5/14., Constitutional Court of Croatia, 15. 
January 2014.)
26  Ibid. Art. 15, Par. 1-4.
27  Ibid. Art. 83, Par. 1.
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constitution,28 except for the Constitutional Act on the Constitutional Court which is 
adopted in the procedure prescribed for the adoption of the constitution which makes it of 
the same rank as the constitution itself.29 Because of this requirement the statutes govern-
ing rights of national minorities are the highest ranking ones, immediately after the con-
stitution. They are not easily amended or altered so the guarantees contained within are 
strong, and their rank in the hierarchy makes those guarantees quite constitutional-like.
The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities was adopted in 2002.30 It 
gives a definition of a national minority,31 and contains provisions that enumerate the 
rights of national minorities, conditions for their enjoyment, and in some cases the meas-
ures of positive discrimination giving an advantage to their members if otherwise they 
could be discriminated in enjoying certain rights. The enumerated rights pertain to vari-
ous areas and include the right to freely declare one’s belonging to a national minority, a 
ban on discrimination because of such belonging, and guarantees of equality before the 
law. The law prescribes that conditions for enjoyment of certain rights may be provided 
by other special laws or may depend on the share of the minority in the population on 
the part or in the whole of the state territory, on the acquired rights, or on international 
agreements that make a part of the internal legal system of Croatia. It bans any measure 
that changes the structure of the population in areas inhabited by members of national 
minorities, providing that those measures aggravate the enjoyment or limit the rights and 
freedoms prescribed by this constitutional law or other special laws.32
Further on, the constitutional law guarantees special individual or collective rights to 
members of national minorities, particularly to use their own language and alphabet (in 
private, in public and for official purposes); the right to education in their own language 
and alphabet; to use their national symbols; the right to cultural autonomy through pres-
ervation, development and expression of their own culture; the right to exercise their 
religion and to establish religious communities with others; to access means of public 
communication and to perform activities of public information in their own language and 
alphabet; to organize and associate with others in order to achieve common interests; to 
be represented in the representative bodies at state and local levels, and in administrative 
and judicial bodies; to participate in the public life and administer local affairs through 
their councils and representatives; to be protected from any activity that may endanger 
their survival and enjoyment of their rights and freedoms.33 Provisions of laws that reg-
ulate rights of national minorities must be construed and applied with respect for the 
members of minorities and Croatian people, and with understanding, solidarity, tolerance 
and dialogue among them.34 
28  Besides this, 2/3 majority is required only for a parliamentary decision about the change of state borders.
29  Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, Art. 127, Par. 1 and 2.
30  The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Narodne novine (Official Gazette of Cro-
atia) no 155/2002. and 47/2010. – Decision of the Constitutional Court no. 80. of 28.06.2010. and no. 93. of 
10.08.2011.
31  Art. 5 defines national minority as a group of Croatian citizens whose members traditionally inhabit the 
territory of Croatia, who share ethnic, linguistic, cultural or religious characteristics different from other citi-
zens, and a wish to preserve those characteristics.
32  Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Art. 4.
33  Ibid. Art. 7.
34  Ibid. Art. 8.
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The law further elaborates some concrete rights and conditions for their enjoyment. In 
some cases the enjoyment of rights is made dependent on the share of the members of 
particular national minority in the population in the respective territory (e.g. the right to 
the official use of their language and alphabet, the right to representation). Sometimes the 
law prescribes affirmative measures to the advantage of members of national minorities 
in order to facilitate their exercise of certain rights, some of which have been challenged 
before the Constitutional Court. The law also regulates the right of national minorities to 
elect their representatives and councils who participate in the public life and administra-
tion of local affairs, specifies the criteria for their election and composition of councils, 
their authorities, funding and functioning, while the fourth section regulates those issues 
in respect of the Council of National Minorities that is established on the state level.
Many statutes that regulate enumerated areas also contain provisions that provide some 
kind of preferential treatment to members of national minorities. Some of them deal ex-
clusively with rights of national minorities in certain areas (for instance the Act on Educa-
tion in the Language and Alphabet of National Minorities,35 Act on the Use of Languages 
and Alphabet of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia36), while others grant 
special rights to national minorities in the matters they govern (such as the Act on the 
Election of Deputies to the State Assembly,37 or Act on the Election of Members of Local 
and Regional Assemblies38). Besides the constitutional law on rights of national minori-
ties, certain provisions of these and other special statues were also an object of review by 
the Constitutional Court of Croatia.
4.  Comparison of Slovenian and Croatian constitutional courts practice regarding 
special rights of national minorities
This chapter compares relevant decisions by the Constitutional Court of Croatia (CCC) 
and by the Constitutional Court of Slovenia (CCS) in matters where special rights and/or 
positive measures to the benefit of national minorities were the subject of review of con-
stitutionality. The analysis is directed primarily at the courts’ understanding of positive 
discrimination that can be derived from those decisions, and their interpretations of the 
admissibility of particular measures of the kind in various fields of life. 
4.1. The right to representation and the right to be elected for public offices
The representation of national minorities in the state, local and regional representative 
bodies is an important element of their participation in decision-making and in public 
life. On the other hand, because of their minority status in most cases national minorities 
35  The Act on Education in the Language and Alphabet of National Minorities, Narodne novine (Official 
Gazette of Croatia) no. 51/00 and 56/00. 
36 The Act on the Use of Languages and Alphabet of National Minorities in the Republic of Croatia, Narodne 
novine (Official Gazette of Croatia) no. 51/00 and 56/00.
37  The Act on the Election of Deputies to the State Assembly, Narodne novine (Official Gazette of Croatia) 
no. 116/99, 109/00, 53/03, 69/03, 167/03, 44/06, 19/07, 20/09, 145/10, 24/11, 93/11, 120/11, 19/15, 104/15 and 
98/19.
38  The Act on the Election of Members of Local and Regional Assemblies, Narodne novine (Official Gazette 
of Croatia) no. 33/01, 10/02, 155/02, 45/03, 43/04, 40/05, 44/05, 44/06 and 109/07.
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would be underrepresented or would have no representatives at all if general rules related 
to elections, distribution of seats and participation in decision making in representative 
bodies applied to them in the same manner. Thus various models have been developed 
with the aim of securing at least a minimal representation of national minorities in such 
bodies and seeking to prevent the terror of the majority over the minority. Both Croatia 
and Slovenia apply a variant of a model of reserved seats in the parliament as a form of 
positive discrimination in favor of minorities,39 and constitutional courts of both countries 
had to deal with some controversies arising from the model applied.
In Croatia the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities guarantees the 
right to representation of national minorities in the State Assembly and in the local and 
regional assemblies. The number of guaranteed seats depends on the share of a particular 
minority in the total population of a respective territorial unit. The Constitutional Law 
also prescribes the criteria to calculate the number of those representatives and the proce-
dure for filling those seats, while statutes governing the elections to representative bodies 
on various levels also contain provisions related to details in this issue. In practice there 
were several occasions where applications were filed to the CCC because of the alleged 
violation of this right, or its alleged overbroad and thus unconstitutional application.
In 2011 the CCC decided upon several applications that challenged the constitutionality 
of multiple Articles amending the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minori-
ties,40 and repealed its Article 1.41 The contested Article introduced two models of positive 
discrimination of national minorities: those exceeding 1.5% in the total population, using 
general electoral right, elect at least three representatives from the lists of minority po-
litical parties or lists put together by voters belonging to the minority, while members of 
minorities who do not exceed this limit may cast two votes – one using their general elec-
toral right, and the other using the special right to elect the guaranteed five representatives 
of national minorities in a separate electoral unit. Only the Serb minority passes the 1.5% 
threshold (4.5% at that time). Several applicants challenged this Article generally stating 
that this amendment was discriminatory and thus unconstitutional. The CCC identified 
three constitutional issues to be resolved: 1. Is it constitutional to guarantee certain num-
ber of seats to national minorities within the framework of the general electoral system 
based on a general and equal electoral right? 2. Is it constitutional to grant an additional 
vote in the elections only to members of national minorities? 3. Is it constitutional to grant 
the members of small minorities one vote more than to members of the largest minority 
in Croatia?
The CCC found that the text of the challenged Article was unclear and allowed for oppo-
site interpretations, so in order to decide these issues the CCC looked into the Constitu-
tion as a whole, and its fundamental values among which is the respect for and protection 
39  More on these models see in: Dragan đukanović: Izborni sistemi u zemljama nekadašnje Jugoslavije 
[Electoral Systems in Countries of Former Yugoslavia], In Međunarodni problemi no. 2006/4, Belgrade, pp. 
513-536, at pp. 518-521.
40  Constitutional Law amending the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Narodne 
novine (Official Gazette of Croatia) no. 80/10.
41  Decision of the CC of Croatia (further on CCC decision) U-I-3597/2010 (U-I-3847/2010; U-I-692/2011; 
U-I-898/2011; U-I-994/2011) of 29 July 2011.
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of rights of national minorities.42 As for the first issue, the CCC deemed that guaranteeing 
three deputies to largest national minority within the general electoral system divides the 
Croatian people in two parts based on their (non) belonging to a particular national minor-
ity: the Serb minority makes up its special lists of candidates, but all the Croatian citizens 
regardless of their national belonging may vote for those, or any other general lists. Such 
a solution primarily contributes to a political instead of a constitutionally allowable goal 
(achieving equality of the minority with the majority) and is unconstitutional as such.43 
Election of a guaranteed number of Serbian representatives must be done either outside 
the general electoral system or by introducing affirmative measures into it. As for the sec-
ond issue the CCC concluded that an additional vote to members of national minorities is 
in breach of the equal electoral right of all citizens even more than granting guaranteed 
seats in the parliament, and annulled that section of the contested Article as dispropor-
tionate.44 As for the third issue, the fact that small minorities are given an additional vote 
need not mean that the large minority is discriminated against; in the current electoral 
system small minorities enjoy an exclusive active and passive electoral right within the 
separate electoral system, while the large minority enjoys only the exclusive passive, but 
not an exclusive active electoral right, which also might be to the advantage instead of 
to the detriment of the large minority. Thus CCC found that an extra vote for members 
of small minorities in comparison with the large one is not contrary to the constitution.45 
It stated that the system of guaranteed seats for minorities within the general electoral 
system violates the constitutionally guaranteed equal electoral right of all citizens, and 
gave prevalence to the general constitutional electoral right over the special right of the 
minority to elect its representatives within the framework of the general electoral system. 
Accordingly, in this case the CCC gave priority to a guarantee of one right contained in 
lex generalis (equal vote of all citizens in general elections) over the other provided for 
by lex specialis as a positive measure (the right of national minorities to a guaranteed 
representation in representative bodies).
In 2013 the CCC decided two more cases related to electoral disputes in regional elec-
tions. The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities grants one seat in 
regional assemblies to minorities who participate with at least 5% but less than 15% in the 
total population, but prescribes that local and regional authorities may set a lower thresh-
old for the guaranteed seat for minorities, or may grant more seats to minorities than what 
they would be entitled to according to their size.46 As an additional measure of positive 
discrimination the Act on Local Elections contains a formula for calculating the number 
of guaranteed seats for minorities, according to which minorities may get a seat (or more) 
in the assembly even if their share in the population is under 5%.47 Besides, each local 
unit may guarantee one or more seats to national minorities on its territory regardless of 
the share of the minority in the population of that unit.48 The number of seats for each 
42  Ibid. Art. 28.
43  Ibid. Art. 32.
44  Ibid. Art. 34, 35.
45  Ibid. Art. 58.
46  Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Art. 20, Par. 2. and Art. 21.
47  The Act on Local Elections, Narodne novine (Official Gazette of Croatia) no. 144/12, 121/16, 98/19, 
42/20, Art. 104, Par. 1.
48  Ibid. Art. 105.
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national minority that meets the requirements for entering the assembly is to be published 
on the internet page of the competent administrative body before the elections.49
The first case before the CCC was initiated because of alleged irregularities in the elec-
tions for the assembly of Zadar district.50 The Serb minority, which made less than 5% of 
the district population, did not win any seat in the general elections. The District Electoral 
Board applied the rules of minority representation under privileged circumstances from 
the Act on Local Elections and assigned one seat to the Serb minority. The applicant 
claimed that the representative of the Serb national minority was elected contrary to rel-
evant electoral legislation since the share of Serbs was under the limit prescribed by the 
Constitutional Law. The CCC rejected the application as unfounded because it ignored 
the mentioned formula from the Act on Local Elections according to which the Serb mi-
nority was entitled to one seat in the regional assembly. 
In another case that originated in the regional elections in Brodsko-Posavska district the 
issue was inverted – the representative of the Serb minority was not elected to the regional 
assembly in the general elections, while the Regional Electoral Board found that this mi-
nority did not meet the requirements for a guaranteed representative because their share 
in the total population (2.6%) was under the prescribed share of at least 5%.51 Before 
the elections the Ministry of Administration published on its internet page that the Serb 
national minority in this district is entitled to one representative. The CCC found that the 
Electoral Board erroneously applied the relevant law. It disregarded the information from 
the Ministry’s internet site, and instead of the formula in the Act on Local Elections it 
applied the stricter general provision from the Constitutional Law on the Rights of Na-
tional Minorities. For those reasons CCC annulled the Board’s decision on the results of 
the elections and ordered the Board to publish a new decision which includes one repre-
sentative of the Serb minority. In both cases the CCC upheld the measures of positive dis-
crimination that regulate the representation of minorities in local and regional assemblies 
under privileged circumstances, and thus enabled the entry of minority representatives 
into regional parliaments.
Closely related to the previous issue is the election of other officials, i.e. guarantees to 
members of national minorities to participate in the executive and judiciary. The CCC 
has decided a number of cases related to the election of judges and public prosecutors. 
The Constitutional Law prescribes that national minorities are guaranteed representation 
in the state and local executive bodies and in the judiciary, with respect to the relevant 
special law and employment policy, minority’s share in the population, and vested rights 
of the minorities. If the candidates evenly satisfy the conditions, precedence in filling 
those posts is to be given to representatives of national minorities.52 This positive measure 
was challenged before the CCC as allegedly discriminatory against Croat majority. The 
CCC stressed that this advantage is a special positive measure introduced intentionally to 
favor particular groups with the aim of removing their actual inequality arising from their 
belonging to minority. The legislator was authorized to prescribe the mentioned measure, 
49  Ibid. Art. 104, Par. 3.
50  CCC decision U-VIIA-3004/2013, 26 May 2013.
51  CCC decision U-VII-3122/2013, 4 June 2013.
52  Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Art. 22.
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which is considered justified until reasons for its introduction exist, and if it does not 
violate the principle of proportionality from Art. 16 of the Constitution. Thus it does not 
amount to discrimination that is forbidden under Art. 14, sec. 2 of the Constitution.53 The 
CCC upheld the use of positive measures in this case, but its reasoning shows a reserved 
stand towards the application of positive discrimination in practice which is deemed jus-
tified only within rather strict limits prone to further interpretation. 
The CCC had several opportunities to test this stance in practice. Members of national 
minorities who were not selected for the post of a judge or a public prosecutor and who 
unsuccessfully appealed to the Administrative Court filed applications with the CCC ar-
guing that their special right to precedence under equal circumstances was violated by 
the selection of the majority member. In several decisions the CCC reiterated that it nor-
mally does not determine whether the court correctly established the circumstances and 
assessed the evidence, but only if the applicant’s constitutional rights were violated.54 
Some authors note that the CCC has not established a consistent set of basic principles in 
respect of the limits of its engagement in the content of the challenged individual act, but 
from its practice follows that it will react whenever the decision has no foundations in the 
material law.55 In cases dealing with this issue the CCC restricted its review to the legality 
of the procedure before competent bodies, while refraining from the analysis of other 
potentially relevant aspects of the concrete case. It upheld decisions on the selection of a 
majority candidates in all related cases. As a general rule, it accepted the findings that the 
majority candidate had some advantage over the minority candidate, so they did not even-
ly satisfy general and special conditions for the post.56 Therefore their national belonging 
was irrelevant, i.e. there was no grounds to apply positive measures in those cases. CCC 
also found that the right of minority candidates to challenge such decisions before the 
Administrative Court was not violated since the courts’ explanations of decision upon 
complaint were not arbitrary.57 So, the CCC construed positive discrimination measures 
restrictively, as they may be applied only where candidates are even in all other relevant 
elements. It is of course a positive measure, but the requirement for its application makes 
it applicable in a very limited number of cases. On the other hand, extending the criteria 
for equal position beyond general conditions to special ones (which may vary), the CCC 
basically narrowed the probability of applying positive discrimination in cases related to 
the selection of officials.
53  CCC Decision U-I-2767/2007, 31. March 2009; also: U-I – 402/2003 and U-I-2812/2007, 30 April 2008 
(Initiative for the review of constitutionality rejected as unfounded).
54  E.g. CCC decision U-III-4079/2010, 17 November 2010; U-III-1286/2012, 11 December 2014.
55  Dubravko ljubić: Granice ustavnog sudovanja iniciranog ustavnom tužbom. [Limits of Constitutional 
Adjudication Initiated By a Constitutional Complaint]. In: Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Splitu (Collec-
tion of Papers of the Split Law Faculty), year 50, 2013/1, pp. 159-176, at p. 163.
56  CCC decisions U-III-1897/2013, 5 March 2015 (better results of the selected candidate in the test of 
knowledge); U-III-4681/2008, 30. June 2010; U-III-3862/2010, 23 May 2012 and U-III-2989/2010, 31 May 
2012 (richer and/or more relevant previous working experience of the selected candidate); U-III-1286/2012, 
11 December 2014 (fulfillment of additional special requirements besides general ones); U-III-5760/2008, 17 
November 2010 (previous work and capabilities of the candidate who belongs to national minority do not se-
cure advantage in his favour in comparison with other candidates, no grounds for the application of affirmative 
measure).
57  CCC decision U-III-4079/2010, 17 november 2010.
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As for Slovenia, the CCS decided a case in this field in 1998 when it reviewed the consti-
tutionality of several legal acts regulating the elections for assemblies on state and local 
levels. The Act on the Elections for the State Assembly and the Act on Local Elections58 
prescribe that members of the autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national communities 
are entitled to cast two votes in the elections – one using the general electoral right to vote 
for any candidate, and the other using the special right of these national communities to 
elect their representatives in the assembly. Applicants deemed that this special right of 
national communities violates the principle of equality of citizens since others may cast 
only one vote.59 In addition, Article 22 of the Act on the Registry of the Electoral Right60 
prescribes that separate electoral lists for the election of guaranteed representatives of 
two national communities are prepared by their boards and confirmed by the competent 
administrative body; individuals of Italian or Hungarian origin who do not dwell in the 
areas that have the status of ethnically mixed settlements may also be added to these lists 
upon their personal request. The applicants argued that this is an unconstitutional exten-
sion of special electoral right to non-autochthonous members of national communities.61
The CCS noted that the Constitution guarantees autochthonous national communities the 
right to be directly represented in the local representative bodies and in the State Assem-
bly, which is the source of their right to a guaranteed seat. It allows them to participate in 
the decision making process regardless of their size or the type of the electoral system, 
while their constitutionally established right to veto general acts that regulate the rights of 
national communities ensures that majority representatives may not overpower those of 
the minority in issues related to constitutional rights and status of national communities. 
Two reserved seats for the autochthonous national communities in the State Assembly are 
filled in elections in special electoral units formed in the areas inhabited by their mem-
bers, from the list which is separate from the general list of voters. The CCS stated that 
the possibility to cast two votes in these elections is indeed a departure from the principle 
of equality of electoral rights, but this form of positive discrimination is not contrary to 
the constitution because the constitution itself instructs the legislator to digress from it 
for the sake of the protection of the autochthonous national communities. Therefore, the 
introduction of this special right into the electoral system by the legislator does not violate 
the constitution.62 As for the possible extension of this special right to non-autochthonous 
members of national communities the CCS had to construe the notion of autochthonicity, 
since dual vote is not granted to all Italians and Hungarians but only to autochthonous 
members of these communities. However, this term is not defined by law. In the absence 
of criteria to establish who is autochthonous and given that lists are assembled by the 
boards of national communities, it follows that autochthonous are those who are on the 
lists. This may lead to arbitrariness in their composition. The CCS refrained from enter-
ing into deliberation on the issue of autochthonicity, but instead concluded that there is a 
legal gap in the relevant legislation and ordered the legislator to prescribe the criteria for 
58  The Act on the Elections for the State Assembly, Official Gazette of RS, no. 109/06, 54/07 – decision of 
the Constitutional Court, and 23/17; The Act on Local Elections, Official Gazette of RS, no. 94/07, 45/08, 83/12 
and 68/17. 
59  CCS decision no. U-I-283/94, 12 February 1998, pt. 3.
60  Act on the Registry of the Electoral Right, Official Gazette of RS, no. 46/52.
61  CCS decision no. U-I-283/94, pt. 5.
62  Ibid. Pt. 30-37.
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validating one’s belonging to autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national community. 
The CCS added that the Constitution prescribes that special rights of the members of 
autochthonous national communities regardless of the territory they live on are regulated 
by statute, so the constitution does not prohibit persons who live outside ethnically mixed 
areas to be counted as members of those communities. 
In this case the CCS also deliberated on the constitutionality of Art. 53 of the Statute of 
the Municipality of Koper which, among others, prescribed that if the Mayor of Koper 
is not a member of the Italian national community, the Deputy Mayor must be from that 
community. The applicants argued that persons who are not members of the Italian com-
munity are discriminated against because they are prevented from filing their candidacy 
for the seat of Deputy Mayor.63 The CCS stated that the constitution does not ban direct 
representation of national communities in other representative bodies besides state and 
local ones. Although this solution constitutes a departure from the principle of equality of 
votes and puts individuals who are not Italians in a less favourable position, such depar-
ture is justified from the point of view of special protection of national minorities imposed 
by the very Constitution and is thus not unconstitutional.64 In a similar case the CCC 
found the dual vote of national minorities unconstitutional as it violated the principle of 
equal electoral right of all citizens. The CCS took a completely opposite stance on the 
additional vote to members of autochthonous national communities and, consequently, 
on the aim and limits of positive discrimination measures. In the electoral dispute CCS 
understood positive discrimination broadly, as legitimate means for achieving equality of 
all citizens and prevention of discrimination of minorities. The Court’s reasoning was that 
measures such as special rights of minorities as vulnerable social groups are so impor-
tant that they may prevail even over some general principles, but also need and deserve 
stronger defense than the rights guaranteed to all. Constitutional provisions allowed for 
and supported such an interpretation, so in this case the CCS demonstrated a strong in-
clination towards favorable interpretation of the scope and applicability of measures of 
positive discrimination.
4.2. Official use of minority language and alphabet
The issue of the official use of minority languages and alphabets is a sensitive one and 
often a cause for controversies. The regulation of this issue most frequently covers their 
use in public – in state agencies (courts, administration etc.), in personal documents, to-
ponyms and the like. Language and alphabet are important elements of national identity, 
and various measures of positive discrimination are necessary to secure their enjoyment. 
Constitutional courts of both countries have deliberated upon some aspects of this issue.
In Croatia the applicant filed an application to the CCC because his request to has his ID 
issued as bilingual (in Croatian and Serbian languages and printed in Latin and Cyrilic 
letters) was rejected. The reasoning stated that he was not entitled to such request since 
Serbian language and Cyrilic letters are not in official use in the local community where 
he resides. The applicant argued that members of national minorities in Croatia have the 
63  Ibid. Pt. 6.
64  Ibid. Pt. 47-49.
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right to bilingual documents regardless of whether in the community of their residence 
the minority language is in official use or not, because Art. 9, Sec. 2 of the Constitutional 
Law on the Rights of National Minorities prescribes no additional conditions for the 
enjoyment of that right. The CCC, however, pointed out that Art. 9, Sec. 2 of the Consti-
tutional Law must be construed in relation to Art. 12 of the same Law, which prescribes 
that conditions for the even (official, note P.T.) use of minority language and alphabet in 
local communities are set by the act that regulates the use of minority languages. That Act 
enumerates conditions none of which was met in this case. Given that relevant Articles of 
the Constitution, the Constitutional Law, and the Act on the Use of languages all prescribe 
that the equal use of minority language in local communities is subject to conditions, the 
CCC concluded that it applies to bilingual documents as well – they may be issued only 
in local communities that meet those conditions.65 The CCC did not investigate whether 
the requirements set by the lower ranking act collide with the formula of unconditional 
right from the higher ranking act, or whether the right to bilingual documents may be one 
of those that belong to the individual member of the national minority regardless of the 
place of his/her residence (for which Art. 9, Sec 2 of the Constitutional Law might give 
sufficient grounds, and which could be defended from the prospective of positive discrim-
ination). Instead it accepted the concept of territoriality of all national minorities’ rights, 
according to which they apply only in territories where the prescribed general conditions 
are fulfilled. Thus this decision seems to be an opportunity lost to apply the provision of 
the Constitutional Law stating that the rights of national minorities... enjoy special sup-
port and protection, including positive measures to their benefit.66
The CCC decided three cases, two of them on the same day in 2014, relating to the highly 
sensitive issue of the official use of Serbian language and Cyrillic alphabet in the City of 
Vukovar which was the site of a siege and numerous victims in 1991 in the war between 
Croatian and Yugoslav Army/Serbian forces. The first dealt with the issue of whether the 
Constitution allows a district referendum on the increase of the threshold for the use of 
rights of national minorities above the one prescribed by Art. 12, Sec. 1 of the Constitu-
tional Law on national minorities’ rights67 (at least 1/3 of the total population). The State 
Assembly received a motion to announce a state referendum on whether this threshold 
should be raised from 1/3 to 1/2 of the minority in the total population and passed it to 
the CCC asking whether such request is in accordance with the Constitution. The key 
part of the decision relates to the contents of the referendum question which proposed a 
stricter precondition for the continuation of the use of minority language and alphabet in 
local communities for the whole territory of Croatia. The CCC stated that obligations of 
majority towards minorities should be understood as a constant pursuit for balance that 
secures fair treatment of minorities and avoids any abuse of the majority status. The focus 
is on the legal obligation of competent state bodies to secure the official use of minority 
language and alphabet where legal conditions are satisfied. The Constitution explicitly 
guarantees free use of minority language and alphabet as a vital part of the minorities’ 
identity, which demands tolerance by the majority and constant reminding of the consti-
tutional limits of allowable behavior towards minorities. There is no explicit ban on the 
increase of the threshold, but the general posture of the Constitution requires that such 
65  CCC decision U-III-4856/2004, 12 March 2007.
66  The Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, Art. 3, Par. 1.
67  CCC decision U-VIIR-4640/2014, 12 August 2014.
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increase must be justified by reasons acceptable in a democratic society based on rule of 
law and protection of human rights. Reviewing the proposal through this filter the CCC 
found no relevant and sufficient reasons arising from the pressing social need to increase 
the threshold on the national level. Being without rational grounds the proposed modi-
fication is unjustified. Besides, the formulation and content of the proposed referendum 
question point to a hidden illegitimate goal. On these grounds the CCC concluded that the 
increase of the threshold would not be in accord with the Constitution. The CCC found it 
necessary to stress that it is not an arbiter in political issues in the Croatian society, and 
that their resolution requires political dialogue instead of repressive means. The CCC also 
obligated the City Council of Vukovar to regulate on the individual rights of members 
of national minorities to use their language and alphabet, and on the obligations of state 
and public authorities, in a way that does not encroach on the essence of those rights, and 
with respect to the needs of the majority Croatian population arising from the still vivid 
consequences of the Serb aggression and the need for a fair treatment of the Serbian na-
tional minority in Vukovar.68 This part of the CCC’s decision is quite controversial, but it 
is discussed a bit later within the analysis of another linguistic case. 
In the second case the Croatian government as applicant contested the constitutionality of 
an amendment to the Statute of the City of Vukovar regarding conditions for the official 
use of minority language and alphabet, which the CCC repealed after establishing its un-
constitutionality.69 Article 12, Sec 1 of the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National 
Minorities sets the 1/3 of the population threshold for the right to official use of minority 
language. According to the 2011 census in Croatia Serbs made 34.87% of the Vukovar 
population, so this condition for the official use of languages was fulfilled. However, in 
November 2013 the City Council of Vukovar adopted several amendments to the city 
Statute.70 Amendments to Art. 2 added that Vukovar is the site of distinct piety for the vic-
tims of the Homeland War, and that Croatian language and Latin alphabet are in official 
use in the territory of Vukovar. Grounded on those, the challenged amendment to Article 
61 of the Statute prescribed that the territory of the City of Vukovar is exempted from the 
application of the Act on the Use of Languages and Alphabet of National Minorities in the 
Republic of Croatia and Article 12 of the Constitutional Law until the requirements from 
Article 8 of the Constitutional Law are fulfilled.71 By suspending provisions of relevant 
higher ranking legal acts for an unspecified period and introducing vaguely formulated 
conditions for the withdrawal of such suspension these amendments would have pre-
vented the Serbian minority from the use of their language and alphabet as official. The 
applicant argued that the aim of Art. 8 of the Constitutional Law is to promote diversity 
and tolerance and may not be used as grounds for arbitrary suspension of the application 
68  Ibid. Par. III of the dictum.
69  CCC decision U-II-6110/2013, 12 August 2014.
70  Statutory Decision Ammending the Statute of the City of Vukovar, class: 012-03/09-01/01, no. 2196/01-
01-13-31 of 4. November 2013, Official Gazette of the City of Vukovar no. 7/13.
71  Art. 8 of the Constitutional Law reads that its articles, and the articles of special statutes regulating rights 
and freedoms of members of national minorities, shall be construed and applied with the respect for national 
minorities and for the Croatian people, with the aim to improve understanding, solidarity, tolerance and dia-
logue among them. Before amendments, Art. 61 of the Statute prescribed that members of the Serbian national 
minority have the freedom to use Serbian language and cirilic alphabet in social and public life, and in official 
communication in public affairs within the competences of the City of Vukovar, in accordance with the Consti-
tutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities.
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of law in force. Statutes of local communities, as their fundamental legal acts, must be in 
accordance with the Constitution and positive law; however, the challenged amendment 
is in direct contrast with highest values of the Constitution and legal order of Croatia, and 
as such may not exist in a democratic state. After citing the relevant law, the CCC agreed 
with the applicant’s reasoning, and stated that it deems it obvious and unnecessary to 
explain why the challenged amendment is contrary to the Constitution. 
The next case in this area was in fact a continuation of the previous two. The mentioned 
CCC’s referendum decision obligated the City Council of Vukovar to regulate individual 
rights of members of national minorities to use their language and alphabet and specify 
the obligations of the authorities in this respect and gave general guidelines for such 
regulation. In 2015 the City Council adopted a Statutory Decision regulating the even 
official use of the language and alphabet of the Serbian minority in Vukovar72 (Statutory 
Decision). The applicant disputed several Articles of the Statutory Decision which pre-
scribed certain conditions and limitations to the exercise of certain aspects of the official 
use of Serbian language and alphabet.73 Article 5 prescribed that the Serb representative in 
the City Council may obtain the Council’s documents in Serbian language and in Cyrillic 
upon written request containing the specification of requested documents, and that minor-
ity representative may exercise this right until the amount allocated in the budget for this 
purpose for the particular month is spent. Same rules apply to a Deputy Mayor from the 
Serbian minority in respect of documents from the Mayor’s office. Article 6 stated that 
the City shall issue transcripts of local documents in Serbian and in Cyrillic to members 
of Serbian minority living in Vukovar who submit a written request and prove their legal 
interest for that. Bilingual headings in such documents are printed in letters of the same 
size, while in bilingual stamps letters shall be of the same size when conditions from 
Article 61, Sec. 3 of the Statute are fulfilled.74 Article 7 stated that collective rights of the 
Serbian minority shall be ensured when conditions from Art. 61, Sec. 3 of the City Statute 
are met. The CCC found that by introducing conditions for the enjoyment of these minor-
ity rights the contested Articles contradict the provisions of the Constitutional Law on the 
Rights of National Minorities, the Act on the Use of Minority Language and Alphabet in 
Croatia and the Constitution of Croatia, and repealed their respective parts as unconstitu-
tional. As for conditions for introducing collective rights the CCC found that they are not 
contrary to the Constitution and relevant statutes since they permit gradual introduction 
of collective minority rights with respect for the needs of the majority population, but the 
CCC also stated that such regulation may not be prolonged indefinitely and ordered the 
City Council to adopt a decision that regulates the way of widening the scope of individu-
al and collective rights of the Serb minority in Vukovar with those prescribed by the law. 
Relying on the Constitution and its fundamental values in the first two linguistic cases, 
the CCC demonstrated readiness to support and provide protection for special rights of 
72  Statutory Decision on the Enjoyment of Equal Official Use of the Language and Alphabet of the Serbian 
National Minority in the City of Vukovar, 17. August 2015, Official Gazette of the City of Vukovar no. 7/15.
73  CCC decision U-II-1818/2016, 2 June 2019.
74  The cited article of the Statute of Vukovar stated that each October City Council of Vukovar shall review 
the acchieved level of understanding, solidarity, tollerance and dialogue amond citizens… and decide whether 
to broaden the individual rights guaranteed to members of Serbain minority in Vukovar with additional rights 
from the Act on the Use of Minority Language and Alphabet in Croatia.
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minorities where defined conditions in respect of the size of the minority were met. It did 
so to some extent in the third case too by annulling the sections that introduced additional 
conditions and limits to the enjoyment of special rights, but refrained from dismissing 
provision that enabled delays in the introduction of other rights already enumerated by 
the law. The CCC explained that part of its decision by reasons that are rather of political 
than legal nature, and tacitly allowed that the enjoyment of minority language rights may 
be delayed and subjected to limitations the removal of which depends on the current level 
of tolerance between the majority and minority. In other words, referring to political con-
cerns the CCC did not sustain the stand on an unconditional and full enjoyment of guar-
anteed linguistic rights of minorities. As stated in the partially dissenting opinion of judge 
Abramović, the CCC effectively gave permission to the authorities in Vukovar to decide 
which minority rights to official use of languages guaranteed by the relevant statute shall 
apply in the city, depending on a previous agreement in the City Council; this way guar-
anteed minority rights were degraded from the constitutional and legal to a mere political 
category, which is unacceptable and unconstitutional.75 In another dissenting opinion it 
was stressed that the flexibility of the legal framework mentioned in the decision may not 
extend to the measure that local by-laws exclude the application of guarantees contained 
in provisions of the Constitutional Law and other relevant statutes in the territory of a 
local community.76 Some authors concluded that the legal regulation of the rights of na-
tional minorities in Croatia is adequate, but problems arise in its implementation.77
As for Slovenia, the CCS had also decided several cases related to the official use of lan-
guages and alphabet of national communities. In the first case the applicants challenged 
the constitutionality of Article 1 of the Act on the Protection of Consumers78 in the part 
where it ordains business entities in territories inhabited by members of an autochthonous 
national community to use the language of that community in their communication with 
consumers, arguing that it puts companies who deal with consumers in those areas in an 
unequal position in comparison to others, and thus hinders free economic initiative guar-
anteed by the Constitution.79 In addition, the obligation applies only to business entities 
that deal with the consumers, and violates the principle of equality of those entities. The 
CCS noted that the right to free economic initiative does not mean that every regulation 
of economic activities is an obstruction of that freedom. The Constitution authorizes the 
legislator to regulate the exercise of human rights, which in this case produce certain rules 
regarding the use of languages that businesses in certain territories must respect; the issue 
75  CCC decision U-II-1818/2016, dissenting opinion of Judge Abramović.
76  Ibid. dissenting opinions of Judges Kušan and Selanec.
77  Goranka lalić novak –Tijana vukojičić ToMić: Integracija stranaca i manjina u lokalnu zajednicu kao 
zadatak lokalne samouprave. [The Integration of Foreigners and Minorities to Local Community as a Task for 
Local Self-Governance]. Presentation at the annual scientific conference Citizens, Public Administration, Local 
Self-Government: Are Trust, Cooperation and Support Feasible?, Zagreb, 16. February 2016, 6. See also: Alek-
sandar vukić: Položaj Srba u Hrvatskoj u procesu pridruživanja Europskoj uniji [Status of Serbs in Croatia in 
the Process of Joining the EU. In: Dragutin babić – Drago Župarić-iljić (eds.): Nacionalne manjine kao faktor 
stabilnosti u međunarodnim odnosima Hrvatske i Srbije [National Minorities as a Factor of Stability in Interna-
tional Relations Between Croatia and Serbia], Institute for Migrations and Minorities, Zagreb, 2010, 169-183; 
Nada raduški: Srbi od konstitutivnog naroda do nacionalne manjine. [Serbs From the Constitutive People to 
National Minority]. Serbian Political Thought 2012/2, Belgrade, pp. 443-459 at p. 451.
78  Act on the Protection of Consumers, Official Gazette of RS no. 20/98, 25/98, 110/02, 14/03, 51/04 and 
98/04.
79  CCS decision U-I-218/04-31, 20 April 2006.
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was not whether this is allowed but whether it was justified in this case. The CCS stressed 
that the use of languages in business is linked with the protection of autochthonous na-
tional communities. When regulating their special rights the legislator is not limited by 
the principle of equality, and that is justified by the constitutional obligation of the state 
to protect and guarantee the rights of national minorities. As for the second argument, the 
CCS noted that the principle of equality does not ban different regulation of certain issue, 
but only that such differentiation may not be arbitrary. High level of protection of nation-
al communities is a prerequisite for their equal participation in all aspects of social life 
including economy, so the legislator had a reasonable and viable reason for making such 
distinction in this case. The CCS concluded that this positive measure does not encroach 
on the freedom of economic initiative nor on the principle of equality and is thus not in 
contrast with the Constitution. 
In another case the applicant of the Italian origin claimed that his right to fair trial was 
violated because he did not understand the language of the court well enough to compre-
hend the consequences of his actions in the proceedings, which resulted in the rejection 
of his claim. The CCS established that all the documents submitted by him through his 
proxy were in Slovenian, that he rejected the right to use an interpreter or have a trial in 
Italian language claiming that he understands Slovenian, and that he explicitly withdrew 
his claim on an occasion when his proxy was not present. On these grounds the CCS 
found that the applicants’ rights were not violated. However, two judges submitted a 
dissenting opinion in which they disagreed with the decision, arguing that, given the 
importance of the constitutional protection of these rights, the CCS should have applied 
positive protection of members of autochthonous national communities instead of relying 
on the general ban of discrimination because of one’s language.80 
The third decision in this area was, among others, related to the provision of the Act on 
Societies81 which provided that the name of a society must be in Slovenian language, 
and if its seat is in the local community where a language of an autochthonous national 
community is in official use the name may also be in that language as a translation of the 
name in Slovenian. The applicant deemed that such a solution is not in accord with the 
guaranteed equality of languages in official use. The CCS reiterated that guaranteeing 
special rights to national communities and their positive protection is not contrary with 
the Constitution. The challenged provision did not prescribe the possibility of exclusive 
use of minority language in areas where it is in official use, and thus the CCS concluded 
that it was not in accord with the constitutionally guaranteed rights and gave a year to the 
State Assembly to rectify that inconsistency.82
In the area of linguistic rights of the autochthonous national communities the CCS again 
demonstrated consistency and firmness to provide high level of their protection. Even 
if they did not seem to be the central issue of a particular application, the CCS did not 
hesitate to regard the controversy in question from the point of the protection of special 
rights of minorities. These special rights were generally understood as rights that need 
and deserve strong protection, and even in the case where the CCS found no violation 
80  CCS decision Up-404/05-13, 21 June 2007.
81  The Act on Societies, Official Gazette of RS, no. 60/95, 49/98, 89/99, 80/04, and 61/06.
82  CCS decision U-I-380/06-11, 11 September 2008.
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because the applicant was not able to produce strong arguments in this respect, two dis-
senting judges deemed that the Court did not apply the positive discrimination provision 
from the Constitution as the correct one in assessing whether a special right was violated, 
although it should have done so.
4.3. Education and other issues related to special minority rights
One of the key rights of members of national minorities is the right to education in their 
own language. Language is the fundamental constituent of individual’s national identity 
and the possibility to attend schools in mother tongue is highly important for mastering 
it, but education is also crucial for getting to know the cultural heritage of one’s national 
community, its history, tradition and beliefs. Consequently, it contributes a lot in pre-
serving the national identity of the minority members. Different models of education for 
national minorities have been established in different countries, but their common trait is 
that minorities usually need additional support and application of positive measures in or-
der to build and maintain an effective and quality system of education for their members. 
Protecting rights of national minorities in this area may be particularly complex. 
The minority educational system in Slovenia is tailored according to the areas where the 
autochthonous minorities live. The Act on the Organization and Financing of Education83 
prescribes that the language of education in pre-school institutions and schools is Slove-
nian, in multiethnic territories inhabited by members of Italian community special institu-
tions are established that work in Italian language, whereas in multiethnic areas inhabited 
by members of the Hungarian community educational institutions are bilingual and work 
in Slovenian and Hungarian languages. The applicants challenged the constitutionality 
of the provision on bilingual education in Slovenian-Hungarian territories, arguing that 
this violates constitutional guarantees of equality before the law because it requires the 
Slovenian children to put in more efforts into learning than those who attend schools in 
Slovenian in order to achieve same results.84 They required that the bilingual education in 
those territories be replaced with the model applied in multiethnic territories inhabited by 
the Italians. The CCS pointed out that national communities have a constitutional right 
to be educated in their own language, while the territories with compulsory bilingual ed-
ucation are set by the law. The proposal to apply the same model as in Slovenian-Italian 
areas would remove bilingual education completely, and the CCS could not support that. 
It emphasized that the aim of bilingual education is to provide education in mother tongue 
to Hungarian children, and the level of education in Slovenian and Hungarian that enables 
the students to continue their participation in education and in life both in Slovenia and in 
Hungary. Provision on equality before the law does not mean that the status of different 
groups may not be regulated differently; however, the distinction may not be arbitrary, 
but must pursue the constitutionally allowed and rational goal, and must be an adequate 
means for achieving that goal. The establishment of bilingual schools is required by the 
Constitution itself, and because of historical circumstances was imposed in the areas in-
habited by Hungarians, but not in those inhabited by Italians. School program sets what 
is to be taught in both and in only one of the languages, so it is not necessary to speak 
83  The Act on the Organization and Financing of Education, Official Gazette of RS, no. 12/96.
84  CCS decision U-I-94/96, 22 October 1998.
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both languages equally good to be able to learn what is required. The obligation of Slo-
venian children to learn a minority language applies in all areas inhabited by members of 
autochthonous national communities, so they are in the same position in bilingual areas 
as in those where Italians live. Bilingual school does not hinder the right of Slovenian 
children to use their language and alphabet. The CCS deemed that with regards to the 
quality of education the applicants did not demonstrate that children in bilingual schools 
are discriminated against and decided that the challenged provision is not contrary to 
the Constitution. The CCS upheld the legislation that provided for bilingual education 
in order to secure the system of education in the language of a minority community that 
proved to be effective.
As for Croatia, in 2010 the CCC decided a case where the applicant claimed that the 
provision in the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, allowing rep-
resentatives of national minorities and the Council for national minorities to submit con-
stitutional complaints to the CCC on behalf of the members of national minorities if they 
deem that their rights were violated, is unconstitutional.85 The Constitutional Law on the 
Constitutional Court of Croatia86 prescribes that everyone may submit a constitutional 
complaint, providing that the applicant is the holder of the right at issue, and that he/she 
was the victim of the violation, which does not encompass third persons or organizations 
who were not victims. After reviewing the enumerated authorities of minority’s repre-
sentatives, boards of national minorities and the Council for National Minorities under 
the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, the CCC established that 
none of them were vested with the authority to submit constitutional complaints. The 
CCC concluded that the contested Article extended the circle of persons who may submit 
such complaints under the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court. Given that 
the Law on the Constitutional Court is higher ranking than the one regulating the rights 
of national minorities, the CCC concluded that the disputed Article was contrary to the 
Constitution and to the Constitutional Law on the Constitutional Court and revoked that 
Article. The outcome is that the representatives and organizations of national minorities 
may not act on behalf of their compatriots or members to protect their rights. Obviously, 
no measure of positive discrimination was applied in this case although there was room 
for that: the Law on Constitutional Court was adopted in 1999, before the Law on mi-
norities’ rights (2002), and so the representatives and organizations of minorities from 
the latter could not have been enumerated in the former; it would be quite logical and 
to the benefit of the members of national minorities to authorize these persons to submit 
complaints to relevant bodies, including the CCC; the state is bound by the law to protect 
the rights of national minorities, and to use positive measures to that end. If it were eager 
to apply such measure, the CCC might have required the legislator to amend the relevant 
statute adding such an authority at least to those organizations, but that seems to have 
been too far fetched. 
85  CCC decision U- I – 1029/2007, 1030/2007, 7 April 2010.
86  Ustavni zakon o Ustavnom sudu Republike Hrvatske, “Narodne novine”, broj 99/99., 29/02. i 49/02.
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5.  Conclusive remarks on the Slovenian and Croatian models of positive 
discrimination
When it comes to the scope and content of the guaranteed rights of national minorities, 
even fine differences and nuances in formulations related to them sometimes produce 
very different interpretations in similar cases occurring in different countries, which may 
seriously affect their enjoyment and implementation in practice either to the detriment, 
or to the benefit of the members of national minorities. The same applies to measures 
of positive discrimination, such as certain improvements and/or privileges intentionally 
introduced to facilitate the enjoyment of certain rights to minorities and their members. 
In this paper we have dealt with the interpretations of positive discrimination by the 
Constitutional Courts of Croatia and Slovenia in order to compare their approaches. Con-
stitutions of both countries provide for measures of positive discrimination in respect of 
minorities. However, the wording of particular Articles, the elaboration of measures by 
relevant legal acts, some doctrinal concepts or the context (historical, political) in which 
they are to be applied in practice may strongly affect the interpretation of the scope and 
validity of measures of positive discrimination in different countries. A look into deci-
sions of two constitutional courts in this area reveals differences between the two models 
of positive discrimination.
As Žagar notes, the positive concept of protection of autochthonous minorities devel-
oped in Slovenia considers minorities as active subjects in the political process and re-
quires the state to have an active role in securing conditions for the enjoyment of rights.87 
The reasonings in the decisions of the Slovenian Constitutional Court show that it has 
consistently interpreted positive measures extensively, defining no strict limits for their 
appropriateness. Relying on relevant constitutional provisions it understands positive dis-
crimination as constitutionally allowed means for securing guaranteed minority rights. 
It construed positive measures as allowed and appropriate in most cases, and generally 
upheld legislation prescribing such measures. The aim of protecting autochthonous na-
tional communities is in the center of its deliberations on the constitutionality of measures 
intended to improve or at least maintain their current social status. On these grounds the 
CCS has normally given priority to special rights of autochthonous national communities 
over certain general rights of citizens. As for controversies related to the autochthonous 
status of the Italian and Hungarian national communities, the CCS avoided any attempt to 
define the meaning of autochthonous so far, pointing out that the theory is yet to discuss 
on this matter, while it is up to the legislator to define it. According to the doctrine the 
CCS applies regarding positive discrimination, special rights of members of autochtho-
nous national communities are necessary for securing their equality with others in all 
areas of life, and for creating favourable conditions for the preservation of their national 
identity; positive measures that pursue that end inevitably produce discrimination in fa-
vour of a minority, but if they were reasonable and proportionate to the intended goal the 
Court consideres them justified. As such, positive measures do not constitute a form of 
prohibited discrimination. Interpreting positive discrimination widely, in some decisions 
in this area the CCS found that special rights were justified even where they contradicted 
87  ŽaGar 2001, pp. 113-114. In contrast, within the “negative concept” of minority protection the state inter-
venes upon a request of an actively legitimized applicant only in the case of concrete violation of an individual 
right guaranteed by the Constitution of legislation.
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the general constitutional principle of equality of all citizens, or where they collided with 
some other constitutionally guaranteed rights such as the right to receive education in 
one’s own language. In its decisions in this area the CCS further developed and refined 
the concept of positive discrimination provided for in general terms by the Constitution, 
and its doctrinal positions are well grounded and argumented. Because of that, the CCS 
has also remarkably contributed to the implementation of this concept in practice, acting 
as a reliable protector of special rights of national communities so far.
As for Croatia, its constitutional and legislative approach to the protection of national 
minorities’ rights stands on different grounds and produces a different model of positive 
protection of minority rights. Under that model special minority rights are regarded vis-
a-vis corresponding general rights and with respect of the needs of the majority. The 
Constitutional Court of Croatia comprehends positive discrimination much narrower than 
the Slovenian court. In some cases the CCC supported certain measures intended to se-
cure the enjoyment of rights of national minorities under privileged circumstances and 
did not declare the challenged regulation as contrary to the Constitution. However, it 
did so restrictively, usually providing for various conditions for the application of such 
measures and upholding them within certain, sometimes rather strictly defined limits. 
Relying on some of the constitutional provisions it found it acceptable to put constraints 
on this concept for various reasons, sometimes by upholding legislation that effectively 
delays the introduction of certain special rights of national minorities, in other cases by 
invoking the general principle of equality as subordinate to special rights. In other cases 
the CCC demonstrated an inclination to restrict the application of special measures, and 
in defending such a stand it sometimes even resorted to arguments that are rather political 
than legal. The CCC also stresses that special rights of national minorities are entailed 
by obligations of the state to secure their enjoyment, but its decisions show that it deems 
that the activities of the state in this respect should remain within certain limits. Unlike 
the Slovenian court, the CCC does not regard special rights of minorities as deserving a 
higher level of protection than others. When deliberating on whether those rights were 
transgressed, the CCC usually refrained from extensive interpretations of their scope and 
justifiability. More than once it found that they contradict the principle of equality of 
all citizens, although positive discrimination by definition produces inequality. In effect, 
such an approach sometimes reduces the possible reach of measures of positive discrimi-
nation. This is not to say that positive discrimination is lacking in the practice of the CCC, 
but only that in the context of the Croatian legal system the acceptability and scope of 
positive measures are interpreted more restrictively.
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Zsuzsa Szakály:1
Intertwined – The Notion of Nation and Identity in the 
Constitutions of the West Balkan2
“Considering that the promotion and protection of the rights of persons belonging to national or 
ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities contribute to the political and social stability of States 
in which they live,”3
1 . Introduction
The aim of this paper is to analyze the concept of nation and identity in the constitutions 
of the Western Balkan. The issue of the interpretation of nation and identity connected to 
the understanding of sovereignty and national minorities, and the choice between cultural 
and political nation. The constitution is the highest law of a state, so the decisions regard-
ing the above mentioned will be determinative to the law system.
This question earned special attention in the constitutions and legal systems of the former 
member states of Yugoslavia after the Yugoslav Wars. As the states of the Western Bal-
kans move further with the negotiations of joining the EU, approaching the Copenhagen 
Criteria becomes more and more crucial. Some of these states are candidate countries – 
Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia – and some are potential candidates: 
Kosovo and Bosnia and Hercegovina. The proper respect of the national minorities is part 
of the criteria. This must appear in the practice and in the written law as well. As I see, the 
wording of the constitution in the issue of nation, nationalities and identity is relevant as 
the source for the laws and judicial decisions of the state.
Firstly, I will examine the concept of nation, then the position of the citizens living abroad 
in this context. Afterwards, I would like to shed light on the issue of the source of sover-
eignty in the constitutions of the Western Balkan states and the theory of nationality and 
identity. Then I will examine the minority rights and the EU enlargement negotiations in 
the constitutional texts. Finally, I will summarize my ideas and results.
The aim is to show the different paths the states took when they drafted the constitutions, 
albeit there were determining international factors during the adoption.
The first task is to define the scope of the examination. The term “states of the Western 
Balkans” will be used for the following states: Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Croatia, 
Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia. Clearly, there could be 
1  Assistant professor, International and Regional Studies Institute, University of Szeged
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights 
as Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level 
of legal education.
3  Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities
Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, Preamble
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different ways to define the territory of the analysis. Nonetheless, the member states of 
the former Yugoslavia have the common historical point of view in the question of con-
stitution-making, as these constitutions were adopted after the Yugoslav Wars. Albania 
was included in the process as a result of the close connection with the other states. The 
‘Balkans’ could mean other states as well, albeit their development differs from these 
countries, and the shared history and circumstances suggests this distinction.
The various ethnic, religious and political conflicts which caused the wars can be relat-
ed to different roots.4 As the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were formed in 
1918, parts from the Austro-Hungarian Empire which had advanced economy and social 
structure in the time period were united with parts from the Ottoman Empire where the 
economic and social affairs were on quite a different state of development.5 The different 
religions and the awakening national movements also caused concern.6 The expression 
“the powder keg of Europe” was in use for this part of Europe. After the dissolution of 
Yugoslavia, the presentiment proved true: the Balkan Wars showed that the forced union 
of different nations is dangerous.
In the aftermath of the war, new states emerged. The new states adopted new consti-
tutions, and because of the new state borders, several people became minorities in the 
new states. If one examines the national populations, the following can be said: there are 
minorities in the states. The status of the minorities is defined in the constitutions. In my 
view, the constitution-makers aimed to create rights for the minorities after the Yugoslav 
Wars. As the tragedies of the Balkan Wars came to the light, the states whose predecessors 
were involved in the conflicts tried to protect the rights of the minorities in a wide scale.
The texts of the constitutions show this caring attitude towards the minorities. How the 
other provisions of these constitutions relate to these Articles? The notion of the nation 
and the source of sovereignty could also affect the position of the minorities as the prin-
ciples are intertwined.
2 . The Notion of Nation
The definition of a nation is a complex issue. Firstly, it must be distinguished from the 
concept of state, as “(…) a nation can exist without a state, as a state will not need a 
nation as a foundation”.7
4  László heka: Etnikai, vallási és politikai konfliktusok a Balkán térségében III. A konfliktus kialakulása. 
[Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflicts in the Balkans III. The Beginnings of the Conflict]. Pólay Elemér 
Alapítvány Szeged, 2010. pp. 9-29. [heka 2010a]
5  László heka: Etnikai, vallási és politikai konfliktusok a Balkán térségében I. A deli szlávok és a Balkán. 
[Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflicts in the Balkans I. The South Slavs and the Balkans]. Pólay Elemér 
Alapítvány, Szeged, 2010, pp. 117-118.
6  László heka: Etnikai, vallási és politikai konfliktusok a Balkán térségében II. Társadalmi, etnikai, vallási 
és politikai viszonyok a Balkán térségében. [Ethnic, Religious and Political Conflicts in the Balkans II. Social, 
Ethnic and Political Relations in the Balkans]. Pólay Elemér Alapítvány Szeged, 2010, pp. 91-95, 153-212.
7  Gergely egedy: Gondolatok a nemzetről. A politikai és a kulturális megközelítés. [Thoughts about the 
Nation. The Political and the Cultural Approach]. In: László Szarka –Balázs vízi –Balázs MajTényi –Zoltán 
kánTor (eds.): Nemzetfogalmak és etnopolitikai modellek Kelet-Közép-Európában. [Definitions of Nation and 
Ethnocpolitical Models in central-eastern Europe]. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2007, p. 70.
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Another complication is the definition. As the Resolution on ‘Preferential treatment of 
national minorities by the kin-state: the case of the Hungarian law of 19 June 2001 on 
Hungarians living in neighboring countries (“Magyars”)’ stated: “The Assembly notes 
that up until now there is no common European legal definition of the concept of ‘na-
tion’.”8 The nation is not strictly a legal issue, as Egedy wrote, “The nation has closer 
connection to social psychology and culture, and if we see it as a starting point, then 
the nation can be defined as a community with common history and culture for the first 
glance. One important criterium is connected: the principle of territoriality, meaning that 
the examined community can define its place in a territory which is seen as the commu-
nity’s own country.”9
The different ideas and elements could create contradictory definitions in the constitu-
tions of the states as well. The nation could be seen as a population living in a territory 
of a sovereign state. 
A different concept comes from the classic statement of Ernest Renan: “A nation is a soul, 
a spiritual principle. Two things which, properly speaking, are really one and the same 
constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One is the past, the other is the present. (…) 
The nation, like the individual, is the outcome of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and de-
votions. (…) These are the essential conditions of being a people: having common glories 
in the past and a will to continue them in the present; having made great things together 
and wishing to make them again”.10
Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes introduced the new concept of nation in his famous essay 
“What is the Third Estate?”.11 Since then, the different ideas on nation and nationality 
created several disputes, as completely contradictory theories were born.12 
The two typical models are the political and the cultural nation. The states decide which 
concept to apply while creating a constitution. The choice will determine the concept of 
the nation. The concept of the political nation has objective criteria, while the cultural 
nation has subjective criteria generally. 
The concept of the cultural nation means that the people who live outside of the borders 
of the state but have the nationality of the state are part of the nation. The concept of the 
political nation means that every citizen living in the territory of the state is part of the 
nation. The choice between the concepts generally happens while drafting the constitu-
tion, albeit it is not always clear from the wording of the document. However, the decision 
8  Preferential treatment of national minorities by the kin-state: the case of the Hungarian law of 19 June 2001 
on Hungarians living in neighboring countries (“Magyars”)’Resolution 1335 (2003) p. 10.
9  egedy 2007. pp. 70-71.
10  Ernest renan: “What is a Nation?”, text of a conference delivered at the Sorbonne on March 11th, 1882. 
In: Renan erneST: Qu’est-ce qu’une nation?, Paris, Presses-Pocket, 1992. (translated by Ethan Rundell), Avail-
able online: http://ucparis.fr/files/9313/6549/9943/What_is_a_Nation.pdf 
11  Emmanuel-Joseph SieyèS: What is the Third Estate? (1789) Available online: https://pages.uoregon.edu/
dluebke/301ModernEurope/Sieyes3dEstate.pdf 
12  egedy 2007, pp. 71-77.
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always has political consequences as it will define the relations with the minorities of the 
state and the members of the nation who are citizens of another state.13
The other side of the coin is the question of the members of the nation who are beyond 
the borders of the state. If one uses the notion of the cultural nation, they are members of 
the nation. The question is that which states of the Western Balkan use the definition of 
the cultural nation?
Albania “assures assistance” for these Albanians.14 Bosnia and Hercegovina has no defi-
nition of the nation. It can be leaded back to the circumstances of the adoption of the 
constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina, which was part of the Dayton Agreement.15 As 
the typical constitution-makers were not present and the situation in the state was dire,16 
the sensitive topics, like the definition of the nation were avoided. Croatia “guarantee 
particular care and protection” to the members of the cultural nation.17 Kosovo gives no 
constitutional mentions to the issue of the nation. Montenegro also avoids the question. 
The constitution of North Macedonia “provides for the diaspora of the Macedonian peo-
ple” and “protects the rights and interests of its nationals living or staying abroad”, also 
using the notion of the cultural nation.18 Serbia “shall develop and promote relations of 
Serbs living abroad with the kin state.”19 The Slovene constitution states that “Slovenes 
not holding Slovene citizenship may enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia.”20 
This principle is more suppressed considering the words of the other constitutions which 
decided on the usage of the cultural nation.
To conclude the different definitions, two groups can be distinguished from the texts of 
the constitutions: one is not mentioning the question – Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo 
and Montenegro – and the other is to aid the members of the cultural nation, but on differ-
ent levels: Albania, Croatia, North Macedonia, Serbia and Slovenia.
As an example, an election process from a state with a mixed nation definition: If one 
examines the possibility for participating in the elections for the voters who do not have 
residence in Croatia, they could elect 14 candidates.21 The national minorities also have 
13  Zoltán kánTor: Egy hamis dichotómia: politikai/kulturális nemzet. [A False Dichotomy: Political and 
Cultural Nation]. In: László Szarka –Balázs vízi –Balázs MajTényi –Zoltán kánTor (eds.): Nemzetfogalmak és 
etnopolitikai modellek Kelet-Közép-Európában. [Definitions of Nation and Ethnocpolitical Models in central-
eastern Europe]. Gondolat Kiadó, Budapest, 2007. p. 80.
14  Constitution of Albania Article 8.
15  The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina Initialled in Dayton on 21 
November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995
16  heka 2010a, pp. 30-46.
17  Constitution of Croatia Article 10
18  Constitution of North Macedonia Article 49.
19  Constitution of Serbia Article 13.
20  Constitution of Slovenia Article 5.
21  The process in detail: “The total number of the valid votes in the ten constituencies in the Republic of 
Croatia shall be divided with 140, which is how many representatives have totally been elected in these constitu-
encies. With the gained results, the number of valid votes in the special constituency shall be divided. The result 
achieved in that manner is the number of representatives elected in the special constituency. If the result is not a 
whole number, it shall be rounded to the whole number from 0.5 up and below 0.5 down.” C.f.: Act on Election 
of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (consolidated wording). Available online: http://aceproject.org/
ero-en/regions/europe/HR/Croatia_Act_on_Election_of_Representatives.pdf 
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the opportunity to elect representatives.22 Thus, the theory of cultural nation influenced 
the election methods to create the possibility of voting for the citizens abroad.
To support one of the theories – to choose between the cultural and political definition of 
the nation is always a choice of the constitution-maker. However, if the issue is absent 
from the constitutional text altogether, vague or contradictory, there is a possibility for the 
legislative or the executive power to create the legal background for the question freely.
3. Source of Sovereignty
One of the most important principles of a constitution is the chosen definition of the 
source of the state sovereignty. 
As Jean-Jacques Rousseau wrote in the “Social Contract”: “Those who are associated in 
it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the 
sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the State. But these terms are 
often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them 
when they are being used with precision.”23
Defining the source of sovereignty has become essential and the legitimate source of 
supremacy is the people generally. The concept become essential in every democratic 
constitution as only the people could give legitimacy to the ruler. The functions of a mod-
ern state are divided between the different branches of power. Nonetheless, the source of 
every power must be linked to the people to gain legitimacy.
The importance of the words defining the sovereignty of a state cannot be emphasized 
enough. The source of the sovereignty generally is the ‘people’ of the state, albeit the ex-
act choice of words can show the concept of the nation in a state. If we analyze the choice 
of the states of the Western Balkans in this issue, the following can be stated: 
Albania and Kosovo use the term ‘people’ which is too wide to support the idea of the po-
litical or the cultural nation. Bosnia and Hercegovina uses “Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, 
as constituent peoples (along with Others), and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.24 
This idea did not make a clear choice between the political and the cultural nation. The 
constitution of Croatia uses the phrase “the people as a community of free and equal 
citizens”,25 so this definition has connection with the political nation. North Macedonia, 
Serbia and Montenegro use the term ‘citizen’, these definitions also refer to the concept 
of political nation. The constitution of Slovenia adopts several different terms: ‘citizens, 
people, Slovene nation, all citizens’, which can be confusing. If the constitution uses con-
flicting terms to define the same issue, the results can cause incomprehension. 
22  Act on Election of Representatives to the Croatian Parliament (consolidated wording), Available online: 
http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/europe/HR/Croatia_Act_on_Election_of_Representatives.pdf , Article 43
23  Jean-Jacques rouSSeau: Social Contract VI. Available online: https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/rous-
seau-the-social-contract-and-discourses 
24  Constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina Preamble
25  Constitution of Croatia Article 1.
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Summarizing the types, what can be concluded is that the constitution of Croatia, North 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro use terms which can be connected to the political 
nation, while the constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina, Albania and Kosovo have not 
made a clear choice between the two concepts. The Slovene constitution uses several 
different terms to describe the issue which also would not give the answer of the choice 
between the political and the cultural nation.
It can be seen that the chosen concept of nation cannot be decided only by the text of the 
constitution of these states, as half of them did not choose between the two concepts at 
all, some of them use terms which can be described as both, and few of them declared 
some connection to the political nation, albeit it is not a clear choice, just an indication.
The problematic issue of defining the nation of a state based on a choice between the 
cultural and the political nation will determine the foreign policy of a state with the states 
which have citizens from the state as minority. While it could cause certain complication 
between the states, it can also help to strengthen the connection. As the nation of a state is 
related to the sovereignty, it will be guarded as a treasure as well, it could be a sensitive 
issue between the states. Especially in the Western Balkans, where the nationality-based 
conflicts and war crimes are not at least 100 years old, but from the close memory of sev-
eral of the citizens of the states. The interactions between the different nationalities show 
a downturn after the Yugoslaw War, as e.g. the rate of marriages between two different 
nationalities in Bosnia and Hercegovina diminished largely.26
As the concept of popular sovereignty is still used in every democratic state, the decision 
of defining the source, the “we the people” is up to the constitutional makers, as the con-
stitution determines the source of sovereignty. 
4 . Nationality
The United Nations created several documents and conventions on the question of differ-
ent minorities.27 The Council of Europe created a framework of minority rights protec-
tion.28 The EU also has special provisions for the protection of minorities which will be 
examined in the subchapter dealing with the EU enlargement issues.
26  heka 2010a, pp. 39-40.
27  Anikó Szalai: Anti-discrimination, Protection of Minorities and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in the 
UN – Is this a Patchwork or a Fine Embroidery? Paper prepared for the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Aca-
demic Council on the United Nations System, June 19-21, 2014, Kadir Has University, Istanbul, Panel 21: 
Human Rights Perspectives and Challenges. Available online: https://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/
Anik%C3%B3-Szalai-Anti-discrimination-Protection-of-Minorities-and-the-Rights-of-Indigenous-Peoples-in-
the-UN-%E2%80%93-Is-this-a-Patchwork-or-a-Fine-Embroidery.pdf ,  pp. 10-25.
28  Noémi nagy: A nemzeti kisebbségek nyelvi jogainak aktuális helyzete az Európa Tanács intézményei 
tevékenységének tükrében. [The Current Situation of the National Minorities in the light of the Actions of the 
European Council]. In: Pro Minoritate, pp. 48-49.
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The definition of nationality itself raises a series of questions. The complexity and un-
certainty of the possible understandings themselves should have a full scale of examina-
tion.29 Nonetheless, some common characteristics can be agreed on: “(…) a group of per-
sons in a State who: resides in the territory of a State and are citizens thereof; maintain 
long-standing firm and lasting ties with that State; display distinctive ethnic, cultural, 
religious or linguistic characteristics; are sufficiently representative, although smaller in 
number than the rest of the population of that State or of a region of that State; and are 
motivated by a concern to preserve together what constitutes their common identity.”30
If the constitutional definitions of the nation and the minorities are analyzed in the con-
stitutions of the Western Balkans, the results will show differences. The different terms 
which are used in the constitutional texts can shed light on the differences of the ideas 
behind the documents. The constitutions of the Western Balkans use the following terms 
in question:
Albania, Croatia and Serbia use the term ‘national minority’. North Macedonia uses the 
expression ‘nationality’, while Kosovo chosen the phrase ‘community’. Slovenia has 
chosen the ‘national community’ and Montenegro uses two terms: ‘minority nations’ and 
‘other minority national communities’.
The expressions nationality, national minority and minority in themselves can cause con-
cern when defining the groups of citizens who are from a different nation then the ma-
jority of the population in a state. The phrases used by the examined constitutions vary. 
A striking difference could be seen in the language of the Bosnian constitution. The term 
‘constituent peoples’ did not give opportunity to define majority and minority of eth-
nic groups. Three nationalities have the same position, they are all part of the consti-
tution-making nation: “Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with 
Others)”.31 This definition caused some difficulty in the elections in relations with ex-
pression ‘Others’.
The Sejdic-Finci case revealed the problematic side of this phrasing for the first time: 
the other nationalities are left out. In the case, a Roma and a Jew citizen of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina appealed to the European Court of Human Rights as they could not stand 
for election to the House of Peoples and state presidency, because they were not members 
of the constituent peoples of Bosnia and Hercegovina. To shed light on the issue, one 
must understand the legal background of the case. The Bosnian constitution is extraor-
dinary as it was adopted as part of international negotiations, annex to the Dayton Peace 
Agreement.32 The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina was not above to use this as 
an argument in processes before the ECHR: “The Government submitted that Bosnia and 
29  Melinda cSáSzár: Nemzet – jog – identitás A státustörvény végrehajtásának szociológiai vonatkozásai. 
[Nation-Law-Identity The Sociological Aspects of the Enforcement of the Status Law]. PhD dolgozat, [Corvi-
nus University of Budapest, Institute of Communication and Sociology.], 2009, pp. 25-35.
30  CDL-INF (1996) 4, Opinion on the interpretation of Article 11 of the Draft Protocol to the European Con-
vention on Human Rights appended to Recommendation 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly, §3 a.
31  Constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina Preamble
32  The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina Initialled in Dayton on 21 No-
vember 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995
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Herzegovina could not be held responsible for the contested constitutional provisions be-
cause its Constitution was part of an international treaty, the Dayton Agreement”.33 The 
language of the constitution is English. Bosnia and Hercegovina consists of two Entities: 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska. The head of state 
position is divided between three members: “one Bosniac and one Croat, each directly 
elected from the territory of the Federation, and one Serb directly elected from the ter-
ritory of the Republika Srpska.”34 The federal parliament of Bosnia and Hercegovina is 
called Parliamentary Assembly. It consists of two houses, the House of Peoples and the 
House of Representatives.35
Special rules were made to define the sensitive relationship between the ‘constituent peo-
ples’ to create a balance. Nonetheless, it created ambiguous results, as the other nation-
alities were banned from the possibility to become a member of the House of Peoples or 
the state president on the grounds of their ethnicity. Both men had political carrier which 
could be a foundation for becoming a candidate to the position of a member of the House 
of Peoples or the state president. The applicants said that these provisions which made 
them ineligible to stand for election are discriminative. As the ECHR examined the case, 
they said: “When the impugned constitutional provisions were put in place a very fragile 
ceasefire was in effect on the ground. The provisions were designed to end a brutal con-
flict marked by genocide and “ethnic cleansing”.”36
There were concerns that changing the system of the elections in Bosnia and Hercegovina 
may result in chaos. However, “the Opinions of the Venice Commission (see paragraph 
22 above) clearly demonstrate that there exist mechanisms of power-sharing which do 
not automatically lead to the total exclusion of representatives of the other communities. 
In this connection, it is noted that the possibility of alternative means achieving the same 
end is an important factor in this sphere”.37
The ECHR decided that “the applicants” continued ineligibility to stand for election 
to the House of Peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina lacks an objective and reasonable 
justification and has therefore breached Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 3 of 
Protocol No. 1.”38
10 years after the decision of the ECHR, there were still no amendment of the constitu-
tion to provide the possibility of standing for election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia 
or state president.39 Other cases were also decided by the ECHR with the same results.40
33  Case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 3681/06)
34  Constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina Article V.
35  Constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina Article IV.
36  Case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 45.
37  Case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 48.
38  Case of Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Applications nos. 27996/06 and 34836/06) 50.
39 Cf.: https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/-/sejdic-and-finci-after10-years-of-absence-of-progress-new-
hopes-for-a-solution-for-the-2022-elections 
40  Case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 3681/06), Case of Pilav Bosnia and Hercego-
vina (Application no. 41939/07)
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In the case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Hercegovina, a former judge of the Constitutional 
Court applied to the ECHR as she did not declare affiliation with any of the constituent 
people, she declares her nationality as a “citizen of Bosnia and Hercegovina”. As she was 
not a member of the constitution people, she did not have the possibility of standing for 
election to the House of Peoples of Bosnia or state presidency. 
The ECHR stated the following: “there are no objective criteria for oneʼs ethnic affili-
ation (see paragraph 8 above). It depends solely on oneʼs own self-classification. There 
may be different reasons for not declaring affiliation with any particular group, such as 
for example intermarriage or mixed parenthood or simply that the applicant wished to 
declare herself as a citizen of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”41
The nationality is a sensitive issue, as the self-classification cannot be an obligation, es-
pecially in case of losing a right in relation. As the Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities defined: “Every person belonging to a national minority shall 
have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvan-
tage shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to 
that choice.”42 Connected with the self-classification, the ECHR stated: “The applicant 
should not be prevented from standing for elections for the House of Peoples on account 
of her personal self-classification”.43
Another controversy was revealed when a Bosniac national wanted to be elected for the 
Presidency from the territory of the Republika Srpska. The existing legal rules excluded 
this possibility: “The applicant was faced with two options: to move to the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina thereby giving up the possibility to serve his community in the 
Republika Srpska, or to accept a status of second-class citizen in the Republika Srpska.”44
The ECHR examined the legal situation and stated that this part of the law is against the 
ECHR as well, as “the applicant could not be elected to the Presidency from the territory 
of the Republika Srpska considering that he declared affiliation with Bosniacs”,45 which 
is discriminative.46
The elections of 2022 will be held according to the discriminative rules if there will not 
be a political will strong enough to change the rules of the elections,47 and the results of 
the last elections show the obstacles with the system.48
41  Case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 3681/06) 31.
42  Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Strasbourg, 1.II.1995 Article 3 1.
43  Case of Zornic v. Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 3681/06) 31.
44  Case of Pilav Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 41939/07) 28.
45  Case of Pilav Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 41939/07) 11.
46  “Notwithstanding the differences with Sejdić and Finci, the Court considers that this exclusion is based 
on a combination of ethnic origin and place of residence, both serving grounds of distinction falling within the 
scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 12 (see, mutatis mutandis, Carson and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], 
no. 42184/05, §§ 70 and 71, ECHR 2010), and as such amounts to a discriminatory treatment in breach of 
Article 1 of Protocol No. 12.” Case of Pilav Bosnia and Hercegovina (Application no. 41939/07) 48.
47  Cf.: https://balkaninsight.com/2018/06/04/discrimination-in-bosnian-election-law-continues-06-01-2018/ 
48  László horváTh: Választások Bosznia-Hercegovinában – újabb elvesztegetett négy év előtt állunk? 
[Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina – Facing Four Lost Years Again?]. In: Parlamenti Szemle, 2019/1. pp. 
80-86, 88-91, 94-97, 101-103.
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The notion of nation and nationality could cause great debates and injustices if not used 
properly and justly. This is still a sensitive issue and the dealing requires kid’s gloves. 
However, a certain degree of cautiousness cannot and should not downgrade the princi-
ples of rule of law and democracy. As the Venice Commission stated: “In both Sejdić and 
Finci as well as in Zornić, the European Court of Human Rights was quite prepared to 
accept that there is a relatively wide degree of latitude in relation to the election of the 
second chamber; the problem was that the total disenfranchisement of certain persons 
was not required to effect a politically acceptable settlement.”49
5 . Identity
The concept of nation has a strong connection with the identity. The identity can deter-
mine the roots and the picture of the nation as the constitution-makers saw it at the mo-
ment of creating the constitution. 
As Majtényi wrote: “(…) if we accept that there is a need for creating a sense of be-
longing in a political community, then the attempts for the creation inevitably must be 
connected to the nation.”50 According to Gary J. Jacobsohn, several constitutions point to 
the identity, albeit it will be gained through experience.51 The text itself has the possibility, 
albeit the parallel practice will be needed. The constitutional text can be a starting point.52
The understanding and types of identity has become a favored topic of interest in the last 
few years, especially in connection with relationship between the EU and the Member 
States. The definition of the identity itself can become a center of dispute. If one adds the 
question of which type of identity to analyze, several new questions will emerge. The first 
what can be examined is the types of identity. One can mention the constitutional identity, 
the national identity, the constitutional national identity and the identity of the Member 
States. The definitions are not crystal clear,53 as the relevant American and European ideas 
diverge, although the differences converge to each other due to the migration of the con-
stitutional ideas. In Tribl’s opinion: “while the national identity’s subject is the political 
nation, the subject of the constitutional identity is the constitutional system itself.”54 The 
constitutional identity can be seen as a sword and as a shield as well.55 What could be the 
scope of national identity and constitutional identity? 
49  CDL-AD(2016)024 59.
50  Balázs MajTényi: Hol húzódnak a kisebbségvédelem határai (Nemzetértelmezések és a kisebbségek 
védelme) [Where are the Limits of Minority Protection? (Understandings of Nation and the Protection of 
Nationalities)] In: Regio Kisebbség, Politika, Társadalom. 2004/4, p. 4.
51  Gary J., jacoBSohn:  The Formation of Constitutional Identites In: Tom ginSBurg – Rosalind dixon (eds.): 
Comparative Constituional Law. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011, p. 129.
52  jacoBSohn 2011. pp. 130-131.
53  Márton Sulyok: Értelem és érzelem vagy büszkeség és balítélet? Alkotmánybíráskodás és alkotmányos 
identitás. [Sense and Sensibility of Pride and Prejudice? Constitutional Jurisprudence and Constitutional 
Identity]. In: Fontes Juris, 2015/1, pp. 27–39.
54  Norbert Tribl: Az alkotmányos identitás fogalomrendszere jogelméleti megközelítésben. [The Conceptual 
System of Constitutional Identity in a Legal Theory Approach.]. In. Jogelméleti Szemle, 2018/1, p163.
55  Pietro faraguna: Constitutional Identity in the EU—A Shield or a Sword? In: German Law Journal, 
2017/7, pp. 1627-1633.
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There is no generally acknowledged opinion in this issue, the matrix is confusing, and the 
different peculiarities of the Member States also must be taken into consideration. The 
concept of identity in the EU has great significance for the Western Balkans, as in the 
process of joining the EU they must deal with the questions of sharing the sovereignty 
and how to protect it. Issues related to the sovereignty are sensitive and can easily cause 
conflicts. The constitutions of the Member States defined the shared sovereignty in quite 
colorful ways to protect as much as possible.
The identity became a central issue between the EU and the Member States in the ques-
tion of sovereignty. The EU started to define the European identity: “they are determined 
to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice 
— which is the ultimate goal of economic progress — and of respect for human rights. All 
of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity.”.56 However, the concept has 
not developed, as “The argument that the EU is too diverse for a common constitutional 
identity has resurfaced at various stages of the European integration.”,57 and it evolved 
to a dialogue between the Member States and the EU.
The TEU mentions the national identity,58 and the common values of the Member States.59 
The common values of the Members States could cover the areas of the identity, as the 
protected values of the national level could be safeguarded on the international and re-
gional level as well. The Treaty of Lisbon created a wave of decisions from the Consti-
tutional Courts in this question, with the leading role of the Federal Constitutional Court 
of Germany.60
The Constitutional Courts of the Member States have a significant role in defining the 
identity of a state, as the generally vague mentions in the constitutional texts leave a wide 
range for interpretation. Some Constitutional Courts are active in this role of starting to 
find the principles of the identity of the state.61 Other Constitutional Courts decided to 
choose another path. As an example, the French practice treats the issue as a technical 
one.62
56  Declaration on European Identity (Copenhagen, 14 December 1973)
57  Pola ceBulak: European Constitutional Identity “Inside Out”: Inherent Risks of the Pluralist Structure. 
In: Croatian Yearbook of European Law and Policy, 2012, p. 6.
58  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union „Article 4. 2. The Union shall respect the equality 
of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, 
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State 
functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding 
national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”
59  Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union „Article 2 The Union is founded on the values of 
respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, includ-
ing the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society 
in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men 
prevail.”
60  Leonard f. M. BeSSelink: Constitutional Identity Before and After Lisbon. In: Utrecht Law Review, 2010/3
61  Constitutional Court of the Czech Republic, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany
62  Réka SoMMSich: Az alkotmányos identitás a francia és a belga alkotmánybírósági gyakorlatban. [Consti-
tutional Identity in the Jurisprudence of the French and Belgian Constituional Courts]. In: Alkotmánybírósági 
Szemle, 2018/1, p. 14.
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The Constitutional Courts of the Visegrad 4 states – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Slovakia – decided to use this concept to support their national values and system 
against the European values and system. Every Constitutional Court of the V4 countries 
interprets the concept with ethnocultural attributes.63 Moreover, they use it as a limit to 
the EU powers by stating the supremacy of the constitution.64 The example of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany is applied by the V4 countries, albeit they deter from 
the German path: the aim is not to strengthen the level of protection of human rights and 
democratic values but to protect the national system against the EU level in some cases.65
The controversial question still remains, albeit the PSPP decision of the Federal Constitu-
tional Court of Germany from May 2020 could be seen as a milestone.66
If one examines the use of the expression ‘identity’ in the constitution of the Western 
Balkans, the first element to recognize is that the constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina 
does not contain the expression. This is the only constitution in the region without using 
it. As it was mentioned above, the constitution of Bosnia and Hercegovina adopted by 
special means and that left quite an imprint on the text. As the identity is scarce from the 
constitution, the identity-forming powers were not part of the creation, and the absence of 
the typical nation-defining and common identity-creating voices makes this constitution 
differ from others also in this question.
The constitution of Albania mentions the national identity of Albania in the preamble, 
in Article 3 as part of the basic principles, and the identity of the national minorities 
are also mentioned in Article 20. The Albanian constitution stated that “(…) minorities 
are the bases of this state, which has the duty of respecting and protecting them”67, and 
gives individual and collective rights to them. The national minorities have constitutional 
rights, and the state has obligation to respect and protect them. The protection of national 
minorities is a basic principle of Albania. 
The constitution of Croatia uses the expression of identity only once, when the “The 
millennial national identity of the Croatian nation”68 is mentioned in the preamble. As 
the national identity itself, the concept of nation is also not clear enough in the text of the 
constitution. The preamble of the Croatian constitution has very extensive wording, with 
great detail to the events of the glorious past.
The preamble of a constitution could have different purposes. The solemn style of a 
preamble aims to show the significance of the entire document, and it could also have 
63  Kriszta kovácS: The Rise of an Ethnocultural Constitutional Identity in the Jurisprudence of the East 
Central European Courts. In: German Law Journal, Vol. 18 No. 07 (2017), p. 1716.
64  kovácS 2017, p. 1718.
65  kovácS 2017, pp. 1719-1720.
66  Márton Sulyok –Norbert TriBl: „A gazda bekeríti házát”? A Német Szövetségi Alkotmánybíróság PSPP 
döntésének jelentősége és az európai integrációért viselt alkotmányos felelősség realitása. [‘The master pulls 
a fence around his house’? The Significance of the PSPP Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court 
and the Reality of Constitutional Responsibility for European Integration]. In: Európai Tükör, 2020/2, pp. 7-15. 
67  Constitution of Albania, Article 3.
68  Constitution of Croatia, Preamble
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normative meaning.69 In the case of Croatia, the aim is to highlight the great events of 
the past. The preamble almost always has a more symbolic purpose then legal, however, 
the Hungarian Fundamental Law gave normative power to the National Avowal, the pre-
amble.70 This is a rare possibility for a preamble; generally their purpose is to create the 
proper environment for the constitutional text itself.
The Constitution of Kosovo protects the identity of the minorities71 and the “(…) nation-
al, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious identity” of the people,72 as they have a wide 
range of individual and collective rights guaranteed by the constitution itself.73
The Constitution of Montenegro provides for the identity of the minorities extensively 
as well.74
The Constitution of North Macedonia held the “the free expression of national identity”75 
as a fundamental value of the constitution, as well as the “ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity” is also protected.76 A special issue related to identity is the particular 
social security rights guarantee for the veterans who, among others, were “expelled and 
imprisoned for the ideas of the separate identity of the Macedonian people and of Mac-
edonian statehood”.77
The constitution of Serbia protects the identity of the minorities as well78 and “(…) under-
take efficient measures for enhancement of mutual respect, understanding and coopera-
tion among all people living on its territory, regardless of their ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
or religious identity.”79 In my view, this sentence should provide for the protection of the 
national minorities as well.
The preamble of the Slovene Constitution states that the Slovenes established their na-
tional identity and the “autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national communities and 
their members”80 can preserve their national identity.
Every constitution from the Western Balkans except the constitution of Bosnia and Her-
cegovina declares the national identity or the identity of the minorities as an important 
principle of the constitutional system. The national identity of a nation and the national 
identity of national minorities both have significance in the understanding of a state’s 
69  Márton Sulyok –László TrócSányi: Preambulum. In: András jakaB (ed.): Az Alkotmány kommentárja I. 
[Commentary of the Constitution I.]. Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 2009, pp. 90-91.
70  The Fundamental Law of Hungary Article R) „(3) The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be 
interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of 
our historic constitution.”
71  Constitution of Kosovo Article 57
72  Constitution of Kosovo Article 58
73  Constitution of Kosovo Article 59
74  Constitution of Montenegro Article 79
75  Constitution of North Macedonia Article 8
76  Constitution of North Macedonia Article 48
77  Constitution of North Macedonia Article 36
78  Constitution of Serbia Article 14
79  Constitution of Serbia Article 81
80  Constitution of Slovenia Article 64
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operations. The states of the Western Balkans show the signs of caring about protecting 
the national minorities in the texts of their constitutions.
6 . Minority Rights and EU Enlargement Negotiations
While one can find treaties of minority rights in both international and regional level,81 the 
EU does not have an exemplary system of legal rules of minority protection despite the 
development of the area in the last decades.82
The EU law had an indirect base for a long time without a special directive on minority 
rights. However, there were supporting rules in the background: the principle of non-dis-
crimination, the value of cultural diversity and the policies on integrating migrants.83
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and TEU mentions “national minorities”, 
which was a progress in the process.84 The Minority Safepack is a new and ambitious 
initiative on the protection of minority rights.85
The treatment of the minorities in the Member States can be seen on a long scale from en-
suring a wide range of collective and individual rights to struggling with the recognition 
of the rights in the practice. The size of the minority groups can determine the actions of 
a state, and historical events can also affect the treatment.86
The first concrete binding conditions are related to the Copenhagen Criteria, which is the 
list of basic conditions for the aspiring states to join the EU, contains the protection of 
minorities.  The candidate and potential candidate states must fulfil the conditions to join 
the EU. The Copenhagen Criteria are the following:
 - “stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities;
 - a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competition and 
market forces in the EU;
81  As an example: The Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities Adopted by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of 18 December 1992, the Framework 
Convention for Protection of National Minorities.
82  Varga cSilla: Eu Minority Protection Policy: Talks about nothing or positive development trends? In: 
Iustum Aequum Salutare, 2018/3, pp. 255-260.
83  Bruno de WiTTe – Enikő horváTh: The many faces of minority policy in the European Union. In: K. 
henrard & R. dunBar (eds.): Synergies in Minority Protection: European and International Law Perspectives 
Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. p. 367.
84  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union „Article 21 Non-discrimination
1.Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic features, 
language, religion or belief, political or any other opinion, membership of a national minority, property, birth, 
disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2.Within the scope of application of the Treaties and without prejudice to any of their specific provisions, any 
discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited.”
85  Cf.: http://www.minority-safepack.eu/ 
86  András Sajó: Constitution without the constitutional moment: A view from the new member states. In: 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 3, Issue 2-3, May 2005. pp. 256-258.
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 - the ability to take on and implement effectively the obligations of membership, 
including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.”87
The protection of minorities must reach a certain level before a state can join the EU. 
However, these criteria were introduced in 1993. The Member States which joined the 
EU before 1993 did not have to reach any level of protection to the minorities, which gave 
some concern about the equal treatment until the Charter and the Treaty of Lisbon were 
not entered into force.
The states in the Western Balkans learned that lesson during the Yugoslav Wars. The new 
constitutions guarantee rights to the minorities, but to what degree? Are they sufficient 
for the EU standards?
If one examines the current state of the negotiations of the EU membership of the states 
from the Western Balkans which are candidates or potential candidates, it can be conclud-
ed that the developments differ. Taking into consideration that Slovenia and Croatia are 
Member States of the EU, and the last Member State to join was Croatia, the other states 
of the Western Balkans should feel the benefits and the real-life possibilities of joining 
the EU.
The most advanced negotiations can be found with Montenegro, where 33 of the 35 chap-
ters are opened.88 The second ‘in the race’ is Serbia with 16 opened chapters.89 Albania90 
and North Macedonia91 got the negotiations opened in March 2020, thus the status of 
these show a different time frame for the joining than Montenegro and Serbia. Leaders of 
the EU said that Montenegro and Serbia possibly can join the EU in 2025.92 Bosnia and 
Herzegovina93 and Kosovo94 show the third level with the negotiations: they are not even 
candidates, just potential candidates.
The other side of the coin is the question of the real speed of the enlargement negotia-
tions. As the EU is imposing more conditions95 on the Western Balkan states then on the 
candidates before, the resistance against the joining is stronger than in the other Member 
States.96 The EU learned from the ‘big bang’ enlargement and the backsliding of the dem-
ocratic conditions, and introduced the ‘benchmarking’ to the negotiations.97 According to 
Economides, the main reasons behind the slow speed are fragmentation and disintegration 
87  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/conditions-membership_en 
88  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/negotiations-status-montenegro.pdf 
89  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20190529-serbia-state-of-play.pdf 
90  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/albania_en 
91  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/north-macedonia_en
92  https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/06/serbia-and-montenegro-could-join-eu-in-2025-says-brussels 
93  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/bosnia-herzegovina_en
94  https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/countries/detailed-country-information/kosovo_en
95  About the Stabilisation and Association Agreements: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/
policy/glossary/terms/sap_en
96  Milada Anna vachudova: EU Enlargement and State Capture in the Western Balkans. In: Jelena dŽankić 
– Soeren keil – Marko kMezić (eds.): EU Enlargement and State Capture in the Western Balkans. A Failure of 
EU Conditionality? Springer, 2019, pp. 66. 
97  vachudova 2019. pp. 77-78.
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on the side of the EU, and unwillingness from the candidate states to meet the EU’s de-
mands.98
While the “(…) Eu’s interest to secure and stabilize its backyard.”,99 and the new com-
mission’s aim is to support the process,100 the new enlargement is far away from being 
successful due to several different factors.101
As the Copenhagen Criteria contains the basic conditions for a Member State, the protec-
tion of minorities must be on a sufficient level for success. The texts of the constitutions 
provide a basis for this, albeit the practical implementation can become quite diverse.
As an example, the constitution of Serbia guarantees a wide range of rights to the mi-
norities.102 However, the reality is quite different as the rules are interpreted by the Con-
stitutional Court. The Constitutional Court of Serbia stated that the obligation to protect 
the minority rights would not mean guaranteeing a certain level of protection.103 This 
decision created a slippery slope for the protection of minority rights as I see, since the 
concrete rules can be altered almost without constitutional limitations. The conclusions of 
the Constitutional Court of Serbia were not consistent with the arguments.104 I hope that 
the pressure from the EU will help to develop the status of the minority rights in every 
state of the Western Balkan. As the states of Central and Eastern Europe tried to prove 
their worth to the EU after 1989 by following the principles of democracy and rule of law, 
now the states of the Western Balkan are in the situation to show that their legal system 
and social environment have reached the level which is needed to join the EU.
“Considering that a pluralist and genuinely democratic society should not only respect 
the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of each person belonging to a nation-
al minority, but also create appropriate conditions enabling them to express, preserve and 
develop this identity;”105
7 . Conclusions
As it could be seen from the analysis, the states of the Western Balkans have diverse con-
stitutional definitions of nation, nationality and identity. However, the strong protection 
of the national minorities is given in most of the constitutions as a result of the Yugoslav 
98  Spyros econoMideS: From fatigue to resistance: EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans. Dahrendorf 
Forum IV Working Paper No. 17 20 March 2020 3-6, pp. 11-13. (econoMideS 2020)
99  vachudova 2019, p. 80.
100  E.g.: https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2020/09/16/von-der-leyen-western-balkans-are-part-of-eu-
rope-not-just-a-stopover-on-the-silk-road/ , https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1816 
101  econoMideS 2020, pp. 15-17.
102  Tamás korhecz: A nemzeti kisebbségek alkotmányos jogai és azok bírósági védelme Szerbiában. [The 
Constitutional Rights of the National Minorities and their Judicial Protection in Serbia]. In: Petar Teofilović 
2020, pp. 177-187.
103  korhecz 2020, pp. 206-213.
104  korhecz 2020, pp. 200-201.
105  Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities Strasbourg, 1.II.1995, Preamble
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Wars. The protection of the national minorities must be a priority in showing the intention 
of leaving the past choices behind and joining the pathway of the EU values.
The aim of the states of the Western Balkans is joining the EU. Nonetheless, the defini-
tions and principles of the constitutional texts must become practice to reach the standards 
of the Copenhagen Criteria and other conditions of becoming a Member State of the EU.
In conclusion, the aim of this paper was to show how the states of the Western Balkans 
define nation, national minorities and identity in their constitutions, to see the starting 
point and the theory. The practice of the states should be a focus point of another paper 
to see how the principles work in real life. The frame for a good system is given in most 
of the states, albeit they are just written words without a strong supporting executive 
administrative system.
I hope that the constitutional framework provided will be supportive for the development 
of the status of the national minorities in the states of the Western Balkans. The possibility 
is in the texts; however, the practical application differs from the ideal. If the states of 
the Western Balkans have a real intent to join the EU, they must start to implement the 
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Table 1. The expression for nationality in the Constitutions of the Western Balkan 
(from the constitutional texts of the states)
State Term
Albania Article 8 3. The Republic of Albania assures 
assistance for Albanians who live and work abroad 
in order to preserve and develop their ties with the 
national cultural inheritance.
Bosnia and Hercegovina no definition
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Croatia Article 10 The Republic of Croatia shall safeguard 
the rights and interests of its citizens living or 
residing abroad, and shall promote their ties to their 
homeland. The Republic of Croatia shall guarantee 
particular care and protection to those parts of the 
Croatian nation in other countries.
Kosovo no definition
Montenegro no definition
North Macedonia Article 49 The Republic shall protect, guarantee 
and foster the characteristics and the historical and 
cultural heritage of the Macedonian people. The 
Republic shall protect the rights and interests of its 
nationals living or staying abroad. The Republic shall 
provide for the diaspora of the Macedonian people 
and of part of the Albanian people, Turkish people, 
Vlach people, Serbian people, Roma people, Bosniak 
people and others and shall foster and promote the 
ties with the fatherland. In doing so, the Republic 
shall not interfere with the sovereign rights of other 
states and with their internal affairs.
Serbia Protection of citizens and Serbs abroad
Article 13
The Republic of Serbia shall protect the rights and 
interests of its citizens in abroad.
The Republic of Serbia shall develop and promote 
relations of Serbsliving abroad with the kin state.
Slovenia 5. Slovenes not holding Slovene citizenship may 
enjoy special rights and privileges in Slovenia. The 
nature and extent of such rights and privileges shall 
be regulated by law.
Table 2. The legal status of citizens living abroad in the Constitutions of the Western Balkan 
(from the constitutional texts of the states)
State Term
Albania the people
Bosnia and Hercegovina Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with Others), and 
citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina (no typical definition of sovereignty)
Croatia the people, the people as a community of free and equal citizens
Kosovo the people
Montenegro citizen with Montenegrin citizenship
North Macedonia citizens
Serbia citizens
Slovenia citizens, people, Slovene nation, all citizens
Table 3. The expression for the source of sovereignty in the Constitutions of the Western Balkan 







Bosnia and Herzegovina potential candidate
Kosovo potential candidate
Table 4. The current state of the enlargement process of the states of the Western Balkan
State Term
Albania Preamble (…) with the centuries-old aspiration of the Albanian people for 
national identity and unity,
Article 3
The independence of the state and the integrity of its territory, dignity of the 
individual, human rights and freedoms, social justice, constitutional order, 
pluralism, national identity and inheritance, religious coexistence, as well as 
coexistence with, and understanding of Albanians for, minorities are the bases of 
this state, which has the duty of respecting and protecting them.
Article 20 
1. Persons who belong to national minorities exercise in full equality before the 
law the human rights and freedoms.
2. They have the right to freely express, without prohibition or compulsion, 
their ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic belonging. They have the right to 
preserve and develop it, to study and to be taught in their mother tongue, as well 
as unite in organizations and associations for the protection of their interests 
and identity.
Bosnia and Hercegovina –
Croatia Preamble The millennial national identity of the Croatian nation and the 
continuity of its statehood, confirmed by the course of its entire historical 
experience in various political forms and by the perpetuation and development 
of a state-building idea grounded on the historical right of the Croatian nation 
to full sovereignty.
Kosovo Article 57 Members of Communities shall have the right to freely express, foster 
and develop their identity and community attributes.
Article 58 3. The Republic of Kosovo shall take all necessary measures to 
protect persons who may be subject to threats or acts of discrimination, hostility 
or violence as a result of their national, ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious 
identity. 
Article 59 Members of communities shall have the right, individually or in 
community, to: 
1) express, maintain and develop their culture and preserve the essential elements 
of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and culture; 
(12) enjoy unhindered contacts among themselves within the Republic of 
Kosovo and establish and maintain free and peaceful contacts with persons in 
any State, in particular those with whom they share an ethnic, cultural, linguistic 
or religious identity, or a common cultural heritage, in accordance with the law 
and international standards; 
14) establish associations for culture, art, science and education as well as 
scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and development 
of their identity. 
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Montenegro Protection of identity
Article 79 Persons belonging to minority nations and other minority national 
communities shall be guaranteed the rights and liberties, which they can exercise 
individually or collectively with others, as follows: 
1) the right to exercise, protect, develop and publicly express national, ethnic, 
cultural and religious particularities; 
2) the right to choose, use and publicly post national symbols and to celebrate 
national holidays; 
3) the right to use their own language and alphabet in private, public and official 
use; 
4) the right to education in their own language and alphabet in public institutions 
and the right to have included in the curricula the history and culture of the 
persons belonging to minority nations and other minority national communities; 
5) the right, in the areas with significant share in the total population, to have 
the local self-government authorities, state and court authorities carry out the 
proceedings also in the language of minority nations and other minority national 
communities; 
6) the right to establish educational, cultural and religious associations, with the 
material support of the state; 
7) the right to write and use their own name and surname in their own language 
and alphabet in the official documents; 
8) the right, in the areas with significant share in total population, to have 
traditional local terms, names of streets and settlements, as well as topographic 
signs written also in the language of minority nations and other minority national 
communities; 
9) the right to authentic representation in the Parliament of the Republic of 
Montenegro and in the assemblies of the local self-government units in which 
they represent a significant share in the population, according to the principle of 
affirmative action; 
10) the right to proportionate representation in public services, state authorities 
and local self-government bodies; 
11) the right to information in their own language; 
12) the right to establish and maintain contacts with the citizens and associations 
outside of Montenegro, with whom they have common national and ethnic 
background, cultural and historic heritage, as well as religious beliefs; 
13) the right to establish councils for the protection and improvement of special 
rights.
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North Macedonia Article 8
The fundamental values of the constitutional order of the Republic of Macedonia 
are: (…) - the free expression of national identity;
Article 36
The Republic guarantees particular social security rights to veterans of the Anti-
Fascist War and of all Macedonian national liberation wars, to war invalids, 
to those expelled and imprisoned for the ideas of the separate identity of the 
Macedonian people and of Macedonian statehood, as well as to members of their 
families without means of material and social subsistence. The particular rights 
are regulated by law. 
Article 48
Members of nationalities have a right freely to express, foster and develop their 
identity and national attributes. The Republic guarantees the protection of the 
ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of the nationalities. Members 
of the nationalities have the right to establish institutions for culture and art, 
as well as scholarly and other associations for the expression, fostering and 
development of their identity. Members of the nationalities have the right to 
instruction in their language in primary and secondary education, as determined 
by law. In schools where education is carried out in the language of a nationality, 
the Macedonian language is also studied.  
Amendment VIII  
1. Members of communities have a right freely to express, foster and develop 
their identity and community attributes, and to use their community symbols. 
The Republic guarantees the protection of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of all communities. Members of communities have the right to 
establish institutions for culture, art, science and education, as well as scholarly 
and other associations for the expression, fostering and development of their 
identity. Members of communities have the right to instruction in their language 
in primary and secondary education, as determined by law. In schools where 
education is carried out in another language, the Macedonian language is also 
studied.
2. This amendment replaces Article 48 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
Macedonia. 
Serbia Article 14 The Republic of Serbia shall protect the rights of national minorities. 
The State shall guarantee special protection to national minorities for the purpose 
of exercising full equality and preserving their identity.
Article 81 In the field of education, culture and information, Serbia shall give 
impetus to the spirit of tolerance and intercultural dialogue and undertake 
efficient measures for enhancement of mutual respect, understanding and 
cooperation among all people living on its territory, regardless of their ethnic, 
cultural, linguistic or religious identity.
Slovenia Preamble (…) centuries-long struggle for national liberation we Slovenes have 
established our national identity and asserted our statehood.
Article 64 (Special Rights of the Autochthonous Italian and Hungarian National 
Communities in Slovenia) The autochthonous Italian and Hungarian national 
communities and their members shall be guaranteed the right to use their national 
symbols freely and, in order to preserve their national identity, the right to 
establish organisations and develop economic, cultural, scientific, and research 
activities, as well as activities in the field of public media and publishing.
Table 5. The expression of sovereignty in the Constitutions of the Western Balkan (from the 
constitutional texts of the states)
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Norbert Tribl:1
Predestined future or persistent responsibility? 
Constitutional identity and the PSPP decision in the light 
of the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s most recent 
practice2
1 . Introduction
One of the most important areas in the discourse on the European dimension of constitu-
tional law is the relationship between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
and national constitutional courts3, as the former is the authentic interpreter of EU law, 
while the latter is an authentic, erga omnes interpreter of national constitutions.4 How-
ever, the issue of the relationship between these organs is in itself a consequence of the re-
lationship between EU law and national constitutions being only seemingly regulated5, 
based on a fragile state of balance below the surface. 6 The principle of the primacy of 
EU law over the constitutions of the Member States is not an expressis verbis clause laid 
down in the Treaties: the CJEU developed them in the van Gend en Loos and then the 
Costa v. E.N.E.L. decisions as general principles of EU law in the 1970s. However, the 
practice of the CJEU did not (even then) receive unreserved support from the Member 
States. From the 1970s onwards, the German Federal Constitutional Court declared in 
the Solange decisions that it reserved the right not to apply EU law against to German 
constitution if certain conditions were met. 7 However, the findings of the principle of 
the Federal Constitutional Court have never become a reality: since the creation of the 
reservation for the protection of fundamental rights and the ultra vires test, the Federal 
Constitutional Court has never taken a position that would have applied the wording of 
Solange decisions to a concrete case or issue. 8
1  PhD, Assistant research fellow, University of Szeged, Faculty of Law and Political Sciences, Institute of 
Public Law 
2  The research for this paper has been carried out within the program Nation, Community, Minority, Identity 
– The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the Protection of Constitutional Identity and Minority Rights 
as Constitutional Values as part of the programmes of the Ministry of Justice (of Hungary) enhancing the level 
of legal education.
3  Cf.: Ernő várnay: Az Alkotmánybíróság és az Európai Bíróság. Együttműködő alkotmánybíráskodás? 
[The Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice. Cooperative Constitutional Justice?] In: Állam- és 
Jogtudomány, 2019/2, pp. 63-91.
4  Attila vincze – Nóra, chronoWSki: Magyar alkotmányosság az európai integrációban [Hungarian 
Constitutionalism in the European Integration.] (Third, revised edition). HVG Orac, 2018, pp. 493-515.
5  Martin Belov: The Functions of Constitutional Identity Performed in the Context of Constitutionalization of 
the EU Order and Europeanization of the Legal Orders of EU Member States. In: Perspectives on Federalism, 
2017/2, pp. 72-97.
6  László TrócSányi: Alkotmányos identitás és európai integráció. [Constitutional Identity and European 
Integration]. In Acta Universitatis Szegediensis: acta juridica et politica, 2014/76, pp. 473-476.
7  Cf: BVerfGE 37, 271 – Solange I., BVerfGE 73, 339 –Solange II.
8  Cf.: vincze–chronoWSki 2018, pp. 197-218.
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However, over the decades, as the European Union has become a community of values 
and internal tensions have intensified. The potential conflict between EU law and national 
constitutions has become a seemingly political debate, becoming a more and more often 
used synonym for Euroscepticism. Meanwhile, the absolute primacy of EU law over na-
tional constitutions has become a doctrine. However, the risk of destabilization is coded 
into a system, which is based on an implicit integration of the absolute, no-exception 
primacy of EU law.9
However, in the midst of increasingly heated political debates, one of the most important 
legal problems of European integration remains, and we pay a serious price manifested 
in constitutional law for the lack of political consensus: certain parts of the relationship 
between the European Union and the Member States must be determined by the national 
constitutional courts and the CJEU. Thus, a force field is created where the originally 
neutral constitutional interpreters start to actively shape the integration process supple-
menting the original functions of the continental (Kelsenian, centralized) system of con-
stitutional justice. Due to the unstable situation created by the Treaties, Member States’ 
constitutional interpreters have been given a de facto new obligation: “to make heads or 
tails” of the relationship between the EU legal order and the Member States’ constitu-
tional systems, of which they are the gatekeepers. If we approach this issue dogmatically, 
we could even say that in the continental, centralized model of constitutional justice, the 
functions of constitutional courts are complemented by a kind of “integrational func-
tion”.10 The relationship between national constitutional courts and the CJEU, and the 
primacy of EU law over the constitutions of the Member States has been and still is 
sought to be maintained by the European Constitutional Dialogue, while the claim to de-
fine these relations simultaneously supports the need to protect constitutional identity.11 
Perhaps, however, the real question is whether EU law takes precedence over national 
constitutions. 
In the scientific discourse of recent years, we have repeatedly encountered glimpses of 
a moment of “open bread-breaking”, when, due to the vagueness of the relationship 
between the two, these courts and these sources of law collided. On May 5, 2020, the 
German Federal Constitutional Court’s decision12 on the PSPP13 scheme seems to have 
actually reached such a moment of “open bread-breaking”, although perhaps the subse-
quent processes are and will be less intense than we first might have thought. Despite all 
this, the decision provoked heated debates and stirred up national and European emotions 
as well, all providing different narratives for why it was born and what it actually means 
for the future.
9  C.f.: R. Daniel keleMen – Piet eeckhouT – Federico faBBrini – Laurent Pech – Renáta uiTz: National 
Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments. A Joint Statement in Defense of the EU Legal Order. On Verfas-
sungsblog: https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/ 
10  The phenomenon is somewhat similar to the form of responsibility for „Integrationsverantwortung” de-
scribed later, which was developed by German constitutional law.
11  Cf.: Endre orBán: Quo vadis, „alkotmányos identitás”? [Quo vadis, „Constitutional Identity”?] In: 
Közjogi Szemle, 2018/3
12  2 BvR 859/15 -, paras. (1-237),
13  Cf.: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/pspp.en.html
The present study has only a limited purpose in examining the decision of the German 
Federal Constitutional Court. However, its aim is to present the similarities that can be 
explored between the previous practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) and 
the PSPP decision of the Federal Constitutional Court. When we are examining PSPP in 
the light of the practice of the HCC, Decisions 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB (on the meaning and 
elements of constitutional identity), and 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB (examining the relationship 
of EU legal order and the Fundamental Law of Hungary (HFL) in the light of Article E) 
of the HFL) will provide the baseline for comparison. 
2. The PSPP Decision – 2 BvR 859/15
In the Decision 2 BvR 859/15 (PSPP decision), the Federal Constitutional Court made a 
number of findings defining European integration and the EU legal order, which, how-
ever, can only be classified as “anti-integration” provisions at a very sloppy and super-
ficial first reading. (Surprisingly, the decision has been widely criticized for exactly the 
above.14) The genesis of the Federal Constitutional Court’s decision is not rotted in an 
anti-integration sentiment, but in the legal doctrine of Integrationsverantwortung15 de-
veloped in German constitutional law, which literally refers to a form of “integrational 
responsibility”16 of the German constitutional organs – in the current case the Federal 
Government, the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court –, in other words their 
constitutional responsibility for the integration process (Integrationsprogramm17).
The responsibility of the German constitutional organs for the integration process is based 
on Article 23 (1) of the Fundamental Law of Germany, i.e. the integration clause of the 
Fundamental Law. According to the settled case law of the Federal Constitutional Court 
and the PSPP decision, the German constitutional organs, within their responsibility for 
the integration process, are obliged to take appropriate steps to implement and protect it.18 
However, the Federal Constitutional Court emphasized that the Integrationsverantwor-
tung is not a unilateral instrument that obliges constitutional organs of Germany to accept 
the decisions of EU institutions without restrictions. On the contrary, it can be interpreted 
as the implementation of the Integrationsprogramm, i.e. the idea of integration enshrined 
in the TFEU, and as such, its masters are the Member States.19 Consequently, it is the 
responsibility of the German constitutional organs to comply with and enforce the acts of 
the EU institutions in so far as they are in line with the idea of the Integrationsprogramm 
in accordance with the Treaties. However, if the acts of these EU institutions run counter 
14  Cf. R. Daniel keleMen – Piet eeckhouT – Federico faBBrini – Laurent Pech – Renáta uiTz: National 
Courts Cannot Override CJEU Judgments. A Joint Statement in Defense of the EU Legal Order. On Verfas-
sungsblog: https://verfassungsblog.de/national-courts-cannot-override-cjeu-judgments/ (2020. 11. 28.)
15  Michael TiSchendorf: Theorie und Wirklichkeit der Integrationsverantwortung deutscher 
Verfassungsorgane. [Theory and Reality of the Responsibility for Integration of German Constitutional Organs.] 
In: Jus Internationale et Europaeum 129, Universitat Augsburg, 2016, pp. 7-9.
16 Cf.: Gero kellerMann: Integrationsverantwortung und Verfassungsidentität – Das Urteil des 
Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Vertrag von Lissabon. [Responsibility for Integration and Constitutional 
Identity – The Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court on the Treaty of Lisbon.]. In: Akademie für 
politische bildung tutzing, Akademie-Kurzanalyse, 2009/1, pp. 1-6.
17  Cf.: Christoph, degenharT: Staatsrecht I., C.F. Müller GmbH, Heidelberg, 2019
18  2 BvR 859/15, 116.
19  2 BvR 859/15, 53, 89, 105-109.
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to the “idea of integration”, the responsibility of the German constitutional organs for 
process of European Integration requires them to take action against ultra vires acts, but 
at least to seek to mitigate their harmful effects.20
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, also argued in the preliminary ruling 
procedure, the ECB’s bond purchase program goes beyond the ECB’s and the ESCB’s 
powers, given that, in addition to its monetary policy implications for the Eurozone, it 
has economic policy consequences and long-term implications21, which fall exclusively 
within the non-delegated powers of the Member States.22 In its PSPP decision of 5 May 
2020 (merging several proceedings – 2 BvR 859/15, 2 BvR 980/16, 2 BvR 2006/15, 2 
BvR 1651/15), the Federal Constitutional Court found, in its decision of 11 December 
2018 in Preliminary ruling procedure C-493/17, that the CJEU stated that the ECB’s 
decisions and the PSPP program complied with the requirements of EU law, in particular 
proportionality without examining the merits of the ECB’s decisions in question or the 
long-term economic policy implications of the PSPP program.23 According to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the CJEU’s review did not cover the real economic, long-term ef-
fects of the PSPP and thus did not examine the merits of whether the ECB exceeded its 
monetary powers under primary law.24
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the CJEU did not properly apply the pro-
portionality test,25 so proportionality as laid down in the second sentence of Article 5 
(1) and (4) TEU could not fulfill its function of protecting Member States’ powers and 
preventing ultra vires acts, thus emptying the principle of delegation of power enshrined 
in the second sentence of Article 5 (1) and Article 5 (4) TEU.26 According to the Federal 
Constitutional Court, the fact that the CJEU did not properly assess the economic policy 
implications of the PSPP (or marginalized it, quasi subordinated it to the monetary objec-
tives of the Eurozone27) is an arbitrary interpretation of EU law28 which allows the ECB 
to go beyond the powers conferred on it by the Treaties (monetary policy) and ultimately 
excludes its activities entirely from the possibility of judicial review.29 This leads to a 
precedent-setting practice which would allow the EU institutions, in this case the ECB, 
to establish or extend their own powers (Kompetenz-Kompetenz30), which is contrary to 
integration efforts and the provisions of the Treaties.31 Therefore, the Federal Constitu-
tional Court does not consider itself bound by the interpretation of the law contained in 
the CJEU’s decision.32 According to the  Court, since the CJEU’s decision was due to 
an insufficient examination of the principle of proportionality, and in view of the above 
20  2 BvR 859/15, 89, 105-106, 107, 109, 116, 231.
21  2 BvR 859/15, 133, 136, 139, 159, 161-162.
22  2 BvR 859/15, 109, 120, 127, 136.
23  2 BvR 859/15, 2, 6, 81, 116, 119-120, 161-162.
24  2 BvR 859/15, 116-120, 133.
25  2 BvR 859/15, 116, 126-128.
26  2 BvR 859/15, 6b, 6c, 116, 119, 123-126.
27  2 BvR 859/15, 120-122, 161-163.
28  2 BvR 859/15, 112-113.
29  2 BvR 859/15, 156.
30  2 BvR 859/15, 102, 156.
31  2 BvR 859/15, 102, 105-106, 116.
32  2 BvR 859/15, 154, 163, 178.
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consequences, it does not ensure proper judicial review of the ECB’s decisions33 and thus 
extends the powers of the EU institutions.
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the German constitutional organs, such 
as the Federal Government, the Bundesbank and the Court itself, have a constitutional 
obligation to protect the principle of democracy, which is protected by Articles 20 and 79 
of the GG (Grundgesetz). The second one is the eternity clause, which is the main source 
of Germany’s constitutional identity.34 In the decision, the Federal Constitutional Court 
explains that the German people, due to their sovereignty, have the right to democrat-
ic self-determination, the principle of democracy, which is a fundamental constitutional 
factor that cannot be endangered by the integration process.35 The system of division 
of competences is intended to ensure the preservation of the principle of democracy – 
and sovereignty of the people – and thus democratic legitimacy during the integration 
process. In order for the decisions of the EU institutions to have requisite democratic 
legitimacy, they must be traceable to the provisions of the Treaties and to the idea of the 
integration that creates them. The stability of the division of competences is intended to 
be ensured by the requirement of proportionality, and any failure to comply with it risks 
destabilizing the division of competences within the European Union.36 According to the 
decision, the idea of integration does not infringe the principles of popular sovereignty or 
democracy as long as the decisions of the EU institutions and bodies are not ultra vires, 
i.e. they remain within the scope of the powers deriving from the Treaties, which are in-
tended to be ensured by one of the main principles of the European Union, the delegation 
of powers and the requirements (and guarantees) imposed on it.37
The decision states that if the CJEU’s interpretation of the law does not respect the pow-
ers set out in Article 19 (1) TEU and goes beyond them38, it violates the minimum require-
ment of democratic legitimacy of EU acts and thus the decision – in the light of the above 
– is not applicable in relation to Germany.39 The Federal Constitutional Court therefore 
does not consider the judgment of the CJEU in the preliminary ruling procedure to be 
binding on it, given that its consequences are contrary to the basic idea of integration40 
and lead to a misuse of powers. At the same time, the Federal Constitutional Court shares 
the view of the petitioners in the underlying constitutional complaint procedure that the 
PSPP deprives the Bundestag of its budgetary powers as enshrined in the GG, thereby 
violating Germany’s constitutional identity. 41
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the CJEU has not carried out an in-depth 
review of the ECB’s bond repurchase program42, as a result of which the relevant ECB de-
33  2 BvR 859/15, 156, 111-113, 116-119.
34  2 BvR 859/15, 115, 230.
35  2 BvR 859/15, 100-101.
36  2 BvR 859/15, 101, 158.
37  2 BvR 859/15, 142, 158.
38  2 BvR 859/15, 154-156.
39  2 BvR 859/15, 2, 154, 157-158.
40  2 BvR 859/15, 113, 116.
41  2 BvR 859/15, 1, 33-42.
42  2 BvR 859/15, 119, 123, 126.
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cisions, and thus the PSPP, are not subject to adequate judicial review. 43 According to the 
Federal Constitutional Court, the PSPP violates the GG because certain of its provisions, 
and in particular its long-term effects, goes beyond monetary policy and falls44 within 
the scope of economic policy. Thus, in particular, the risk-sharing scheme of the PSPP 
constitutes a budgetary commitment which falls within the competence of the Bundestag. 
45 According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the ECB exceeds its powers under the 
Treaties if its decisions have diversified economic or social policy implications which 
already fall within the competence of the economic policies of the Member States. 46 
According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the bond purchase program could have an 
impact on public debt, private savings, pensions and the pension system, real estate prices 
and rescuing non-marketable companies as well. 47
In addition to the ultra vires declaration of the ECB’s bond purchase program (and the 
decisions on which it is based) and of the CJEU’s preliminary ruling decision, the Federal 
Constitutional Court stated that it was contrary to the GG that the Federal Government 
did not challenge the decisions underlying the ECB’s bond purchase program, in which 
the ECB did not substantially examine or assess whether the bond purchase program 
complied with the proportionality requirement. It did so, inter alia, with regard to the inte-
gration responsibilities of the German constitutional organs (Integrationsverantwortung), 
the principles of democracy and popular sovereignty.48
In its PSPP decision, the Federal Constitutional Court has called the Federal Government 
in the context of their integration responsibilities to prevent an EU institution, in this case 
the ECB, from taking a decision on the budget (and thus German constitutional identity) 
beyond its powers. In the decision, the Court called the Federal Government to demand 
a comprehensive proportionality test in the context of the PSPP and, given its integra-
tion responsibilities, to ensure that the PSPP does not violates the German constitutional 
identity and Member State competences while remaining within the competence of the 
Treaties. 49
The PSPP decision of the Federal Constitutional Court states in several points that the 
ultra vires acts are not binding on German public organs in the light of the above and as a 
result of the provision in point 10 of the of the decision and in point 235 of the reasoning, 
the Federal Bank can only take continue to participate in the PSPP program if the ECB 
conducts an appropriate proportionality analysis of the economic policy implications of 
the PSPP. The Federal Constitutional Court also ordered the Federal Bank to place on the 
market assets already purchased under the PSPP. 50
43  2 BvR 859/15, 156.
44  2 BvR 859/15, 6b, 122, 133, 135, 138-139, 163, 165.
45  2 BvR 859/15, 8, 116.
46  2 BvR 859/15, 6c, 139.
47  2 BvR 859/15, 6c, 139.
48  2 BvR 859/15, 6a – 10, 232.
49  2 BvR 859/15, 230-232, 234-235.
50  2 BvR 859/15, 235.
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3.  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the interpretation of Article E) (2) of the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary 
Decision 143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (also known as 
the “Lisbon decision” of the HCC) was the first such ruling in Hungary that examined 
the constitutionality of the Act CLXVIII of 2007 on the promulgation of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The decision has been subject of heavy criticisms for its approach and a limited, 
tangential discussion of the dogmatic problems of the conflict between Union and domes-
tic (Member State) law. The decision also failed to address the issue of the protection of 
national sovereignty as part of EU integration, the issue was only brought up in one of 
the concurring opinions.51 In 2010, the HCC did not essentially mark the constitutional 
direction to follow regarding the relationship of the Hungarian legal system and European 
integration. However, with their decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB, the HCC took to con-
sider the interpretation of Article 4 (2) TEU in light of the “integration clause” of the FL 
(primarily Article E) and to answer the questions it left open in the (first) Lisbon decision. 
At the same time, the HCC also opened a Pandora’s box: it thwarted the concept of con-
stitutional identity into the center of Hungarian constitutional theory. In 2016, however, 
constitutional discourse did not revolve around any “integrational” responsibilities of the 
Member States constitutional courts, we have the PSSP decision to thank for this addition 
to the current debate. Regardless, the frequent demergence of notions such as constitu-
tional identity and constitutional dialogue in national constitutional case-law have un-
doubtedly already pointed in this direction.
The second time around, after the first “botched” Lisbon decision, the Commissioner for 
Fundamental Rights petitioned the HCC regarding the interpretation of certain provisions 
of the Hungarian Fundamental Law, among others the “integration clause” [Article E) 
para (2)], which reads like this: “In order to participate in the European Union as a 
Member State, and on the basis of an international treaty, Hungary may, to the extent 
necessary to exercise the rights and fulfil the obligations set out in the founding treaties, 
exercise some of its competences deriving from the Fundamental Law jointly with other 
Member States, through the institutions of the European Union.” The clause continues 
with the following (third) paragraph: “The law of the European Union may stipulate 
generally binding rules of conduct subject to the conditions set out in paragraph (2).”52
The Commissioner’s petition was filed in relation to the provisions of Article XIV and 
Article E (2) of the FL in view of the prohibition of group expulsion, and asked for the 
interpretation of Article (E) (2) (i) regarding whether Hungary was obliged to implement 
measures that are in violation of the FL; (ii) whether an EU act could violate fundamental 
rights; and (iii) the Commissioner asked for further “guidance” in relation to ultra vires 
51  László Trócsányi emphasized in his concurring opinion that when Member States have transferred some 
of their powers to the EU organs, did not give away their statehood, sovereignty and the essence of their inde-
pendence. The Member States retained the right of disposal to the fundamental principles of their constitution 
that are indispensable for maintaining statehood and constitutional identity. The state, joining the integration, 
maintains the state sovereignty without a separate declaration, as it is the basis of the constitutions of the 
Member States (and the Community legal order). Cf. László Trócsányi’s concurring opinion in the Decision 
143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB.
52  Cf. Article E) (2) – (3) of the FL
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actions of the EU.53 The HCC separated the questions in the petition and considered the 
interpretation of Article XIV in a separate procedure, while the questions concerning 
Article E) have been discussed above.54 Following the presentation of the petition and 
the determination of its competence, the HCC engaged in a broad-ranging comparative 
examination into the high court practices of the Member States.55
As a result,56 the position of the HCC is that in exceptional cases and as a last resort (“ul-
tima ratio”) it is possible to examine “whether exercising competences on the basis of 
Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law results in the violation of human dignity, the essen-
tial content of any other fundamental right or the sovereignty (including the extent of the 
competences transferred by the State) and the constitutional self- identity of Hungary.” 
57 Regarding the possibility of an exercise of competences under Article E) (2) infringing 
fundamental rights, it is determined by the HCC that any exercise of public authority in 
the territory of Hungary (including the joint exercise of competences with other Member 
States) is linked to fundamental rights.58 
In this second “Lisbon decision” of the HCC (the so-called “Identity decision”), the HCC 
argued, using a very strange and untranslatable terminology, that the “self-identity” of 
Hungary is to be understood under the concept of constitutional identity, and the scope 
of this identity can only be considered on a case-by-case basis, based on the “whole Fun-
damental Law and certain provisions thereof, in accordance with the National Avowal 
and the achievements of the historical constitution – as required by Article R) (3)59 of 
the Fundamental Law.” 60 At the same time, the HCC regards constitutional identity as a 
bridge between Member States and European integration when it states that the protection 
of constitutional identity should be granted in the framework of an informal cooperation 
with the Court of Justice of the European Union – namely constitutional dialogue – based 
on the principles of equality and collegiality.61
With reference to the German Solange decisions62, the HCC declared that it must act 
with regard to the possible application of European law in protecting fundamental rights. 
However, the HCC also noted, as a last resort, that “it must grant that the joint exercising 
of competences under Article E) (2) of the Fundamental Law would not result in violating 
human dignity or the essential content of fundamental rights.” 63 With regard to ultra 
vires acts, the HCC emphasized the fact that the “Integration clause” of the FL allows 
for the application of the EU legal acts in Hungary but also means the limitation of any 
53  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [1] – [21]
54  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [29]
55  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [33] – [45]
56  Regarding the decision, the dominance of the comparative investigation, sometimes its exclusivity, is 
expressed as a criticism in Hungarian legal literature. See more: drinóczi 2017, p. 6.
57  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [46]
58  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [47] – [49]
59  According to Article R (3) of the Fundamental Law: “The provisions of the Fundamental Law shall be 
interpreted in accordance with their purposes, the National Avowal contained therein and the achievements of 
our historical constitution.”
60  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [64] 
61  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) CC [63] 
62  For more detail see: Decision Solange I. and II.
63  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [49]
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joint exercise of competences.64 In accordance with the above, based on Article E) (2) FL 
and Article 4 (2) TEU, as a constraint on the joint exercise of powers within European 
integration, the HCC established the “sovereignty control” and “identity control” tests 
based on an influence from the German Federal Constitutional Court’s (GFCC) past cases 
(elaborated for the protection of Hungarian constitutional identity).65 In this context, the 
Constitutional Court essentially declared and strengthened the consensus on constitu-
tional identity in Hungarian academic literature, when it stated that the Constitutional 
Court is the supreme guardian of the protection of constitutional self-identity.66 However, 
following this declaration of principle, the HCC noted that “the direct subject of sover-
eignty- and identity control is not the legal act of the Union or its interpretation, therefore 
the Court shall not comment on the validity, invalidity or the primacy of application of 
such Union acts.”67
Academic circles in Hungary and also internationally took note of the HCC decision in a 
controversial manner.68 One of the biggest criticisms the decision received is that it may 
raise more questions about the relationship between national and EU law than it can an-
swer.69 Despite the fact that the HCC has laid out the results of a broad-ranging compara-
tive overview of different constitutional jurisdictions in Europe in the justifications for its 
decision, its position was most significantly influenced by the judgments of the German 
Constitutional Court as noted above regarding the two tests. The HCC was criticized for 
too many references to the practice of European constitutional (and supreme) courts (in 
the name of the constitutional dialogue), at the same time, despite the declarations of the-
oretical significance in the decision, the relationship between Hungarian national law and 
the legal order of the European Union was not exactly determined in the decision.70 As far 
as European judicial dialogue is concerned (not as a criticism, but rather as an opportuni-
ty for constitutional courts), the applicability of the preliminary reference procedure has 
been mentioned by scholars as a future possibility on the issue which was sat aside by the 
jurisprudence of the HCC.71 (It should be noted that HCC is not precluded from initiating 
referrals to the CJEU – as the authentic interpreter of the EU law – on this issue72 with 
reference to the identity-test. Especially since HCC has made an abstract interpretation 
of the Article E of FL73 and did not decide on the concrete conflict between EU law and 
national law in the “Identity decision”.)
64  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [53]
65  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [54]
66  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [55]
67  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [56].
68  Cf. Ágoston Mohay – Norbert TóTh: Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB on the Interpretation of Article E) (2) 
of the Fundamental Law. In: American Journal of International Law, 2017/2, pp. 468 – 475.
69  Nóra chronoWSki – Attila vincze: Alapjogvédelem, szuverenitás, alkotmányos önazonosság: az uniós 
jog érvényesülésének új határai? [Protection of fundamental rights, sovereignty, constitutional identity: 
new frontiers for EU law?]. In: Szuverenitás és államiság az Európai Unióban. [Sovereignty and statehood 
in the European Union.]. ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, Budapest, 2017, p. 93., Tímea drinóczi: A 22/2016 (XII.5.) 
AB határozat: mit (nem) tartalmaz, és mi következik belőle – Az identitásvizsgálat és az ultra vires közös 
hatáskörgyakorlás összehasonlító elemzésben. [Decision 22/2016 (XII.5.) AB: What (does not) It Contains 
and What Follows from It – Identity Testing and Ultra Vires Joint Exercise of Competences in a Comparative 
Analysis.]. In: MTA Law Working Papers, 2017/1, pp. 1-6., 10-11.
70  chronoWSki – vincze, p. 96.
71  chronoWSki – vincze, p. 122.
72  chronoWSki – vincze, p. 109.
73  Cf. Article 38 of the HCCA
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Another fundamental concept in the decision, besides that of European constitutional 
dialogue, is the notion of (national) constitutional identity.74 In the European view,75 there 
is academic consensus on the fact that the exact meaning and content of constitutional 
identity (which shall contribute to the “self-definition” of the constitutional systems of 
the respective Member States; as the ensemble of fundamental constitutional provisions 
and institutions with historical origins defining the constitutional system) has not yet been 
defined, however, the ultimate interpretation and concept of constitutional identity must 
materialize in the practice of the constitutional courts of the Member States in charge 
of the interpretation of the constitution and be consistent with the case law of the CJEU 
and the provisions of Lisbon Treaty. The indefinite nature of the constitutional identity 
concept has amounted to academic views debating the incorporation of an undefined 
concept into the practice of the HCC, which resulted – according to some – in further 
uncertainties.76 Hungarian authors posited that the HCC decision does not make it clear 
what exactly “protecting the constitutional identity of Hungary” means, i.e. what identity 
is based on Hungary’s historical constitution”.77
Taking everything into account (facts and opinions), the representatives of the Hungarian 
legal literature are in consensus that Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB is a landmark ruling 
–unavoidable in discussions on the topic of constitutional identity; a milestone, which 
obviously outlines the future direction of HCC jurisprudence on similar matters.78 By this 
decision, the HCC joined those European constitutional courts who apply the concept 
of constitutional identity as an element of the relationship between EU law and national 
constitutions. On the other hand, the HCC has ruled in favor of the importance of consti-
tutional dialogue, which forecasts an increase in the role of national constitutional courts 
in the European integration process. Not just as individual bodies, but as a conglomerate 
(cf. Verfassungsgerichtsverbund): looking at the challenges facing the European Union in 
the 21st century, we need to talk not about the role of a constitutional court, but about the 
role of constitutional judiciary in the integration process.
4. Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB
Unlike the “Identity decision”, in Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB the HCC approached the 
relationship between the European legal order and the national constitution not through 
constitutional identity, but specifically through the integration clause of the FL. It was 
concluded that the HCC’s authentic (erga omnes) interpretation of the FL should be 
74  The concept of constitutional identity has extensive legal literature across European, for a well-rounded 
collection see e.g.: Alejandro Saiz arnaiz – Carina Alcoberro llivina (eds.): National Constitutional Identity 
and European Integration. Intersentia, Cambridge – Antwerp – Portland, 2013. 
75  The concept of constitutional identity appears in a different approach in the Anglo-Saxon legal systems 
and in the European integration. In Anglo-Saxon approaches, constitutional identity is understood as the 
interpretation of legal institutions in conformity with the constitution.
76  drinóczi, p. 13.
77  Ibid.
78  Cf.: László, BluTMan: Szürkületi zóna – Az Alaptörvény és az uniós jog viszonya. [Twilight Zone – 
Relationship between the Fundamental Law and EU law]. In: Közjogi Szemle, 2017/1, pp. 1-14.
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respected by all other organs (national and European).79 The case was relevant to the 
awarding of refugee status, and the HCC held that the Hungarian State is not constitu-
tionally obliged to award such status to all applicants.80 Based on the petition submitted 
by the Government, the HCC had to answer three questions, for which it had to interpret 
Articles R) (1), E), 24 (1) and XIV (4) of the FL.81 
Based on the petition, the particular constitutional problem addressed in the case was the 
relation between the FL and the legal order of the European Union, more specifically the 
HCC’s monopoly of interpreting the FL. The background of the case was the formal no-
tice sent by the European Commission regarding the compliance with EU law of the Act 
VI of 2018 on amending certain Acts relating to measures to combat illegal immigration 
and the Seventh Amendment82 of the FL. According to the Commission’s interpretation, 
the amended Article XIV of the FL on asylum violated certain Articles of the Directive 
2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as benefi-
ciaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible 
for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted. According to the 
petitioner, in the context of this interpretation of the FL, a particular constitutional issue 
has been raised regarding the relationship between the interpretation of the FL by an or-
gan of the EU and the authentic interpretation provided by the HCC.83
With regard to the above, the petitioner asked the following questions:84
(i)  Can it be concluded from Article R (1) of the FL that, as the basis of Hungary’s 
legal system, the FL is at the same time the source of legitimacy for all sources 
of law – including the law of the European Union under Article E) of the FL?85 
(First Question)
(ii)  Does it follow from Article 24 (1) of the FL that the HCC’s (authentic – erga 
omnes) interpretation of the constitution may not be derogated by any interpre-
tation provided by other organs? (Second Question)
(iii)  In case of an affirmative answer to the second question, how does the HCC 
provide a genuine interpretation of the second sentence of Article XIV (4) of 
the FL with regard to the right to asylum, by taking into account the Seventh 
Amendment? (Third Question)
79  The English version of the decision is available in the following link: https://hunconcourt.hu/uploads/
sites/3/2019/03/2_2019_en_final.pdf 
80  Justices Egon Dienes-Oehm, István Stumpf, Mária Szívós and András Zs. Varga attached a concurring 
reasoning, while Justices Ágnes Czine, Imre Juhász, Béla Pokol and László Salamon attached dissenting opin-
ions to the Decision.
81  Cf. Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [7]
82  The Seventh Amendment of the FL was adopted on 20 June 2018. See in details: Márton, Sulyok – 
Norbert, TriBl: Chronicle on Hungarian Constitutional Law 2018. In: European Review of Public Law, 2018/4, 
pp. 1225-1257.
83  Cf. Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [2]
84  The arguments and detailed reasons given by the petitioner are set out in points [4] – [6] of the decision.
85  About the position of EU law in the case law of the HCC between 2012 and the current examined decision 
see: Márton, Sulyok – Lilla Nóra, kiSS: In Unchartered Waters? The Place and Position of EU Law and the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Hungary. In: Hungarian 
Yearbook of International Law and European Law. 2019/1, pp. 395-417, 397-402.
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4.1. Answers to the First Question
In answering the first question, the HCC pointed out that according to Article R) (1) of the 
FL, the FL shall be the foundation of the legal system of Hungary and Article E) thereof 
contains the constitutional basis upon which Hungary participates, as a Member State, in 
the EU and which also serves as a constant basis for the enforcement of the Union’s law 
as internal law, as well as for the direct applicability.86 In its decision, the HCC recalled 
that Article E) (1) of the FL specifies the participation in the development of European 
unity as an aim of the State. The HCC noted with reference to the so called “Lisbon deci-
sion”87 (cf. above), that this participation is not self-serving as it should serve the purpose 
of expanding human rights, prosperity and security.88 The HCC pointed out that Hungary 
participates in the EU as a Member State in the interest of developing European unity, 
for the purpose of expanding the freedom, prosperity and security of European nations.89 
(The rules contained in Article E) and the interpretation of the HCC therefore are consist-
ent with the terminology of ‘Integrationsprogramm’ used in German constitutional law, 
as presented above.90)
This decision of the HCC highlighted that EU law as internal law does not fit into the 
hierarchy of the domestic sources of law specified by the FL under Article T): it is a set of 
laws to be applied mandatorily on the basis of the constitutional order incorporated in the 
FL and the HCC has no competence to annul EU law.91 (The HCC may only apply such 
legal consequence under Article 24 of the FL to the legal regulations listed in Article T) 
(2), while EU law provides for generally binding rules of conduct on the basis of Article 
E) (3).)92 According to the HCC, therefore, the Court’s lack of competence to annul EU 
law results from the fact that Union law is not part of the system of the sources of law 
according to Article T) and there is a separate constitutional provision that makes Union 
law, as a mandatorily applicable law, part of the legal system.93
The HCC pointed out that the transfer of competences on the basis of Article E) (2) of 
the FL is based on the Founding Treaties as international treaties signed by the Member 
States, ratification of which requires a majority required for the adoption of a constitution 
under Article E) (4).94 In the opinion of the HCC, the requirement of a majority for the 
adoption of a constitution specified in Article E) (4) results in the obligation of a coop-
erative interpretation of the law and the Union law shall enjoy a primacy of application 
in contrast with the internal law created by the domestic legislator. The HCC cited the 
jurisprudence of the GFCC stating that “the uniform enforcement of the European law 
in the Member States is of central importance concerning the success of the European 
86  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [14]
87  Decision 143/2010. (VII. 14.) AB
88  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [15]
89  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [15]
90  Cf. degenharT 2019, BVerfG, 2 BvR 859/15, 116.
91  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [20]
92  Cf. Ondrej, haMuľák – Márton, Sulyok – Lilla Nóra, kiSS: Measuring the ’EU’-Clidean Distance Between 
EU Law and the Hungarian Constitutional Court – Focusing on the Position of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. In: Czech Yearbook of Public & Private International Law, 2019/10, pp. 130-150, 133-137.
93  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [20]
94  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [21]
172
Union”95 and the legal community of the 28 members could not survive without the uni-
form enforcement and effect of European law in the Member States.96
It should be noted that the HCC stated that restrictions can also be identified in Article E) 
of the FL: the joint exercise of competences “shall not limit the inalienable right of Hun-
gary to determine its territorial unity, population, form of government and state struc-
ture”. The wording “some of its” competences originating from the FL as referred to in 
Article E) (2) may mean, in the view of the HCC, that concrete competences and the joint 
exercise of competences may take place “to the extent necessary”. The HCC recalled that 
the Founding Treaties at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon were al-
ready examined and it was stated that the procedures of the treaty guarantee that “the Par-
liament shall play a proactive role in controlling the “extent necessary” for exercising 
the rights and performing the obligations originating from the founding treaties”. 97 The 
subsidiarity check and the proportionality test – continued the HCC – offer preliminary 
control, while with regard to adopted acts of legislation there is the annulment procedure 
which may be initiated at the CJEU.98
The HCC stated, in accordance with the “principle of maintained sovereignty”99, that EU 
membership shall mean the joint exercise of competences in an international community 
rather than a surrender of sovereignty.100 Moreover, in the decision, the HCC explained 
that the joint exercise of competences is allowed by the FL through the constitutional 
self-restraint of Hungary’s sovereignty. As a consequence, the limitations set by the FL 
shall also be respected in the case of the jointly exercised competences, in particular the 
protection of fundamental rights, which is “the primary obligation of the State” under 
Article I (1) of the FL as well as the inalienable elements of sovereignty in accordance 
with the last sentence of Article E) (2).101 The reasoning of the HCC is essentially in line 
with the PSPP decision of 5 May 2020, in which the GFCC stated that the German people, 
by virtue of their sovereignty, have the right to democratic self-determination, to enforce 
the principle of democracy, which is a fundamental constitutional factor that cannot be 
jeopardized by even the integration process (cf. above). 
It should be noted that the direct context of the PSPP decision is ultra vires review of the 
EU legal acts, which did not arise before the HCC, so the parallel presented between the 
two decisions should only be assessed in the light of the underlying facts. Both decisions 
interpreted Member States’ obligations under EU law in the light of the basic idea of inte-
gration/integrational process. However, a specific act that did not arise from the Founding 
Treaties meant the genesis of the constitutional problem in the PSPP decision, while the 
HCC interpreted the exact articles of the FL in the context of the EU law in its decision.
95  Cf. BVerfGE 73, 339, 368
96  Cf. BVerfGE – 2 Bvr 2735/14, 37
97  Decision 143/2010 (VII. 14.) AB, 708-709.
98  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [22]
99  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [60]. The English version of the decision is available online: here: https://
hunconcourt.hu/uploads/sites/3/2017/11/en_22_2016.pdf
100  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [23]
101  Cf. Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [97]
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In essence, the HCC, similar to the PSPP decision, stated in Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB 
that in the view of the CJEU the Union law is defined as an independent and autonomous 
legal order.102 However – continues the HCC – the EU is a legal community with the 
power – in the scope and the framework specified in the Founding Treaties and by the 
Member States – of independent legislation, concluding international treaties in its own 
name, and the core basis of this community are the international treaties concluded by the 
Member States.103 
Finally, answering the first question of the petitioner, the HCC stated that the Member 
States are the masters of treaties and their acts on the national enforcement of treaties and 
ultimately the frameworks set by the Member States’ constitutions shall determine the 
extent of primacy enjoyed by Union law in the given Member State over the State’s own 
law and, on the basis of Article R) (1) of the FL, the foundation of the applicability of 
Union law in Hungary is Article E).104
At this point, Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB can once again be paralleled with the PSPP de-
cision. One of the basic arguments of the PSPP decision is the concept of Integrationsver-
antwortung developed in German constitutional law, which can be interpreted as the form 
of a special constitutional responsibility of the German constitutional institutions for the 
integration process (Integrationsprogramm).105 The responsibility of the constitutional or-
gans for the integration process is based on Article 23 (1) of the GG, i.e. their integration 
clause. According to the settled case law of the GFCC, German constitutional institutions, 
within their responsibility for the integration process, are obliged to take appropriate steps 
to implement and protect it (i.e. the integration).106 However, the GFCC emphasized that 
the Integrationsverantwortung is not a unilateral instrument which obliges constitutional 
institutions to adopt decisions of the EU institutions in an unlimited manner. On the con-
trary: it can be interpreted as an implementation of the idea of integration enshrined in the 
TFEU and as such its masters are the Member States107. Consequently, it is the responsi-
bility of the German constitutional institutions to comply with and enforce the provisions 
of the EU organs in so far as they are in line with the spirit of the Integrationsprogramm 
in accordance with the Treaties. However, if the acts of the EU institutions run counter to 
the “idea of integration”, the responsibility of the German constitutional institutions for 
EU integration requires them to take action against ultra vires acts, but at least to seek to 
mitigate their harmful effects.108
In essence, therefore, the starting point and conclusion of the two decisions is the same, 
but while the HCC made findings of principle, the GFCC had to take a position in a spe-
cific case with an important integrational dimension.
102  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [24]
103  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [32]
104  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [24]
105  Cf. kellerMann 2009/1, pp. 1-6.
106  2 BvR 859/15, 116.
107  2 BvR 859/15, 53., 89., 105-109.
108  2 BvR 859/15, 89, 105-106, 107, 109, 116., 231. 
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4.2. Answers to the Second Question
In answering the second question, the HCC had to look at whether it follows from Article 
24 (1) of the FL that the HCC’s interpretation of the FL shall not be derogated by any 
interpretation provided by another (international) organ.109 (A similar issue was referred 
to the CJEU by the Romanian Supreme Court of Cassation in case C-357/19, in which 
the Supreme Court asked, inter alia, whether the primacy of EU law must be interpreted 
lowing the national court to disapply a decision of the constitutional court, handed down 
in a case concerning a constitutional dispute, binding under national law.110)
Answering the question in the reasoning, the HCC recalled Hungary’s obligations under-
taken in international treaties, those arising from EU membership, and also the generally 
acknowledged rules of international law, and the basic principles and values reflected in 
them.111 The HCC cited one of its former decisions on the European arrest warrant and 
the act on which the decision is based and according to which: “the law of the European 
Union is not a set of rules enforced unconditionally and independently from the Member 
States” decision, as the basis of the validity of Union law is the decision based on free 
determination in line with the national constitution of the Member State on the intention 
to join the European Union and to ratify the amendment of the founding treaties. Howev-
er, if a State has made a decision on accession or on ratification, it has also undertaken 
to adopt all general and individual measures in accordance with Article 10, currently 
in force, of the Treaty establishing the European Community for the performance of the 
obligations resulting from the founding treaties”.112 However, the HCC’s interpretation 
of the FL has an erga omnes character (similarly to all other constitutional courts of the 
Member States) and all organs or institutions shall respect it in their own procedures as 
the authentic meaning of the constitution.113
In addition to the above, the HCC recalled in the decision (with reference to its previous 
jurisprudence114) that the proceeding courts shall take into account each other’s authentic 
interpretations.115 The HCC considered Article E) of FL as a bridge between the FL and 
EU law and stated that “the creation of European unity”, the integration, sets objectives 
not only for the political bodies but also for the courts and the HCC itself, defining the 
harmony and the coherence of legal systems as constitutional objectives that follow from 
“European unity”. 
Achieving the above – continues the HCC –, the laws and the FL should be interpreted in 
a manner to make the content of the norm comply with the law of the EU. The view of the 
HCC was based on the presumption that both the Union law and the national legal system 
109  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [25]
110  Request for a preliminary ruling from the Înalta Curte de Casație și Justiție (Romania) lodged on 6 May 
2019. Available online:  http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=217084&pageIndex-
=0&doclang=en&mode=req&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=5642265 
111  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [26]
112  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [30]
113  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [35]
114  Decision 22/2016. (XII. 5.) AB [33], [63]
115  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [36]
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based on the FL aimed to carry out the objectives specified in Article E) (1) of FL. 116 In 
essence, the starting point of the HCC corresponds again to what was written in the sub-
sequent PSPP decision, in which it is stated that failure to respect Article 19 (1) TEU vio-
lates the minimum requirement of democratic legitimacy for EU acts117 and constitutional 
identity.118 Consequently, if the CJEU is required to respect the constitutional identity of 
the Member States, which arise from the constitution, it must necessarily interpret the 
constitution of the Member State. Vice versa, when the GFCC found that the CJEU had 
decided ultra vires, it necessarily carried out an interpretation of the TEU. Based on the 
reasoning above, in its answer to the petitioner’s second question the HCC stated that ac-
cording to Article 24 (1) of the FL the HCC is the authentic interpreter of the FL, and its 
interpretation shall not be derogated by any interpretation provided by other organs and 
shall be respected by everyone. It was also stated that despite the above, in the course of 
interpreting the FL, the HCC shall take into account the obligations binding on Hungary 
on the basis of its membership in the EU and under international treaties.119
4.3. Answer to the Third Question
Finally, in the third question, the petitioner requested an interpretation of Article XIV (4) 
of the FL from the HCC. According to the petitioner, the exact meaning of this phrase 
(“shall not be entitled”) of the Article XIV (4) could mean that a non-Hungarian national 
shall not be able to receive asylum if he or she arrived to the territory of Hungary through 
any country where he or she was not persecuted or directly threatened with persecution, 
but on the other hand it could also be interpreted in a way that although the affected appli-
cant does not enjoy a fundamental right to get asylum and therefore the Hungarian State is 
not obliged to grant it, the National Assembly may provide for substantive and procedural 
rules on granting asylum to such persons as well.120 
In answering the question, the HCC examined the context and content in which the phras-
es “not entitled” and “have no right” have been used by other provisions of the FL and 
interpreted the provision of the FL by way of analogy.121 Based on these, the HCC found 
that the wording “not entitled to” used in the second sentence of Article XIV (4) means 
that the right to asylum shall not be regarded as a fundamental individual subjective right 
in the case of a non-Hungarian citizen who arrived to the territory of Hungary through a 
country where he or she was not subject to persecution or the imminent danger of perse-
cution.122 However, the HCC established that such persons do have a claim (protected as 
a fundamental right – right to petition) to have their application decided by the competent 
authority on the basis of Article XIV (5) of the FL. Due to this claim protected as a fun-
damental right, it is the duty of the National Assembly to lay down the fundamental rules 
on granting asylum in a cardinal Act.123
116  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [36]
117  2 BvR 859/15, 2, 154., 157-158.
118  2 BvR 859/15, 1., 33-42.
119  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [37]
120  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [38]
121  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [42]
122  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [43]
123  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [43]
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The HCC pointed out, however, that based on the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, “no Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened 
on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion”, which means that paying full respect to the principle of non-refoule-
ment is one of the minimum obligations explicitly undertaken by Hungary.124 Based on 
the above, the HCC stated in principle that “with account to the international undertak-
ings applicable to Hungary, the last sentence of Article XIV (4) of the Fundamental Law 
is actually setting out in the Fundamental Law the fact that in Article XIV (3) Hungary 
provides constitutional protection for the principle of non-refoulement, however, it refers 
to regulating in its national law at the level of an Act of Parliament, rather than in the 
Fundamental Law, to state what rules are applicable to those refugees who are not sub-
ject to the principle of non-refoulement.”125
To sum up, the HCC noted that during the decision-making process, the principle of con-
stitutional dialogue was taken into account and the decision was made with respect to the 
accomplishment of European unity, which originates in Article E) (1) of the FL.126 The 
HCC noted as well, that it interpreted the second sentence of Article XIV (4) on the one 
hand for the purpose of reaching a conclusion, which is in line with the overall spirit of 
the FL and on the other hand to take into account compatibility with the relevant provi-
sions of the Directive interpreted in the light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, in the 
spirit of contributing to the development of European unity.127
It can be seen based on the above, that the HCC was presented with a legal problem 
that challenged all the national constitutional courts within the European integration. The 
HCC ruled on this problem using the possibilities available to it, but within the limits of 
its powers and competences. On the one hand, the decision is anchored by the FL and – 
on the other hand, simultaneously – the consequences of the decision must not lead to a 
violation of an obligation arising international commitments under the FL. Concerning 
the third question, the HCC has identified the obligations arising from international trea-
ties and the FL and concluded that the right to decide within this scope belongs to the 
National Assembly. 
5 . Summary
Although harsh criticism of both the PSPP decision and the relevant practice of the Hun-
garian Constitutional Court is trending, one thing needs to be stated: both bodies took 
their decisions in the context of their assumed constitutional responsibility for European 
integration, in the light of the founding treaties and the process of integration. 
The importance of these decisions is significant one by one, but more important is an-
other, emerging trend that seems positive: one can point to the existence of a form of 
124  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [45]
125  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [47]
126  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [48]
127  Decision 2/2019. (III. 5.) AB [48]
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responsibility of the Member States’ constitutional courts for the European integration 
process. The undefined nature of the relationship between EU law and national constitu-
tions (resulting from the supranational nature of the integration) forced European Con-
stitutional Courts into a role that could also be seen as a functional change in terms of 
the entirety of the European constitutional judiciary. The role of European constitutional 
justice seems to be complemented by a kind of ‘integrational’ function: the European 
Constitutional Courts must no longer only defend their own national constitutions but 
must do so while taking into account the proper advancement of the integration process. 
They must do so in a way that respects the right of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union to an authentic interpretation of the Treaties; however, taking into account that the 
CJEU, as an institution of the European Union, is not entitled to take decisions ultra vires, 
against the framework set by the Treaties. 
Just as we distinguish between substantive law and constitutional law rules in national 
law, we can distinguish by analogy between the “ordinary provisions” of the European 
legal order and the fundamental provisions arising from supranationalism. The primacy 
of EU law is beyond dispute, which is also safeguarded by the CJEU. However, the CJEU 
and the EU institutions are not federal bodies above the Member States, but they are much 
more like the Member States themselves, subordinated to the consensual frames of the 
Founding Treaties in the integration process. European Constitutional Courts, collective-
ly, can build a bridge that can establish a balance between national legal systems and the 
supranational structures of the European Union. Based on all this, the European system 
of constitutional justice seems to play a key role in this constitutional matrix of responsi-
bility for the integration process.



